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Preface 
 
This dissertation consists of an introductory chapter, followed by four papers that approach the 
topic of internationalization of small economies and the multinational firm from different angles. 
The concluding chapter deals with what happened in Iceland after the crisis that started in 
October 2008 with the collapse of the Icelandic financial system and how the very fast 
internationalization of Icelandic firms was possible, but only as further issues that need to be 
researched. Each of the papers can be read individually as well as in the larger context of this 
dissertation. 
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1. Introduction to the thesis 
 
The study of the economics of international business began in the US in the late 1950s and the 
1960s. The basic question was why do major companies engage in production in foreign 
countries rather than supply these markets through exports? With time, international business 
became the common mode of conducting business in the world. One major implication of this 
development is the change in the focus of international economics from the country to the firm. 
This change makes it possible for small countries to become major players in world business, 
much beyond their relative economic size. This is not entirely new. Small countries like the 
Netherlands and Switzerland were active in world business many years before scholars were 
concerned about international business, but this phenomenon became much more common in the 
last quarter of the twentieth century and at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Ireland, 
Israel, Finland, Estonia and Slovenia are some examples of newcomers to the scene of 
international business. All of the newcomers share one important feature: the growth of the 
corporate sector did not follow the pattern of supplying the local market, exporting and then 
international business activities, a pattern followed by companies like Ford and many other large 
country-based multinational enterprises, but the global activity was almost totally divorced from 
the local market. Nokia in Finland and Teva in Israel are two well-known mega examples, but 
there are many others. 
Iceland is a very extreme case of this process. With a little more than 300,000 people, the local 
market in Iceland hardly exists. Moreover, unlike small countries like the Netherlands and 
Sweden, Iceland has no history of international trade. Yet, in a very short time, Icelandic firms 
and financial institutions became active and meaningful players in the global market. This short 
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period of very rapid global growth ended in October 2008 with a severe financial and 
economiccrisis. 
  Several research questions are addressed to get the answer to the overall question of the thesis.  
The sub research questions addressed in this dissertation are: What were the main reasons for the 
rapid growth of the global business activities in Iceland? Why did they collapse in October 
2008? Is it possible or likely for the global sector of Iceland to recover from the crisis of 2008? 
This multifaceted issue is discussed by examining the data on the rise and fall of the global 
activities of Icelandic companies and banks in the context of similar research that was performed 
pertaining to other small counties.  
Global business proves itself to be an important driver of economic growth in small 
countries. As the recent history of Iceland shows, it is also extremely risky. An important aspect 
of this dissertation is to discuss the way in which the competitive advantages of Icelandic 
companies and financial institutions can be maintained without risking a crisis. The dissertation 
is comprised of four papers that, put together, provide a complete analysis of the following 
questions:  
1. How did Icelandic companies become global players in the period 2004–2007 
2. What was the main motivation behind their foreign direct investments?   
3. Are the global expansion strategies for Icelandic firms different from those of Irish or 
Israeli firms?  
4. Did Icelandic managers have some special managerial capabilities to manage such rapid 
growth?  
5. Did they have integrative capacity in their headquarters? 
6. What was the role of the Icelandic banks and the global financial community in 
facilitating this growth?  And  
7. What were the main reasons for the crisis and is there a way to resurrect the global 
activities of Icelandic companies?   
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Theoretical approaches  
Benito et al. (2002) postulate that micro–macro interaction is pronounced in the case of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) from small open economies (SMOPECs), since they outgrow 
their home base more easily, and small countries are more dependent on their large companies. 
The literature has illustrated that small open economies tend to be more internationalized, with a 
relatively large share of the value-added activity being conducted with the explicit purpose of 
serving overseas markets. Firms from these countries tend to be competitive in a few niche 
sectors, as small countries tend to have limited resources and prefer to engage in activities in a 
few targeted sectors, rather than spreading these resources thinly across several industries 
(Benito et al., 2002). The current international business literature extensively covers the firm-
level determinants of foreign direct investments (FDI) and empirical research in the field is 
commonly based on Dunning’s eclectic paradigm, ownership, location and internalisation 
advantages-based framework (OLI) and/or focused on what firms are seeking when investing 
abroad. In the past, though, research on the multinational enterprise has to a large extent focused 
on large, mature corporations originating from the leading and larger OECD countries. 
Moreover, considerable attention has been given to transition economies, the Central European 
economies and China. A very small proportion of previous contributions deal specifically with 
SMOPECs and the motivating factors that drive MNEs originating from small countries to 
undertake outward FDI. On the contrary, the magnitude of research does not reflect the relevance 
of FDI to small economies. In fact, Hogenbirk and Narula (1999) note that the role of MNEs in 
small countries is significant and growing, as generally “the MNE has become pivotal in 
economic growth and development through its overseas production, its intra-firm and inter-firm 
trading activities, and other forms of cross-border economic activity” (Hogenbirk & Narula, 
1999: 23).  Here the focus is on small economies, not their openness. 
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A variety of theoretical perspectives have been used to approach the question of why 
companies engage in foreign direct investment, ranging from international trade theories (see 
e.g. Morgan & Katsikeas, 1997) and market imperfections theory (Caves, 1971; Hymer, 1976; 
Kindleberger, 1969) to internalization theory (Buckley & Casson, 1976; 1985; Rugman, 1981) 
and eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1980; 1988; 2000). For a quick review, the basic 
macroeconomic explanation of international investments is the classical theory of international 
trade (Mundell, 1957), which emphasizes “the factor endowments of an economy and implies 
that a firm’s international investments follow the comparative advantages of different locations” 
(Arvanitis & Hollenstein, 2006: 5). In other words, firms are claimed to engage in international 
production because of the resources available in foreign locations that are not available at home. 
Market imperfections theory then recasts FDI in microanalytical terms (Nicholas & Maitland, 
2002) and shares the basics of new trade theory (Ethier, 1986; Helpman, 1984) in its view that 
firms capitalize on specific capabilities that can be exploited abroad independently of the 
economic attractiveness of the foreign location, with the advantage that these particular 
capabilities are not shared by competitors in the foreign country. The market imperfections 
theory then further explains how advantages come into being by challenging the model of perfect 
competition, and stating that the reality of imperfect competition enables firms to achieve 
different types and degrees of competitive advantages (see Porter, 1985). In other words, market 
imperfections theory explains FDI as a means to exploit firm-specific capabilities in new 
markets. On the other hand, it does not explain why FDI is considered the most desirable method 
to take advantage of those. Internalization theory, however, addresses this issue. Internalization 
theory is rooted in transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975; 1985) and predicts that 
because of market imperfections firms may face high transaction costs in foreign intermediate 
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markets. This brings firms to develop their own internal markets, transferring assets within the 
organization through hierarchies instead of via the market whenever transactions can be made at 
a lower cost that way. Hence, firms internalize their international activities using FDI rather than 
alternative forms of foreign market entry, such as exporting or contractual agreements, in order 
to minimize cost and/or increase efficiency.  
Definition of a small economy 
When inspecting literature and reports concerning small economies (see e.g. Hogenbirk & 
Narula, 1999; Merrett, 2002; Thorhallsson, 2000; Walsh, 1988), it is clear that definitions of the 
concept of a small economy vary between authors and context. Indeed, it is widely agreed that no 
single definition of a small economy exists and that there are many criteria on which one can 
classify the size of a country. Within the international business literature, the most commonly 
used criteria for classifying the size of markets and, hence, economies are: a) population and b) 
different measures of gross domestic product (GDP) – absolute size of GDP, GDP per capita and 
growth of GDP (see e.g. Bora, 2002; Merrett, 2002; Thomas & Grosse, 2001; Veugelers, 1991; 
World Bank Group, n.d.). Whereas measures such as GDP and territory size have been found to 
be highly correlated with population, population can be concluded to be a good indicator of size 
and will be used as a benchmark for the purpose of this particular paper (World Bank Group, 
n.d.). Economies with an upper limit of 10 million people may therefore be referred to as small 
economies. Taking into consideration only sovereign developed economies, Iceland is, according 
to this definition, a small economy along with the countries presented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Developed and sovereign economies with an upper limit of 10 million people 
 
Different population thresholds have been used in the past, for example, an upper limit of 1.5 
million people has been used when discussing developing countries (World Bank Group, n.d.). 
Using the upper limit of 10 million people, however, conforms for example to Simon Kuznets’s 
(1960) definition of a small country. It should be noted that the particular population threshold 
has no particular significance. Rather, it is used as an indicator since no single definition is likely 
to be fully satisfactory. Indeed, according to information from the World Bank Group (n.d.) 
website, “there is a continuum, with states larger than whatever threshold is chosen sharing some 
or all of the characteristics of smaller countries”.   
When reviewing the literature on SMOPECs and FDIs, this is evident as much of the 
literature takes examples of economies with a population of 5–10 million people, for example, 
Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Finland and Sweden. There are also examples of countries with 
a population slightly over 10 million people but with a relatively small GDP, and even a country 
like Australia, which is considered as a small open economy although having around 20 million 
inhabitants as the GDP generated is also relatively low when compared with the larger 
economies, like France, Germany, the UK and the US.   
A relatively large population threshold is chosen here because of the economic 
development stage of Iceland. If one were to compare Iceland’s economy with other countries of 
EU countries 
Other 
European 
countries
Non- European 
countries 
Austria 8,210,281 Luxembourg 491,775 Andorra 83,888 New Zealand 4,213,418
Cyprus 796,74 Latvia 2,231,503 Iceland 306,694 Bermuda 67,837
Denmark 5,500,510 Lithuania 3,555,179 Lichenstein 34,761 Israel 7,233,701
Estonia 1,299,371 Malta 405,165 Monaco 32,965
Finland 5,250,275 Slovakia 5,463,046 Norway 4,660,539
Hungary 9,905,596 Slovenia 2,005,692 San Marino 30,324
Ireland 4,203,200 Sweden 9,059,651 Switzerland 7,604,467
Source: The 2009 World Factbook (July 2009 est.)
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a more similar size in terms of population, most of the counterparts would be developing 
countries generating a significantly smaller GDP per capita than Iceland in the period under 
study (see World Bank Group, n.d.).  
Recent studies have found evidence against the idea that small countries suffer from an 
inability to exploit increasing returns to scale and moreover that small states have a higher GDP 
per capita than other states, when controlling for location (Easterly & Kraay, 2000), small 
economies do have greater volatility of annual economic growth rates, partly because they are 
more vulnerable to trade shocks, which in turn is caused by their greater openness (Easterly & 
Kraay, 2000).  
The small economy under study 
We have defined a small economy and, as stated above, the focus of this thesis is on one of the 
smallest sovereign economies in the world, Iceland, the country that has led the World 
Investment Report in the last few years in outward foreign direct investments and the first 
country to be hit seriously by the financial crisis that is shaking the world today. Globalization is 
not a new concept to the Icelandic nation. Over 1,000 years ago, the country was actively 
involved in international trade when the “Vikings” sailed across the oceans. Despite their 
barbaric reputation, they were no more than merchants who took advantage of their more 
advanced sailing skills at the time. 
If we start by looking back only three years, we can see that Icelandic businesses have 
experienced an extraordinary rate of international growth and expansion. This phenomenon has 
caught the attention of economists, analysts, the media and even the general public around the 
world. Such expansion, motivated by domestic and international factors, is a natural 
development as companies outgrow the local market and turn their attention to finding new 
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markets abroad (Óladóttir, 2009). Icelandic organizations now own or hold a majority stake in 
many long-established businesses, primarily in Britain and the Scandinavian countries. This 
aggressive expansion of Icelandic businesses into Europe has resulted in extensive media 
coverage, and considerable coverage by financial analysts and rating agencies. Volatility and 
economic imbalances have given rise to concerns about the financial stability of Iceland’s 
economy and financial system during 2006.  
Due to these imbalances and the risk posed by the looming correction process, Fitch Ratings put 
Iceland’s sovereign credit rating on a negative outlook in February 2008. In the following weeks, 
negative discussion escalated when several pessimistic reports were released by bank analysts 
and rating agencies. Those concerns were understandable at that time to a certain degree: it is a 
tiny country, with a little more than 300,000 people living on a rock in the Atlantic Ocean and, 
following the dramatic transformation of Iceland’s economy over a relatively short period of 
time, key indicators appeared abnormal and even alarming.  
Among these was a double-digit current account deficit, phenomenal growth in corporate debt 
and considerable volatility in the currency. The sudden presence of Icelandic companies in the 
global economy demands an explanation of the factors leading to such rapid expansion. If this 
information is not adequately provided to key stakeholders, decisions may be made based on the 
wrong assumptions.  
Hence, the biggest risk facing the Icelandic economy in 2006 was that misguided and 
often negative media coverage would lead to hostility toward Icelandic firms, causing further 
instability in Iceland’s economy and financial system. But was it really misguided and negative 
media coverage or even hostility or did others see the situation that is now facing the world 
before the people that live in this small and maybe too open economy did?   
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Looking further at Iceland’s size in context with other small developed economies shows 
that, in terms of population, Iceland is most closely comparable with the microstate Malta with 
approximately 405,000 inhabitants.1 Still, Iceland is not considered a microstate, most likely 
because of its large land area. Another comparison could be Luxembourg, which close to 
500,000 people inhabit. Therefore, most of the countries that fall within the given definition of a 
small economy and are dealt with as small open economies in the current literature differ 
markedly in size relative to Iceland when referring to population. Gross domestic product (GDP) 
is the standard measure of the value of the goods and services produced by a country during a 
period. Each country calculates GDP in its own currency and, in order to compare countries, 
these estimates have to be converted into a common currency. Often, the conversion is made 
using exchange rates, but these give a misleading comparison of the real volumes of goods and 
services in the GDP (OECD, 2007). Then, examining size in terms of GDP, the absolute GDP of 
Iceland is rather low in this comparison and ranked number 138 of 227 countries when 
comparing GDP worldwide in 2006, generating a GDP of US$10.9 billion (OECD, 2007). On 
the other hand, when looking at the GDP per capita, Iceland sat in thirteenth place in the same 
year with approximately US$36,000 (OECD, 2007).  
Despite its smallness, Iceland now “has all the characteristics of a modern welfare state” 
(Central Bank of Iceland, 2007: 19) and is a prosperous modern economy with two-thirds of the 
labour force employed in services. Less than a century ago, however, Iceland counted as one of 
the poorest economies in Europe, with almost two-thirds of the labour force employed in 
agriculture. The Icelandic economy has therefore gone through very rapid changes in the past 
decades. The country modernized quickly in the second half of the twentieth century and rapid 
                                                 
1 Microstates are very small sovereign states, usually having both a very small population and a small land area. Other microstates are: Andorra, 
Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican City. 
 
16 
 
economic progress was achieved as a result of market liberalization, fiscal consolidation, 
privatization and other structural reforms implemented in the late 1980s and 1990s. However, it 
was not until the middle of the 1990s that economic growth started to gain momentum. The 
liberalization process continued in the second half of the 1990s, involving the restructuring of the 
Icelandic financial markets and financial institutions as well as changing the exchange rate 
policy to become more flexible (Central Bank of Iceland, 2007). In 1994, Iceland became a 
member of the European Economic Area (EEA), which integrated the country into the single 
European market of the European Union (EU). During the past ten years, the Icelandic economy 
has grown faster than ever before, with one of the most dramatic changes of the economic 
structure being the globalization of the Icelandic business environment (Portes & Baldursson, 
2007; Tómasdóttir et al., 2007). The policy changes in the past decades have enhanced access to 
foreign markets, liberated the flow of labour, goods and capital and thus turned Iceland into an 
open market economy.  
 
Methodology of the thesis 
Iceland is like a black hole in the study of FDI in the Nordic countries (Hellgren and Schriber, 
2003). That is why an exploratory approach was choosen on the internationalization of Icelandic 
firms investing abroad. Different methods were used to collect data to gain as broad an overview 
of the internationalization process as possible. Primary data and secondary data were used to see 
how Icelandic firms had invested abroad. Published data, companies’ web pages, databases, 
interviews, emails, conversations with managers and surveys were used to obtain a broad picture 
of outward foreign direct investments of Icelandic firms. These mixed methods in data collection 
17 
 
were used because data about FDI from Iceland were not available and no research had been 
conducted previously that could be used. 
The present study focuses on the internationalization and on the motives behind outward 
FDI undertaken by firms from small economies, with special emphasis on Icelandic firms. A 
combined research method, meaning both qualitative and quantitative research methods, is used 
in this thesis to obtain the best data, information and knowledge possible regarding the subject 
under study. 
As has been presented before, the thesis is built on four individual papers, plus an 
introductory chapter and a concluding chapter where further research is suggested. Each paper 
includes its own methodology chapter. Here, a broad overview of the methodology chosen is 
presented. The thesis starts with a broad overview of the internationalization of firms from a 
small economy, Icelandic firms. Then, the motivation behind those OFDIs is studied. Iceland is 
then compared with two other small economies, Ireland and Israel, and finally a paper that 
studies the relationship between headquarters and their subsidiaries abroad is presented. 
Choice of research methods 
In this thesis, it was found necessary to use different kinds of research methods to approach 
different angles of the internationalization of firms from small economies, both to gain a broad 
overview and also to gain more in-depth information. Both exploratory research and descriptive 
research methods are used where quantitative and qualitative methods are combined. 
Out of several approaches to case-based empirical research identified in related literature 
(Eisenhardt, 1989;Yin, 1993), the choice was made to follow the procedures of comparative case 
analysis as presented by Eisenhardt.  
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To understand the motivation behind foreign direct investments as will be presented below, a 
multiple-case method is preferred over a single-case study because of the inductive approach of 
the research and because general explanations will be sought in cases that cannot be considered 
as rare, critical or revelatory.  
Collected data 
To achieve the objective of triangulation, both primary and secondary data were collected. Semi-
structured interviews were chosen as one of the data collection methods. The answers to the 
questions provided mainly factual data. The interview data were supplemented with written 
background questionnaires, which were confirmed by managers at the companies under study. 
Data were also drawn from company reports and news reports (from the Icelandic stock 
exchange) where possible. Company reports (and other secondary data, e.g. stock exchange 
news) were the main source for triangulation, as these provided some information about the 
objectives and strategies of the companies in the past years. 
As stated above, no data were available about the OFDI of Icelandic firms and no 
research had been conducted about OFDI from Iceland. It was thus very important to gain an 
overview to try to see the broad picture about how Icelandic managers saw the future of the 
OFDI of Icelandic firms and if and how they had invested abroad. It was neccesary to see how 
many Icelandic firms had invested abroad, if they planned to invest abroad, how they had done it 
and how they had financed it. That is why a cooperation with Gallup in Iceland was chosen for a 
telephone survey among Icelandic managers. The survey was carried out by telephone from 13 
January until 27 February 2006. A random sample was used. The original sample consisted of 
1000 companies in Iceland. Of these, 32 companies had quit their operation and 165 companies 
in the sample had fewer than 10 employees. That gave a final sample of 803 companies. The 
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managers of 191 companies refused to answer and Gallup could not reach the managers of 115 
companies. Managers of 497 companies participated in the survey, which is a 61.9% response 
rate. The classification of the firms was service companies and manufacturing firms. The 
minimum number of employees was 10. 
The data that were collected with the telephone survey2 raised more questions than they 
answered. Why did 4% of the managers invest abroad in the last 12 months and why were 8% 
planning to invest abroad in the following 12 months?  That led to the conclusion that very few 
Icelandic firms were investing abroad. The data collected were new data on the overseas 
activities of 21 Icelandic companies, which were collected in the period from November 2004 
until July 2006. The underlying companies make up the majority of companies listed on the 
Icelandic Stock Exchange (NASDAQ, OMX), as well as a few others that are not listed but that 
have been investing considerably abroad. At the year end of 2004, those 21 companies 
represented 88.9% of the total outward FDI stock and represented 89.2% of total outward FDI 
flow. Information was gathered from the websites of the relevant companies and from the 
website of the Icelandic Stock Exchange, as well as from databases of Icelandic and foreign 
newspapers. The information collected about each company included: the year of establishment; 
investments undertaken; investment year, country and industry; and, finally, the overall purpose 
of these investments. The factors that motivated those companies to internationalize were also 
investigated. The data about each company were then sent to the CEOs – in most cases – of the 
companies under investigation, who were asked to confirm the information about the 
internationalization of their companies. The CEOs were also asked to provide additional 
information about the financing of their operations abroad. This process resulted in the creation 
                                                 
2 The questions asked can be seen in the Appendix 2 of the thesis. 
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of a unique firm-level database of the leading Icelandic MNCs. Finally, data from the Central 
Bank of Iceland about the outward FDI (flows and stocks) from 1998–2005 were also used. 
To be able to gain insight into the motivation behind the foreign direct investments of 
Icelandic firms, four case studies, representing Icelandic MNCs in different industries, were 
carried out. This approach enables the integration of primary and secondary data, exploring 
managers’ perceptions of motives and underlying influences as well as reading between the lines 
of reports available from the case companies. The twofold research problem under scrutiny is 
seen as an ambiguous and unstructured problem. The answers to the research questions can, for 
example, not all be listed beforehand (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2002) and research is needed to gain 
a better understanding of the different dimensions of the problem (Zikmund, 2000). This 
suggests an exploratory research design (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2002; Zikmund, 2000).  
The data sets collected were broader in scope than those presented in the present study. 
The collected data cover the period 1992–2007. To enrich the database, interviews were carried 
out with the CEOs of the companies or with the corporate communication managers whereever 
information was missing. Those interviews were semi-structured, starting with very open 
questions on the companies’ internationalization processes and the motivations behind each 
investment, but using the conceptual framework and a research-question form to ensure that all 
the important areas were covered. The interviews were recorded and transcribed. In addition, 
annual reports, company presentations, press releases, journal articles, books and book chapters, 
newspaper articles and public statistics were used in case study analyses. Archive work was 
performed in building cases. The selected cases come from different industries. Actavis is a high 
technology manufacturing firm, Bakkavor is a medium technology manufacturing firm, 
Kaupthing Bank is in financial services and Baugur Group in other services. The selected cases 
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were found to enable different dimensions for gaining understanding of the subject. For example, 
based on the literature review, it is known that different motives may characterize initial versus 
sequential FDI. As the characteristics of the firms differ, the four cases might therefore also 
represent different motives for engaging in FDI. Thereby, the four cases chosen have been 
justified. 
Also, an exploratory study was conducted working with published data on three 
economies. In the empirical analysis of the expansion strategies of firms from Iceland, Ireland 
and Israel, we investigate the determinants of investment expansion strategies employing a 
multinomial logistic regression approach where the probability of a firm having a particular 
strategy for investing is modelled as a function of firm-specific and location-specific variables. 
This model is appropriate as it is used to model relationships between a multiple response 
variable and a set of regressors (Greene, 2003; Wooldridge, 2002).  
The maximum likelihood estimates are obtained using Stata 10. It is customary in the 
literature to report the estimates of multinomial regression analysis as relative risk or odds ratios. 
The coefficients are then interpreted as changes in the relative risk of the respective category 
over the base category. While important in understanding the determinants of firm motivations 
behind decisions to invest, relative risk ratios are not directly interpretable in terms of 
incremental impacts on probabilities of respective motives. This is achieved through the 
calculation of marginal effects or elasticities.   
The final paper in the thesis covers how a firm from a small domestic base, with the 
headquarters located in Reykjavík, Iceland, can manage to be an MNC, or the relationship 
between the headquarters and the subsidiaries and if they have the capacity they need integrated. 
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The overall strategy of the Integrative capacity paper is a case study, where the 
headquarters of Marel and its subsidiaries and Actavis and its subsidiaries are the primary focal 
point. Primary data were collected through interviews with 25 people at all levels of the 
organization in Marel and the CEO and the deputy CEO of Actavis and the manager of corporate 
communication at Actavis. Additionally, secondary data issued by Marel and Actavis have been 
used to complement and supplement the gathered data and account for any missing information 
in the interviews. 
Initial primary data were collected through lengthy unstructured interviews with two employees 
of Marel and Actavis. By doing so, information regarding the industries in which the companies 
work and the historical background of the companies and the acquisitions were gained.  
The following interviews at manager level were semi-structured, allowing for the 
comparison of the answers and to gain a more complete look into both a strategic level and a 
more practical level of their activities. The interviews took place in four series. 
The execution of data collection 
At the beginning, as stated above, no data were available about OFDI of Icelandic firms. When 
the Central Bank of Iceland was contacted, the answer was that those data they had were 
confidential and the managers sent information if they felt like it, so they were not reliable 
anyway. That is when the companies’ web pages and the database of the main newspapers in 
Iceland were studied to see what information was available; the companies’ annual reports were 
studied and the stock exchange and conversations with managers in different fields gave ideas 
about companies to study. In the beginning, a database of 28 companies was conducted but 
ended in a database of 21 companies that had invested heavily abroad in the recent years. After 
23 
 
the database about the internationalization had been compiled, the CEOs of the 21 companies 
were contacted to review the information about their company.  
The interviews were carried out in November 2006 and February 2007 in the case 
companies’ headquarters in Reykjavík. Semi-structured questions were asked, based on an 
interview guide that had been developed after surveying previous literature. At the end of the 
interview sessions, the respondents were asked to provide company reports that might prove 
useful, which they did.  
 
Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is built on four individual papers that all reflect on the internationalization from small 
economies and is structured in the following way: after the introductory chapter comes an 
empirical paper about the internationalization of Icelandic firms. Iceland has been like a black 
hole in the study of FDI from the Nordic countries: there has been a gap in the literature about 
FDIs from Iceland. This paper is the first empirical study to address the outward foreign direct 
investment of Icelandic firms. The purpose is to demonstrate how Icelandic companies have 
invested abroad through foreign direct investments. The overall objective of this paper is to 
describe the key characteristics of Icelandic multinational corporations (MNCs) and to gain a 
deeper understanding of the internationalization processes of firms from a small domestic base.   
Most Icelandic outward FDI has been directed at European countries, with the UK and Denmark 
in the front seats for host countries. In recent years, though, investments have increasingly been 
made in more distant countries, for example in North America and Asia. Acquisitions have 
accounted for most of the outward FDI from Iceland (Óladóttir, 2009). This is in line with world 
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trends as, “according to UNCTAD (1997), between 55 percent and 60 percent of FDI flows over 
the period 1985-1995 was accounted for by mergers and acquisitions” (Dunning, 1998: 49).  
Besides, FDI has been the most common means of expanding abroad and the total stock 
of FDI by Icelandic residents grew by over 55% per year on average over the period 1996–2006 
(Central Bank of Iceland, 2007). Consequently, the net international investment position is 
highly negative and increasing (Portes & Baldursson, 2007), meaning that the total stock of 
outward FDI is much higher than the inward FDI stock owned in Iceland by foreigners. As 
already mentioned, Iceland has rapidly climbed to the top of UNCTAD’s outward FDI 
performance index and ranked first in 2004–2006, which further indicates the relative 
importance of Icelandic OFDI against the country’s economic size.3  
Keeping in mind the contrasting elements of the relatively small size of the country in 
terms of population, the short history of FDI activity of Icelandic firms, the recent growth of 
outward FDI stock, the high ranking of GDP per capita and the high level of foreign assets as a 
proportion of GDP leading to a number one position in the outward FDI index in the past few 
years, one cannot help wondering whether the outward FDI engagement of Icelandic firms is in 
some way peculiar; why has the growth of outward FDI flows been as tremendous as is evident, 
and has the size of the country or some other country-specific characteristics influenced the 
evolvement of firms’ FDI activity or is the Icelandic case perhaps not so different from other 
small open economies? Attempting to answer wide-ranging questions like these calls for a 
comprehensive approach, examining a wide range of companies and FDI activities.  
Many of the Icelandic companies have been investing heavily abroad over the last six 
years4. Some have acquired companies that are relatively larger than themselves, at least if one 
                                                 
3 In terms of GDP 
4 Examples of OFDI of Icelandic firms can be seen in table 6 in Appendix of the thesis. 
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studies the increase in the number of employees. The main motive for this increase in foreign 
direct investments is access to a new market. The Icelandic market is simply not large enough for 
companies to be categorized as medium and large companies in the global environment. What 
also supports this is that, as mentioned above, the outflow of FDI from Iceland was very low in 
the last century (Óladóttir, 2009). Following the empirical research on the FDI of Icelandic 
firms, we gain a macro story (in International business (IB) terms) about the motivation behind 
those FDIs. Why did Icelandic managers want to invest abroad? The motivation is studied with 
multiple case studies that were conducted among four Icelandic firms who had invested abroad. 
Empirical data were collected that gave valuable insights into what has motivated outward FDI 
of Icelandic firms and whether the small size of the Icelandic economy has had something to do 
with that. Our analysis reveals several important facts. First, seeking new markets and strategic-
asset seeking are the main motives behind the OFDI of the case companies under study. Second, 
by far the majority of investment projects are carried out in northern Europe. Third, the case 
companies are mainly exploiting their ownership advantages when investing abroad (Óladóttir, 
2009a). 
Firms must have both an ownership (O) advantage and an internalization (I) advantage, 
while the foreign market must offer a locational (L) advantage (Dunning, 1980). Obviously, 
location advantages are relevant in determining where the firm chooses to manufacture its 
products, which leads us to the fourth paper in this thesis, which is a comparison of global 
expansion strategies for Icelandic, Irish and Israeli multinationals. The aim of the paper is to 
analyse the overseas activities of multinational corporations (MNCs) coming from small open 
economies (SMOPECs) and their global expansion strategies behind outward foreign direct 
investments (OFDI). Recent data in the annual World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2007a) 
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show that, in the top 20 of the outward foreign direct investment (FDI) performance index for 
2006, appeared countries like Iceland, Ireland and Israel. Thus, we do see that leading FDI 
performers do not limit themselves to what we traditionally consider as large and developed 
countries such as the US or the UK but include a variety of countries ranging from small 
developed countries with a long-standing history in the international investment scene. At the 
same time, as we already indicated, another group of countries, including Iceland, Israel, Ireland 
and others, emerges as potential key players in the global business environment. The focus 
countries are Ireland, Iceland and Israel. Using a sample of 1089 foreign operations, of which 
187 are Icelandic, 444 are Irish and 458 are Israeli operations, we explore the geographical and 
industrial pattern of their direct investment strategies. Our analysis reveals several important 
facts. Firstly, most of the OFDI is directed to finance, insurance and real estate services for all 
the countries. Secondly, by far the majority of investment projects are carried out in Europe and 
North America, which are almost equal in terms of frequency of investments. Finally, with 
regard to their investment strategies, risk-diversification strategies seem to be the dominant 
expansion strategy choice followed by horizontal integration  expansion strategies (Óladóttir, 
Papanastassiou, Hobdari & Sinani, 2009). 
However, the location is not the only important issue, as Dunning has pointed out. Firm-
specific advantages are also important. As has been stated, ownership advantages take the form 
of firm-specific assets both tangible, e.g. products or technologies, and intangible, e.g. patents or 
brands. Hence, the firm is more than able to offset the incremental transaction costs of 
multinational operation because of the cost or demand benefits conferred by the ownership 
advantage. Multinational firms also need an internalization advantage in the sense that benefits 
accrue to the enterprise by exploiting the ownership advantage from choosing to produce abroad 
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internally, rather than through the market by franchising or licensing the product or process 
internationally. The fifth paper in this thesis focuses on the inter-firm managerial issues in global 
firms, with a focus on MNCs that have their headquarters in Iceland. Here, we touch upon a new 
term in the international business literature: integrative capacity. 
The past decades have been characterized by profound changes and an increased rate of 
globalization. As a result, there have been dramatic shifts in the way businesses are organized 
and how firms compete. These rapid changes in the nature of global competition have caused 
international managers and international management researchers alike to search for new ways to 
frame problems and answer questions about how to manage complex multinational corporations 
most effectively. When a corporation establishes a subsidiary in a foreign country, through 
greenfield or acquisition, its managers must decide how much control they need to maintain over 
the subsidiary. Should the company operate separately or should it be integrated into the 
corporation? The control relationship between headquarters and foreign subsidiaries can be 
either centralized or decentralized. Too much centralization or decentralization can lead to an 
ineffective corporation so there has to be a good balance. A good balance is attained when the 
managers in the headquarters have global vision, core values and cultural principles that are 
shared by all the subsidiary managers. The managers in the headquarters make decisions based 
on an understanding of the cultural and other needs of foreign subsidiary managers. They also 
have to have an understanding of the needs of specific organizational situations; they have to 
have integrative capacity in the corporation. Integrative capacity can be described in the 
following way: the strategic infrastructure of the corporation is seen as a multidimensional 
system that contains strategic resources or capability and organizational infrastructure, which 
might provide a foundation for global expansion and latent linkages within the MNC. When the 
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firm boundaries are fuzzy, a conventional organizational structure is unable to satisfy the internal 
need for ecological evolution within its network. In a situation like this, a strategic infrastructure 
is necessary for the coordination and integration of business units that are geographically 
dispersed, while also maintaining internal differentiation and local responsiveness amongst 
individual subunits. To succeed with the flow of knowledge, capital and products between the 
headquarters and the subunits, the multinational corporation must have integrative capacity 
embedded in the organization (Óladóttir, 2009a). 
The final part of this thesis is a concluding paper.  There, some issues regarding what has 
really been going on in Iceland are pointed out and questions raise about the business model that 
has been used in Iceland and how this aggressive growth was financed.  The paper deals with the 
business model of the boom period: An aggressive growth through FDIs. 
We also mention the cross ownership and we ask if the Central Bank, the government and the 
Financial Supervisory Authority in Iceland were awake during those years when Icelandic 
“Vikings” invested abroad. However, all these issues are relevant and need to be researched in 
detail. 
 
 
  
29 
 
References 
Arvanitis, S. & Hollenstein, H. (2006). Determinants of Swiss Firms’ R&D Activities at Foreign 
Locations. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Swiss Society of Economics and 
Statistics 2006, March 2006.  
 
Benito, G.R.G., Larimo, J., Narula, R. & Pedersen, T. (2002). Multinational enterprises from 
small economies. International Studies of Management & Organization, 32 (1): pp. 57–78.   
 
Bora, B. (2002). The international distribution of multinational production. In Bora, B. (ed.), 
Foreign Direct Investment: Research Issues. London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Buckley, P. & Casson, M. (1976). The Future of the Multinational Enterprise. London: 
McMillan Press. 
 
Buckley, P. & Casson, M. (1985). The Economic Theory of the Multinational Enterprise. 
London: McMillan. 
 
Caves, R. (1971). International corporations: The industrial economics of foreign investment. 
Economica, 38 (149): 1–27.  
 
Central Bank of Iceland (2007). Economy of Iceland 2007. Reykjavík: Central Bank of Iceland. 
 
Dunning, J.H. (1980). Toward an eclectic theory of international production: Some empirical 
tests. Journal of International Business Studies, 11 (1): 9–31.  
 
Dunning J.H. (1988). The eclectic paradigm of international production: A restatement and some 
possible extensions. Journal of International Business Studies, 19 (1): 1–31. 
 
 
Dunning, J.H. (2000). The eclectic paradigm as an envelope for economic and business theories 
of MNE activity. International Business Review, 9 (2): 163–190.  
 
Easterly, W. & Kraay, A. (2000). Small states, small problems? Income, growth, and volatility in 
small states. World Development, 28 (11): 2013–2027. 
 
Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. Academy of Management 
Review, 14 (4): 532-550. 
 
Ethier, W.J. (1986). The multinational firm. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101 (4): 805–833.  
 
Ghauri, P. & Grønhaug, K. (2002). Research Methods in Business Studies: A Practical Guide 
(2nd ed.). Harlow: Pearson Education Limited.  
 
Greene, W. (2003). Econometric analysis. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.  
 
30 
 
Hellgren, B. & Schriber, S. (2003). Nordic research on mergers and acquisitions. In Nordiske 
Organisasjonstudier, pp. 102–111. Fagbokforlaget.  Bergen. 
 
Helpman, E. (1984). A simple theory of international trade with multinational corporations. 
Journal of Political Economy, 92 (3): 451–471.  
 
Hogenbirk, A. & Narula, R. (1999). Globalisation and the small economy: The case of the 
Netherlands. In Van Den Bulcke, D. & Verbeeke, A. (eds.), Globalisation and the Small 
Economy. Edward- Elgar. 
 
Hymer, S.H. (1976). The International Operations of National Firms: A Study of Direct Foreign 
Investment. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Katzenstein, P. (1985). Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe. Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca. 
 
Kindleberger, C.P. (1969). American Business Abroad. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
 
Kuznets, S. (1960). Economic growth of small nations. In Robinson, E.A.G. (ed.), Economic 
Consequences of the Size of Nations. Proceedings of the Conference held by the International 
Economic Association. London: Macmillan. 
 
Maitland, E. & Nicholas, S. (2002a). Preface: Modeling multinationals from small, open 
economies. International Studies of Management and Organization, 32 (1): 3–15. 
 
Nicholas, S. & Maitland, E. (2002). International Business Research: Steady-States, Dynamics 
and Globalisation. In Bora, B (ed.), Foreign Direct Investment: Research Issues, London and 
New York: Routledge. 
 
Merrett, D.T. (2002). Australia’s emergent multinationals: The legacy of having a natural-
resource intensive, small, and closed economy as home. International Studies of Management & 
Organization, 32 (1): 109–135. 
 
Morgan, R.E. & Katsikeas, C.S. (1997). Theories of International Trade, Foreign Direct 
Investment and Firm Internationalization: A Critique. Management Decision, 35 (1): 68-78. 
 
Mundell, R.A. (1957). International trade and factor mobility. American Economic Review, 47 
(3): 321–347.  
 
OECD (2007). OECD Factbook 2007 – Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics. 
Retrieved January 3rd 2009 from 
http://caliban.sourceoecd.org/vl=3483169/cl=25/nw=1/rpsv/fact2007/. 
  
Óladóttir, Á.D. (2009). Internationalization from a small domestic base – An empirical analysis 
of foreign direct investments of Icelandic firms. Management International Review, 49 (1): 61-
80.  
31 
 
Óladóttir, Á.D. (2009a). The rise of Icelandic multinationals (MNCs); A multiple case study 
approach.   
 
Óladóttir, Á.D., Papanastassiou, M., Hobdari, B. & Sinani, E. (2009). Global expansion 
strategies for Icelandic, Irish, and Israeli multinationals.    
 
Porter, M.E. (1985). Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance. 
New York: The Free Press. 
 
Portes, R. & Baldursson, F.M. (2007). The Internationalisation of Iceland’s Financial Sector. 
Reykjavík: Iceland Chamber of Commerce. 
 
Rugman, A.M. (1981). Research and development by multinational and domestic firms in 
Canada. University of Toronto Press, 7 (4): 604–616. 
 
 
Thomas, D.E. & Grosse, R. (2001). Country-of-origin determinants of foreign direct investment 
in an emergent market: The case of Mexico. Journal of International Management, 7 (1): 59–79. 
 
Thorhallsson, B. (2000). The Role of Small States in the European Union. Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd. 
 
Tómasdóttir, H., Ólafsson, F., Óladóttir, A.D., Thorláksson, D. & Thorsteinsson, D.S. (2007). 
Iceland’s Advance: Foreign Investment 2001-2006. Reykjavík: Iceland Chamber of Commerce.  
 
Veugelers, R. (1991). Locational determinants and ranking of host countries: An empirical 
assessment. Kyklos, 44 (3): 363–382. 
 
Walsh, V. (1988). Technology and the competitiveness of small countries: A review. In 
Freeman, C. & Lundvall, B.A. (eds.), Small Countries Facing the Technological Revolution, 
London: Pinter.   
 
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies. New York: Free Press.  
 
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press. 
 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. MIT Press. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England 
 
UNCTAD (2007a). World Investment Report 2007. Transnational Corporations, Extractive 
Industries and Development. New York and Geneva: United Nations. 
 
The World Bank Group (n.d.). Small States. Retrieved March 15th 2009 from 
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/html/smallstates.nsf/. 
 
Zikmund, W.G. (2000). Business Research Methods (6th ed.).  Forth Worth, TX: Dryden Press. 
32 
 
2.  Internationalization from a small domestic base• 
An empirical analysis of foreign direct investments of Icelandic firms 
 
By 
Ásta Dís Óladóttir 
 
Abstract and Key Results 
 
? Iceland has been like a black hole in the study of FDI from the Nordic countries, there 
has been a gap in the literature about FDIs from Iceland.  This paper is the first empirical 
study that addresses the outward foreign direct investment of Icelandic firms.  The 
purpose is to demonstrate how Icelandic companies have invested abroad through foreign 
direct investments.   
? The overall objective of this paper is to describe the key characteristics of Icelandic 
multinational corporations (MNCs) and to gain a deeper understanding of the 
internationalization processes of firms from a small domestic base.   
? Many of the Icelandic companies have been investing heavily abroad over the last six 
years.  Some have acquired companies that are relatively larger than themselves, at least 
if one studies the increase in number of employees.  The main motive for this increase in 
foreign direct investments is access to a new market.  The Icelandic market is simply not 
large enough for companies to be categorized as medium and large companies in the 
global environment.  What also supports this is that, as mentioned above, the outflow of 
FDI from Iceland was very low in the last century. 
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Internationalization process, stage models, born globals, FDI, small economies and Iceland. 
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If a metaphor would be used to describe the process of the internationalization of 
Icelandic firms, it would be appropriate to liken Icelandic FDI to the volcanic 
activity for which the island nation is famous.  Much like the run-up to a volcanic 
eruption, the Icelandic business environment bubbled in pre-investment seismic 
activity from around 1946 to 1999.  Businesses knew of this seismic activity but it 
was not until 2000, when the Icelandic investment volcano exploded, that the 
outside world knew of the activities.  One can assert that the volcanic activity 
changed the business environment in Iceland for good; its lava has cooled to 
form a new landscape which will shape the economy for years to come. 
 
Introduction and Background 
The internationalization process has traditionally been understood as an incremental and gradual 
process.  More recent international business (IB) research has shown, however, that the 
internationalization of firms is often a swift process—one in which firms skip several entry 
modes and enter remote markets soon after their establishment.  This paper aims to discuss the 
internationalization of firms from a small domestic base, with special emphasis on the experience 
of the internationalization of Icelandic firms: an almost unknown phenomenon until the late 
1990s.  The internationalization of Icelandic firms is an interesting subject to study because 
Iceland is one of the smallest economies in the world.  Despite its relatively small GDP—in fact, 
Iceland has the smallest economy within the OECD nations—Iceland has made proportionately 
significant foreign direct investments since 2000.  Iceland invests almost 60% of its GDP in 
foreign direct investments (FDI): a higher proportion than any other OECD nations (OECD, 
2006).  According to the Central Bank of Iceland (2006), the flow of foreign direct investment 
between 1998 and 2005 increased from 55.2 million euros to 4.669.2 million euros.  This is 
nearly an 85-fold increase in just 7 years and a remarkable annual outward FDI flow in 2005: 
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over 43% of GDP, accounting for 6,783.7 million Euros.5  The increasing advance of Icelandic 
firms into foreign markets is attributable to several factors.  It is safe to say that the economy has 
undergone more changes in past decades than ever before in the country’s history.  In addition to 
internal structural changes and financial liberalization, a favourable global and domestic business 
environment has led Icelandic companies toward a broad-minded global perspective rather than a 
myopic, inward-looking one.  In 2005, approximately 75% of the revenue of companies listed on 
the Iceland Stock Exchange was generated abroad.  This development has left many quite 
puzzled outside Iceland, especially since it was not until quite recently that any outsiders took an 
active interest in the affairs of this tiny economy, which had based its growth mainly on its 
export of fish and fish products. 
This paper is the first systematic empirical study on the outflow of FDI by Icelandic 
multinational corporations (MNCs).  To shed light on the scope and the pattern of the 
internationalization of Icelandic firms, an empirical study of 21 Icelandic firms is presented.  
Those firms represent more than 89% of the total Icelandic outward FDI.  In order to understand 
the internationalization pattern of Icelandic MNCs, it is appropriate to ask the following two 
research questions (RQ). RQ1: What is the degree of internationalization of Icelandic MNCs?  
RQ2: Which model of internationalization explains the internationalization process of Icelandic 
firms?  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, the theoretical framework is 
analysed based on the theories of internationalization, including the literature on 
internationalization that takes place incrementally or the stages models and the opposing theories 
of international new ventures or the theories of the born global.  Section 3 describes the research 
                                                 
5 Source: Central Bank of Iceland, 17 July 2006.  The used exchange rate of the euro/IKR is 94.1. 
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focus and approach.  In section 4, the empirical findings follow, and in the last section we 
conclude and raise issues for further discussion. 
Theoretical framework 
There are two traditional approaches to internationalization: the innovation model (Cavusgil 
1980) and the Uppsala model (Johanson/Vahlne 1977, Johanson/Wiedersheim-Paul 1975).  Both 
models are referred to as “stages models” because they propose that the internationalization 
occurs in incremental steps.  Earlier studies concerning the internationalization from a Nordic 
perspective are mainly based on the stage models or the Uppsala internationalization model.  
According to the Uppsala model, firm internationalization has long been regarded as an 
incremental process, wherein firms gradually internationalize through a series of evolutionary 
stages.  They enter “psychically close markets” and increase their commitment to international 
markets step by step.  The learning and commitment stages that a firm gradually progresses 
through as it internationalizes are as follows: no regular export; export through agents; grounding 
of an overseas sales subsidiary or overseas production (Johanson/Wiedersheim-Paul 1975).  In 
this traditional view, firms make their export debut when they have a strong domestic market 
base.  The choice of market also occurs in stages: firms begin to export to a market that has a 
close psychic distance.  Then they expand the export sales into markets that have increasingly 
greater psychic distances. 
The concept of psychic distance relates to differences from the home country in terms of 
language, culture, political systems, information flow, business practice, industrial development 
and educational systems  (Johanson/Vahlne 1977, 1990).  The firm chooses an incremental 
approach to internationalization because it lacks experiential knowledge and because the 
decision to internationalize is risky.  Johanson and Vahlne’s (1977) central argument is that, as 
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the firm gains more knowledge about a market, it will commit more resources to that market.  
Newly established firms tend to start their internationalization on close-by markets, and with 
increasing commitment and better understanding of markets abroad, firms enter into markets that 
are increasingly dissimilar to their home market.  It has been argued that if firms have surplus 
resources, they can be expected to take larger steps toward internationalization (Johanson and 
Vahlne 1990).  
Once market conditions are stable and homogeneous, important market knowledge can be 
acquired by the firms in other ways than through their own experience.  A firm may have 
considerable experience from markets that have similar characteristics and in a situation like this 
it may be possible to generalize this experience to the specific market (Johanson/Vahlne 1990).  
Another important aspect is the claim by several authors (Porter 1980, Levitt 1983) that the 
world generally has moved towards homogenization.  Levitt (1983) claims that technology 
especially is the contributing factor to a more homogenous business world since development 
within the field of information technology has “made” the distances between countries smaller, 
and thus the communication flows faster. 
An underlying assumption of stage models including the Uppsala model is that firms are 
well established in the domestic market before venturing abroad.  Criticisms that such 
conceptualizations wrongly assume step-wise progression and forward motion pay insufficient 
attention to industry, company or people contexts and are generally too deterministic emanated 
as long ago as the late 1970s (Cannon/Willis 1981, Rosson 1984).  Buckley, Newbould and 
Thurwell (1979) argued that firms do not neccessarily adopt consistent organizational 
approaches to internationalization.  Turnbull (1987) also found little empirical support for 
incremental internationalization as firms often omitted stages in the process.  Firms may choose 
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different entry modes and internationalization patterns in different countries.  Entry modes and 
internationalization processes also tend to differ by industry.  Despite criticism of the Uppsala 
model, there is empirical evidence that many firms have internationalized in incremental stages 
and that others continue to do so.  Several streams of research in the 1990s have served to 
challenge seriously stage process models.  Although challenged, the importance of the stage 
model is that it makes clear the importance of cautious and incremental steps in the 
internationalization process.  The model is valid for any firm size and it analyses the whole 
internationalization process.  The model’s limitations, however, are that it overemphasizes the 
role of market-specific knowledge, it does not include all (hybrid) entry modes, it does not 
explain the leapfrogging6 behaviour and decreasing foreign commitment and, finally, it is less 
suitable to explain the internationalization of service companies (Andersen 2000, 
Autio/Sapienza/Almeida 2000, Björkman/Eklund 1996, Forsgren 1989, Knight/Cavusgil 1996, 
Turnbull 1987). 
In the recent literature, there has been clear evidence of rapid and dedicated 
internationalization by so-called born global firms.  This view holds that firms do not 
internationalize incrementally but rather enter international markets soon after the firm’s 
inception. This contradicts the stages model, which posits that firms begin to export from a 
strong domestic market base.   
In the literature, these firms have been termed “international new ventures” 
(McDougall/Shane/Oviatt 1994), “born globals” (Knight/Cavusgil 1996, Knight 1997, 
Madsen/Servais 1997, Harveston/Kedia/Davis 2000), “global startups” (Oviatt/McDougall 
1994), “born international firms” (Majkgård/Sharma 1999) and “committed internationalists” 
                                                 
6 The term "leapfrogging" describes the rapid change made by a company to a higher level of development without going through the 
intermediate stages observed in other cases. 
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(Bonaccorsi 1992, Jolly/Alahuhta/Jeannet 1992).  Here, the term “born globals” is used.  Born 
globals are thought to be smaller entrepreneurial firms that internationalize from inception or 
shortly thereafter, targeting small, highly specialized global niches and which implement a global 
strategy from inception (Bell/McNaughton/Young 2003, McDougall/Oviatt/Shrader 2003).  Born 
global firms perceive international markets as providing opportunities rather than obstacles 
(Madsen/Servais 1997).  Such firms may not even have sales in their domestic market 
(Jolly/Alahuhta/Jeannet 1992, Knight/Cavusgil 1996, McKinsey and Co. 1993, Oviatt 
/McDougall 1994).  An increasing number of smaller firms behave in a manner that is 
contradictory to the stages models.  Jolly, Alahuhta and Jeannet (1992, p. 71) focus on the ability 
of entrepreneurially inclined startup companies to pursue global strategies: “...by leapfrogging 
some of the traditional intermediate stages of internationalization (to become) significant global 
players ... in a relatively short time”.  They identify sets of entrepreneurial competences as 
drivers of competitive advantage, such as having a global vision, a focused approach to doing 
business, the ability to recognize technological opportunities and to capitalize on them, together 
with the insight of the founder of the organization.  The resultant internationalization behaviour 
experienced by these hi-tech firms is described as a functionally specialized global network 
which needs careful management.  Knight and Cavusgil (1996) see this born global phenomenon 
as a challenge to accepted internationalization theories where “small technology oriented 
companies are operating in international markets from the earliest days of their establishment 
and tend to be managed by entrepreneurial visionaries who view the world as a single, borderless 
marketplace from the time of the firm´s founding.”  Some companies do internationalize rapidly 
by developing international networks, offering adapted and customized products and generally 
being much more flexible and faster in their approach to business than their larger competitors.  
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By operating in niche markets and utilizing their distinct sets of competencies, the smaller firm 
can compete with larger organizations, despite resource limitations (Madsen/Servais 1997).  The 
same can be said for firms from small economies: they tend to be competitive in a few niche 
sectors, as they have limited resources and prefer to engage in activities in selected sectors, 
rather than spreading the available resources thinly across several industries (Benito et al. 2002).  
In addition, they also draw on the work of Oviatt and McDougall (1994), who identify an 
international new inventure as an organization which may initially have one or a few employees 
but has a proactive international strategy from the inception of the business.  It is also important, 
according to Madsen and Servais, to understand the background characteristics of the founder of 
the organization in shaping internationalization behaviour.   
There are several different definitions of born globals, so it is not clearly determined how 
many markets such a firm should enter in a certain period of time, how soon since its 
establishment a company should expand to foreign markets or which countries it should prefer.  
Oviatt and McDougall (1994, p. 49) define born global as “a business organization that, from 
inception, seeks to derive significant competitive advantage from the use of resources and the 
sale of outputs in multiple countries.”  They are global from inception or internationalize within 
two years of their establishment.  Knight and Cavusgil (1996, p. 11) define born global as “small, 
technology oriented companies that operate in international markets from the earliest days of 
their establishment.”  Then they define them further and say that born globals: are small firms; 
have fewer than 500 employees; have an annual turnover of approximately US $100 million; 
have leading-edge technology; and manufacture high technology products for a particular niche 
in international markets (Knight/Cavusgil 1996, p. 11).  The literature reveals a considerable 
difference of opinion about how quickly and how widely a firm must internationalize for it to be 
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recognized as a born global.  To be considered a born global, the maximum time for the firm’s 
internationalization debut ranges from within two years (McKinsey and Co. 1993), to six years 
(Zahra/Ireland/Hitt 2000) to seven years (McDougall/Shane/Oviatt 1994).  
In conclusion, in the past years, the phenomenon of born globals has inspired several 
empirical studies which deal with initiating forces and success factors of rapid 
internationalization.  Summing up their results, market conditions and firm resources can be 
identified as important initiating forces of born globals.  Particularly relevant are international 
experiences of the founders or top management team as well as their integration in worldwide 
networks with suppliers, customers and cooperation partners.  Despite the different definitions of 
born-global firms in the literature, two central characteristics can be observed which allow 
distinguishing between born-global firms and traditional internationalizers, namely the speed of 
internationalization (born) and the geographic scope (global) of internationalization.  
Research focus and approach 
This paper is based on new data on the overseas activities of 21 Icelandic companies, which were  
collected in the period from November 2004 until July 2006.  The underlying companies make 
up the majority of companies enlisted in the Icelandic Stock Exchange (NASDAQ, OMX), as 
well as a few others that are not listed, but which have been investing considerably abroad.  At 
the year end 2004, those 21 companies represented 88.9% of the total outward FDI stock and 
represented 89.2% of total outward FDI flow.  Information was gathered from the websites of the 
relevant companies and from the website of the Icelandic stock exchange, as well as from 
databases of Icelandic and foreign newspapers.  The information collected about each company 
included: the year of establishment; investments undertaken; investment year, country and 
industry; and, finally, the overall purpose of these investments.  The factors that motivated those 
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companies to internationalize were also investigated.  The data about each company was then 
sent to the CEOs—in most cases—of the companies under investigation, who were asked to 
confirm the information about the internationalization of their companies.  The CEOs were also 
asked to provide additional information about the financing of their operations abroad. This 
process resulted in the creation of a unique firm-level database of the leading Icelandic MNCs.  
Finally,  data from the Central Bank of Iceland about the outward FDI (flows and stocks) from 
1998–2005 are also used. 
Empirical findings: analysis of the key characteristics of Icelandic MNCs 
As already discussed, the main purpose of this section is to show the degree to which the firms in 
this study became international and to understand their internationalization model.  Icelandic 
MNCs were initially grouped into manufacturing and services which, in turn, were divided into 
four final industrial categories.  High technology manufacturing firms included four firms and 
medium technology manufacturing firms included five companies.  The service sector was also 
divided into two categories: financial services, which included five companies and then other 
services, which included seven companies.  The MNCs included in this study are presented in 
Table 1.
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Table 1.  The year of establishment by industry 
 
(Source: Author's survey, 2004-06) 
The establishment years from a historical point of view 
As Table 1 shows, there is a variance in the number of firms established between 1885 and 2006, 
with a clear dominance of firms established since the 1980s.  Although the data cannot directly 
link the historical elements from the business environment, it would be useful to relate the date 
of establishment with corresponding developments in the Icelandic economy.  In this spirit, it 
was, in fact, in the 1990s when the Icelandic economy opened up.  Around 19% of the 
companies were established after 1991.  Until approximately 1956, the Icelandic economy was 
highly regulated and there was trade protectionism from 1946–1955.  Foreign currency was in 
such short supply that a variety of restrictions were imposed on trade and commerce.  In an 
attempt to cope with the difficult economic situation, the currency was devalued, but correcting 
the persistent current account deficit proved difficult.  Five of the companies were established in 
that period.  During the latter part of the 1960s, the Icelandic economy suffered a series of 
setbacks.  The herring stocks collapsed in 1967–1968 and prices for other principal seafood 
exports fell sharply.  Once more, the authorities tried to put the economy back on an even keel 
Indus try E s tablis hed Indus try E s tablis hed
1956 1886
high technology  1971 financial serv ices   1982
manufacturing  firms 1983 firms 1990
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through devaluation, which fanned inflation.  Nine of the companies in this study were 
established in 1960–1985, when inflation was extremely high in Iceland.  From 1986 until 
around 1995, the entrenched inflation subsided so rapidly that it had reached a level on a par with 
that in neighbouring countries.  Deposit institutions were indirectly involved and contributed to 
restraining price levels by agreeing, as part of this consensus, to accelerate cutbacks in their 
interest rates.  At last, a long-sought era of stability had dawned.  Business dealings were altered 
to conform with more modern practices and electronic communications began to change the face 
of banking.  It is not only the electronic communication but also the privatization of the Icelandic 
banks that triggered this wave of foreign direct investment that started around the year 2000.  In 
1997–2002, the government in Iceland went through the privatization of many firms, first by 
changing them into limited liability companies, then by selling to private investors.  That, along 
with The European Economic Area (EEA) agreement in 1994, has triggered all foreign 
acquisitions of the Icelandic firms.  The banks had been privatized and started their 
internationalization.  They became a stronger supporter of other Icelandic firms and access to 
financial resources opened.  Most of those Icelandic MNEs were established before the changes 
were made in the Icelandic economy around 1992.  To reiterate, Iceland’s participation in the 
European Economic Area in 1994, along with the many other changes mentioned above, have 
altered the legal and financial environment of Icelandic business in recent years and, thus, have 
greatly influenced the internationalization of the Icelandic firm.  
Before analysing further characteristics of the expansion process of Icelandic MNCs, it is 
important to see which countries are the main recipients of Icelandic outward FDI. 
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Table 2.  Host countries receiving Icelandic FDI 
 
(Source: Author's survey, 2004-06) 
As Table 2 shows, most of the FDIs are in the EU countries, in which the financial services firms 
have invested the most.  Other service firms follow, with 68% of their investments in the EU 
countries.  The countries that Icelandic firms have invested in the most are the UK and Denmark, 
which are countries that could be categorized as closest to Iceland in many senses, even though 
the language, for example, is different.  In recent years, Icelandic firms have also invested further 
away, for example in North America and in Asia.  Asia and Eastern Europe are growing 
investment countries for Icelandic firms. 
Elapsed time from company establishment until internationalization 
In order to understand the internationalization process of Icelandic firms, we first estimated the 
elapsed time since their establishment until their first outward FDI project by mode of entry i.e. 
greenfield or acquisition.  The very first greenfield investment of an Icelandic company took 
place in 1915, when a shipping company opened its first sales office in Denmark.  Forty years 
would elapse before the first Icelandic foreign acquisition took place in the UK.  From 1955 until 
1999, very few foreign acquisitions took place.  This long period of elapsed time seems common 
for the Icelandic business environment.  
 
E U
Other 
E uropean 
countries Asia
North ‐ 
America
S outh 
America Austalia Africa
high tech 54,8% 8,1% 6,5% 25,8% 1,6% 3,2% 0,0%
medium tech 60,0% 11,1% 13,3% 8,9% 2,2% 2,2% 2,2%
financial 83,3% 12,5% 0,0% 2,1% 2,1% 0,0% 0,0%
other 68,4% 12,7% 5,1% 12,0% 1,3% 0,6% 0,0%
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Table 3.  Time elapsed from the establishment of the firms until their first FDI 
 
(Source: Author's survey, 2004-06) 
As can be seen in Table 3, this study sample shows that more than 21 years elapsed from the 
time of establishment until the first acquisition took place for 38% of the firms studied.  More 
than 21 years elapsed from the time of establishment until the first greenfield investment was 
made for 28% of the firms studied.  It would seem, therefore, that approximately one-third of the 
Icelandic firms studied fit into the Uppsala model.  Ruzzier (2005) carried out research on firms 
from Slovenia.   
Most SMEs in the study by Ruzzier started internationalizing at an early stage of their existence.  
It took, on average, 3.3 years for their share of international sales to reach 20%; 57% of them had 
affiliates in more than three countries; and on average they had about 40% of their sales abroad.  
Those companies employed as many as 46% of their workers abroad.  Let us look at the modes 
of expansion by time periods to see how the development has been from the year 1915 until 
2006. 
 
 
 
 
T ime spread ‐ acquisitions S ame year 1‐5 years 6‐10 years 11‐20 years x>  21 years
Acquisition/#of firms 2 2 2 6 8
G reenfield/#of firms 1 6 1 4 6
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Figure 1.  Modes of expansion by time periods 
 
(Source: Author's survey, 2004-06) 
As can be seen in Figure 1, Icelandic firms have invested more abroad through acquisitions.  
This is especially true for the time period from 1999–2006, in which acquisitions were the 
dominant entry mode for Icelandic firms into new markets 
(Tómasdóttir/Ólafsson/Óladóttir/Thorláksson/Thorsteinsson 2007).  It is also quite interesting to 
see the elapsed time from the industry point of view.  Though the average years indicate that 
Icelandic firms are late movers to international markets, service companies enter new markets by 
acquisitions or by greenfield relatively early after establishment.  One financial firm served the 
domestic market for 114 years befored it entered foreign markets through an acquisition and 119 
years passed before it established a company abroad.  If compared with the average age of 
Slovenian firms, it can be seen in research by Svetlicic and Rojec (2003) that the average age of 
companies investing abroad is 35 years.  This is in line with theoretical predictions that older (i.e. 
more experienced) firms have a greater propensity to internationalize through outward FDI.  
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Industrial composition and mode of expansion 
Significant shifts in Iceland’s business environment greatly influenced the internationalization of 
the Icelandic firms.  According to the data, industrial classification also seems to be related to the 
internationalization process.  In Figure 2, outward FDIs by industry can be seen. 
Figure 2.  Modes of expansion by industry 
 
(Source: Author's survey, 2004-06) 
Figure 2 demonstrates that Icelandic firms enter foreign markets through acquisitions, which can 
also be seen in Figure 1.  Greenfield investments were more popular from 1915 until around 
1998 but then Icelandic firms started acquiring companies abroad.  As can be seen, all industries 
use acquisitions more than greenfield investments when investing abroad. As can be seen in 
Table 4, in which the investments are divided by industry, companies that enter foreign markets 
within five years after establishment are categorized as new.  Firms that invest abroad or start 
exporting 6–20 years after establishment are categorized as experienced firms.  If more than 21 
years elapse from establishment until FDI or an export, the companies are called matured 
companies.   
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Table 4.  Years on average by industry from establishment until first export and first FDIs 
 
(Source: Author's survey, 2004-06) 
It is also interesting to see the number of years that elapsed, both minimum years and 
maximum years, by industry by export, acquisition and greenfield investments.  As can be 
seen in Table 5, a minimum of two years elapsed from establishment until the firms started 
exporting in the high technology industry.  Medium technology firms started the same year.  
For one medium technology firm, 38 years elapsed from the establishment until the firm 
started exporting.  One high technology firm didn’t start exporting until 36 years after its 
establishment.  The financial services firms conduct FDIs very soon after their establishment.  
Only one firm didn’t enter foreign markets until 114 years after its establishment.  Then it 
acquired a few firms in a row 4 years later, or 119 years after its establishment.  
 
 
 
New E xperienced Mature
E xport 2 0 2
hig h  tech   G reenfield 2 0 2
Acquisition 0 2 2
New E xperienced Mature
E xport 3 0 2
medium  Tech G reenfield 0 2 2
Acquisition 0 2 3
New E xperienced Mature
E xport 0 0 0
financ ial S ervice G reenfield 0 2 1
Acquisition 2 2 1
New E xperienced Mature
E xport 1 0 0
other s ervices G reenfield 5 1 1
Acquisition 2 3 2
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Table 5.  Breakdown between industries of minimum and maximum years 
 
(Source: Author's survey, 2004-06) 
Degree of internationalization in terms of foreign employment 
In order to measure the degree of internationalization of Icelandic MNCs, we applied two 
measures, i.e foreign employment and overseas turnover.  A factor limiting the largest 
companies’ domestic growth is the small size of the workforce.  Despite the fact that labour 
participation in Iceland is among the highest in the world and the country has one of the 
highest retirement ages in Europe, the total labour force amounts to 160,000 people.  
Nevertheless, it is interesting to see how the Icelandic companies included in this research 
have penetrated foreign markets in terms of foreign employment.  If the growth in number of 
employees is compared between January 2000 and July 2006, it can be seen that many of 
them have grown significantly as outlined in Figure 3.  Many companies start international 
operations when they are comparatively small.  Most of the Icelandic firms were rather small 
in the beginning but have grown through acquisitions.  To give examples, one of the high 
technology firms had, in the year 2000, 146 employees but after acquiring companies abroad, 
the number of employees increased to around 10,000 employees.  The firm has increased in 
size 68-fold in terms of employees.  In percentages, the growth for that firm was 6849% in 
only 6 years.  
 
Industry Export Acquisition Greenfield
Min 2 8 2
Max 36 43 47
Min 0 13 0
Max 38 63 56
Min n/a 0 0
Max n/a 114 119
Min 0 0 0
Max n/a 77 31
high tech manufacturing
medium tech manufacturing
financial services
other services
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Figure 3.  Average increase in employees by industry from 2000–2006 
 
(Source: Author's survey, 2004-06) 
As Figure 3 shows, these Icelandic companies have increased their size in terms of number of 
employees.  The most extreme cases are one high technology manufacturing firm which has 
been mentioned.  It has increased its size by 68-fold and one of the services firms has 50-
folded its size.7  To give more examples, one of the medium technology manufacturing firms, 
previously a small family-owned export company with few employees at the time of its 
establishment in 1986, has grown to large size status with approximately 16,000 employees.  
This is a significant change in 20 years.  This company used to be a seafood manufacturer but 
let go of its seafood business and replaced it with a focus on chilled convenience food.  As 
Figure 3 shows, acquiring firms has allowed companies with a high demand for labour to 
grow much faster than they could have in Iceland.  The aggregate growth in these companies’ 
number of employees is almost equal to the total labour force in Iceland.  If the growth in 
number of employees is classified by industries, the high technology firms have been 
growing the most between the years 2000 and 2006. Medium technology firms and other 
services have been growing quite similarly in terms of number of employees but firms in 
financial services have not been growing that fast in terms of employees.  However, it is not 
                                                 
7 Employee numbers include both parent companies and their subsidiaries. 
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only interesting to see how much growth there has been in the number of employees; it is also 
interesting to see how many employees are located in Iceland and how many are abroad.  A 
perusal of the structure of the Icelandic companies that are investing abroad indicates a rather 
international structure in which more than half of the employees are located abroad: this is 
detailed in Table 6.  Under high technology are 4 firms, and each line in the table represents 
each company´s number of employees in Iceland and abroad, in total 20 companies.  
Table 6.  Employees in Iceland and abroad 
 
(Source: Author's survey, 2004-06) 
As can be seen in Table 6, manufacturing firms, both high technology and medium 
technology firms, have most of their employees abroad.  Financial services firms have more 
than half of their employees in Iceland, or 57%.  Other services firms have almost 80% of 
their employees abroad.  Most of the growth of the Icelandic firms has been abroad, through 
acquisitions and greenfield investments, which explains this high number of employees 
located abroad.  More than 80% of the total labour in those 21 Icelandic firms is located 
Indus try Iceland Abroad
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abroad.  To be more specific, 14 companies have more than half of their employees abroad.  
There are examples in this study of firms that have more than 99% of their employees abroad.  
Only 5 of the companies have more employees in Iceland than abroad.  
Degree of internationalization in terms of overseas turnover  
For small firms, internationalization represents a higher risk than for larger companies 
(Vahlne/ Nordstroem/Torbacke 1996).  This is because of a lack of information, as has been 
mentioned, but is also on account of the relatively high negative impact that taking the wrong 
decision in international business can have on the very existence of the whole firm.  It has 
also been stated that firms will only begin to internationalize when they have become 
relatively large.  It does not matter which measurement is used: the increase in number of 
employees between 2000 and 2006 or the increase in turnover between 1998 and 2005.  Both 
measurements show an enormous increase and, as shown below, most of the turnover of the 
Icelandic firms is originated abroad and many of the companies have more than half of their 
employees abroad.  Even though many of the Icelandic companies could not be categorized 
as large companies, they were very small when they started their internationalization process.  
They have, as said before, grown a lot through their FDIs and did not have a very established 
market before they started internationalizing, counter to what was mentioned above (Frjáls 
Verslun 1999, 2006). 
One medium technology firm has the most increase in turnover between 1998 and 
2005.  It is interesting to see that the companies have increased their turnover; however, what 
is more interesting is that most of their turnover, except for the financial services, today 
comes from abroad.  All of the firms studied generate more than 25% of their turnover from 
abroad.  Out of those 21 firms, 7 generate more than 95% of their turnover abroad.  Four 
companies generate 75–95% of their turnover abroad and 10 companies generate 25–75% of 
their turnover from abroad.  There are cases in which up to 99.9% of the turnover comes from 
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abroad.  The average increase in turnover from 1998 to 2005 is in financial services.  Medium 
technology firms have the second largest increase in turnover or on average around 2,300%.  
However, even though the highest increase in turnover has been in the financial services, the 
highest turnover from abroad comes from manufacturing firms.  This is slightly more from 
medium technology manufacturing firms or around 90% of their total turnover and 87% of 
the turnover in the high technology manufacturing firms.  Around 46% of the total turnover 
for the financial services firms comes from abroad and almost 62% of other services8.  
Motives and driving forces for internationalization 
A firm’s decision to initiate global market involvement often arises for a variety of reasons.  
Many of these motivational factors have been identified in previous international models 
(Albaum 1983, Bilkey/Tesar 1977, Malhotra/Agarwal/Baalbaki 1998).  A review of the 
literature reveals that firms may be influenced in their internationalization by more than one 
motive.  The firms’ motivational factors could be due to success in the domestic market, due 
to a saturated domestic market, due to a geographical location advantage, due to some 
technological improvements or due to any other motive.  Initially, most firms invest outside 
their home countries to acquire natural resources or gain access to markets.  As they become 
increasingly multinationalized, they use their activities abroad to improve their global market 
condition by raising their efficiency or acquiring new sources of competitive advantage 
(Dunning 1993, p. 57). 
The motives can vary from firm to firm based on past experience, current market 
circumstances and future market trends.  The motives list could be endless.  For the Icelandic 
firms, there are two main motives, market seeking motives and strategic asset seeking ones, 
as can be seen in Table 7.  Behind these two motives are 330 instances of foreign direct 
investments. 
                                                 
8 Turnover from abroad for the case companies can be seen in table 3 in Appendix of the thesis. 
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Table 7.  Motivation behind FDIs by industry 
 
 
(Source: Author's survey, 2004-06) 
This outcome agrees with Hollenstein (2005), who shows that market seeking strategies are 
more prevalent than cost-oriented strategies, which, however, are quite important for small 
and medium sized firms.  In February 2006, a telephone survey was conducted among 
managers of Icelandic firms.  Of 497 participating managers in the survey, almost 65% 
answered9 that the main motive for investing abroad is access to new markets (Óladóttir 
2006).  Another factor that is likely to have motivated the Icelandic firms to expand their 
operations abroad is to diversify risk.  It is well known that investors should not keep all their 
eggs in the same basket.  The same applies to companies: in order to diversify their income 
streams, acquisitions in foreign markets are an optimal strategy.  A prime example of this is 
the banks, which have expanded their markets through strategic acquisitions.  If the 
motivation behind the Icelandic FDI is compared with Slovenian firms, it can be seen that it 
is similar.  The small domestic market and relatively high labour costs in Slovenia are key 
drivers of outward FDI.  Maintaining and expanding foreign market shares have been 
priorities for Slovenian enterprises (Svetlicic 2007). 
The characteristics of Icelandic investments 
It can be said that three things characterize the Icelandic FDIs.  It does not matter that the 
economy is small or that the firms are small in the beginning.  If they focus on those three 
                                                 
9 The questions can be seen in Appendix 2 of  the thesis. 
Market 
seeking
S trategic  
asset seeking
high tech manufacturing 94% 6%
medium tech manufacturing 100% 0%
financial serv ices 77% 23%
other services 83% 17%
 55 
 
things, they might have a more efficient external growth through FDIs.  Those three things 
are: investment scope, speed and specificity.  Regarding scope, Icelandic firms seem to follow 
an investment pattern, or perhaps an investment strategy, in which they grow significantly in 
size through single investments.  As such, they seem to aim for relatively large, well-known 
and established companies with a strong customer base instead of buying small and unknown 
companies as a stepping stone into the foreign market.  Secondly, speed is something that 
seems to characterize the FDI of those Icelandic firms.  The investment execution, from 
target screening to deal-making and purchase, of Icelandic companies seems to be very fast.  
As an example, the fastest growing Icelandic companies have a record of purchasing close to 
30 foreign companies over a period of 6 years, from 2000–2006.  In May 2007, according to 
new research carried out by Deloitte International, Baugur Group (retail company) is the 
company that has grown the most of all retail companies in the whole world or about 106% 
per year for the last five years.  Norvik, another company in this study, is also on the list of 
the fastest growing companies in Scandinavia.  Finally, for specificity, investment focus 
seems to be very narrow, i.e. Icelandic companies seem to follow an investment pattern (or 
strategy) of obtaining a leading position and size in a given market niche.  To give examples, 
an orthopedic design firm, was named by the World Economic Forum as a “technology 
pioneer” for the year 2006.  Another one develops and markets high tech processing 
equipment for the food industry.  Both companies are among industry leaders within their 
fields.  Among the firms in this study is also a high technology firm which could be 
categorized as a leading company because it is the fifth largest generic pharmaceutical 
company in the world.  Yet another example is the largest rotational-molding plastics group 
in the world.  Another characteristic of many of the Icelandic firm is that in all industries 
there are cases ofnew owners, new structure and strategy, and even new products or services, 
can be seen.  A new name for the firms also follows those dramatic changes.  There have 
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been some kind of changes in almost all of the companies and almost half of them have also 
gone through the name changing process.  In some cases, it happened because new owners 
acquired the companies.  The generic pharmaceutical company mentioned above is yet 
another example.  It was originally established in 1956 under a different name, with the sole 
purpose to import and later to manufacture drugs for the domestic market.  In 1999, new 
owners and a management team who had much experience of internationalization by working 
abroad came along.  Immediately, the strategy was to create an international pharmaceutical 
company.  Today, the company has subsidiaries in 32 countries and generates almost all its 
turnover abroad with 95% of its employees located abroad.  The internationalization of this 
firm can, to some degree, be explained by the Uppsala model.  It started on the domestic 
market and then it started exporting.  No existing theory can, however, explain the boom that 
has been in its investments in the last couple of years.   
Conclusion and discussion  
The question that usually rises is why study Iceland?  Iceland has been like a black hole in the 
study of FDI from the Nordic countries, there has been a gap in the literature about FDIs from 
Iceland.  As has been explained, the market in Iceland, like in the other Nordic countries, is in 
general small in terms of growth potential and sales possibilities.  This fact has forced 
Icelandic companies to engage in international trade, i.e. export or FDIs.  The purpose of this 
paper was to present the main characteristics of the major Icelandic MNCs and to investigate 
their internationalization patterns.  With the changes in the economy in 1992—particularly 
the changes in the financial sector—and with the participation in multilateral trade 
organizations like the EEA in 1993, new markets opened up for Icelandic companies, which 
gave them an opportunity to invest heavily abroad as most of the companies presented in this 
study has  been doing since 1998. 
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From 1915 until July 2006, those Icelandic firms that are investigated in this study 
have acquired over 200 firms overseas and established around 130 new units10.  Looking at 
the foreign direct investment behaviour, the Icelandic firms in general start up their 
international commitments with foreign acquisitions and greenfield investments.  Most of the 
acquisitions have taken place after the changes were made in the economy, so it has happened 
in a relatively short period of time. As has been stated in the theory of the Uppsala 
internationalization model, it is mainly built on research on manufacturing firms.  Only very 
few of the Icelandic firms have internationalized according to the Uppsala model, starting 
with a focus on the home market, then started exporting and soon thereafter increased their 
commitment in overseas markets through greenfield or by an acquisition.  This mainly fits 
with some of the medium tech manufacturing firms in this study.  Due to the above-
mentioned changes in the economy, the increase in Icelandic FDIs seems to be more toward 
the theory of the born global.  Even though some of the companies didn’t start their FDIs 
within the given time frame put forth in the literature about born globals, this was not 
possible for them because of the structure of the Icelandic economy before 1993.  As soon as 
the structure of the economy changed, all of the companies started investing abroad. 
As previously mentioned, born globals perceive the world to be one market and thus 
do not confine themselves to a single country.  This is what many Icelandic companies 
included in this study have been doing lately, they do not confine themselves to Iceland.  As 
already shown, most of those 21 Icelandic companies have more than half of their employees 
abroad.  All of the firms studied generate more than 25% of their turnover from abroad and 
there are cases of companies having up to 99% of their turnover from abroad.  Another 
characteristic of born globals, according to the literature, is that they target small, highly 
specialized global niches and they implement a global strategy from inception. From the 
                                                 
10 Examples can be seen in table 6 in the Appendix of the thesis. 
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literature of born globals, it can be concluded that a critical incident, for example a change in 
the ownership, may trigger a firm’s internationalization.  This has been the case in several 
firms in this study.  Among firms in all industries, new owners, new structure and strategy, 
and even new products or services, can be seen.  A new name for the firms also follows those 
dramatic changes.  There have been some kind of changes in almost all of the companies and 
almost half of them have also gone through the name changing process.  In some cases, it 
happened because new owners acquired the companies.   
It is safe to say that at least some of the Icelandic companies have been investing 
heavily abroad over the last six years.  Some have acquired companies that are relatively 
larger than themselves, at least if one studies the increase in number of employees.  The main 
motive for this increase in foreign direct investments is access to a new market.  The 
Icelandic market is simply not large enough for companies to be categorized as medium and 
large companies in the global environment.  What also supports this is that, as mentioned 
above, the outflow of FDI from Iceland was very low in the last century.  In 1998, Iceland 
ranked number 21 on the list published in the World Investment Report (WIR) of the 
developed countries; in 2001 it was number 11.  In the year 2004, however, Iceland led the 
list.  The same happened in 2005 and 2006.  To answer the main research question in this 
paper, which model could be used to explain the internationalization of Icelandic firms, then 
it is safe to say that Icelandic companies have been developing quite fast and many of them 
can be considered as born globals or even “leapfrogging globals”, i.e. they become global in a 
very short time by jumping over some stages predicted by evolutionary models. 
For future research it could be interesting to study further the main characteristics of 
the Icelandic FDIs. When conducting the study, three main characteristics came to light, as 
mentioned above, which other small economies could keep in mind when investing abroad.  
It does not matter that the economy is small or that the firms are small in the beginning.  If 
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they focus on those three things, they might have a more efficient external growth through 
FDIs.  Those three things are: investment scope, speed and specificity.  Regarding scope, 
Icelandic firms seem to follow an investment pattern, or perhaps an investment strategy, in 
which they grow significantly in size through single investments.  As such, they seem to aim 
for relatively large, well-known and established companies with a strong customer base 
instead of buying small and unknown companies as a stepping stone into the foreign market.  
Secondly, speed is something that seems to characterize the FDI of those Icelandic firms.  
The investment execution, from target screening to deal-making and purchase, of Icelandic 
companies seems to be very fast.  As an example, the fastest growing Icelandic companies 
have a record of purchasing close to 30 foreign companies over a period of 6 years, from 
2000–2006. Finally, for specificity, investment focus seems to be very narrow, i.e. Icelandic 
companies seem to follow an investment pattern (or strategy) of obtaining a leading position 
and size in a given market niche. These characteristics of the Icelandic firms need to be tested 
among firms from other small economies, to see if this could help firms to grow faster and in 
a more efficient way through FDIs.   
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3.  The Rise of Icelandic Multinationals (MNCs): A multiple case 
study approach 
By 
Asta Dis Oladottir11 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Based on the cases of four multinational corporations (MNCs) whose headquarters are 
located in Iceland, we explore the geographical patterns and the motivation behind the 
outward foreign direct investments (OFDI) of Icelandic firms. Our analysis reveals several 
important facts. Firstly, new-market seeking and strategic-asset seeking are the main motives 
behind the OFDIs of the case companies under study. Secondly, the majority of investment 
projects are carried out in Northern Europe, showing an underlying regionalization in the 
geographical expansion of Icelandic MNEs.   
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Introduction 
One of the distinguishing features of the Icelandic economy during the past two decades has 
been the significant rise of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) activity of Icelandic 
firms. In this period, various Icelandic firms have grown from being small or medium-sized 
domestic companies to large multinational corporations (MNCs) in a fairly short period of 
time with some of the investing firms having already become world leading companies in 
their sectors, like Promens in Roto moulding, Össur in orthopaedics and Actavis as the fifth 
largest generic pharmaceutical company, to name a few. 
Previous work by Óladóttir (2009) showed that Icelandic firms choose to invest 
abroad mainly through acquisitions and they invest in countries that are relatively close to 
Iceland, such as the UK and Denmark. This study assesses the geographical expansion of 
Icelandic MNCs in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI)  motivations. As the 
internationalization of Icelandic firms is still in its infancy, the particular phenomenon under 
investigation has not been subject to research to any significant degree in the existing 
literature. In this context, this paper provides fresh new evidence on the understanding of the 
new emerging MNCs. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: it starts with the 
theoretical background and an overview of the literature, then the methodology and an 
introduction to the case companies under study. The motivation behind their outward foreign 
direct investment is then introduced and discussed, followed finally by a conclusion. 
Theoretical Background and Literature Review 
Outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) has been widely covered by international business 
scholars. For more than four decades now, authors have endeavoured to explain the nature, 
causes and consequences of foreign direct investments made by MNCs. A variety of 
theoretical perspectives have been applied to approach the question of why companies engage 
in FDI. These include both macro- and micro-level models (Maitland & Nicholas, 2002b; 
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Thomas & Grosse, 2001). The diverse approaches range from international trade theories 
(Morgan & Katsikeas, 1997) to market imperfections theory (Caves, 1971; Hymer, 1976; 
Kindleberger, 1969), internalization theory (Buckley & Casson, 1976; 1985; Rugman, 1981) 
and eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1980; 1988).  
Market imperfections theory then recasts FDI in microanalytical terms (Nicholas & 
Maitland, 2002) and shares the basics of new trade theory (see Arvanitis & Hollenstein, 2006; 
Helpman, 1984) in its view that firms capitalize on specific capabilities that can be exploited 
abroad independently of the economic attractiveness of the foreign location, with the 
advantage that these particular capabilities are not shared by competitors in the foreign 
country (Porter, 1985). In other words, market imperfections theory explains FDI as a means 
to exploit firm-specific capabilities (competitive advantages) in new markets. However, it 
does not explain why FDI is considered the most desirable method to take advantage of firm-
specific capabilities. Internalization theory, however, addresses this issue. Internalization 
theory has its roots in transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975; 1985) and predicts that, 
because of market imperfections, firms may face high transaction costs in foreign 
intermediate markets. This brings firms to develop their own internal markets, that is, to 
transfer assets within the organization through hierarchies instead of via the market, 
whenever transactions can be made at a lower cost that way. Hence, firms internalize their 
international activities using FDI rather than alternative forms of foreign market entry, such 
as exporting or contractual agreements, in order to minimize cost and/or increase efficiency. 
Finding no single approach able to explain firms’ international activities fully, Dunning 
(1980; 1988) proposed converging the different strands of research into an analytical 
framework, the eclectic paradigm of which has become one of the most popular theories to 
explain OFDI. OLI stands for ownership, internalization and location (Dunning, 1980; 1993). 
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Dunning states that foreign investment occurs because firms have certain ownership (O) 
advantages, which they exploit through a process of internalization (I) in countries that offer 
the requisite location (L) advantages. Dunning grouped the former literature of international 
business (IB) theories into three sub-paradigms, as explained above, that represent the 
interaction of different variables that determine whether or not a firm will engage in FDI. In 
short, the eclectic paradigm provides an ownership, location and internalization (OLI) 
advantages-based framework to analyse why, where and how MNCs engage in international 
production. For a further explication of the OLI parameters, ownership-specific advantages 
(O-advantages) represent the firm-specific competitive advantages of MNCs that make it 
possible for them to go abroad. The O therefore represents the answer to the why question. 
Further, O-advantages “must be sufficient to compensate for the costs of setting up and 
operating a foreign value-adding operation, in addition to those faced by indigenous 
producers or potential producers” (Dunning, 1988: 2). Ownership advantages may arise 
because of three things: firstly, “exclusive privileged possession of or access to particular 
income generating assets” (Dunning, 1988: 2) such as monopoly power or better resource 
capability and usage; secondly, because of the advantages enjoyed by branch plants in terms 
of economies of scale in overhead costs for example; and, thirdly, as a result of 
multinationality per se, or put differently, the wider opportunities and abilities enabled by 
already-established foreign operations (Cantwell & Narula, 2001; Dunning, 1988). The 
ownership advantage of a firm can be seen as something that gives the firm market power or 
cost advantage, while other firms have no access to these benefits. These advantages include 
patents, blueprints and brand names.  
Location-specific advantages (L-advantages) represent the question of where to 
locate, or, to put it differently, why produce in one country rather than another. L-advantages 
therefore arise due to the location attractions of alternative countries that firms may use along 
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with their O-advantages in a more profitable way abroad than could be achieved in the home 
country. Location advantages refer to various features owned by the potential host country 
that make the country profitable for multinational production. Cheap labour, for example, is 
the most obvious source of the location advantage. Trade barriers such as tariffs and transport 
costs are also sources of location advantages if the finished goods of MNCs are sold on 
foreign markets, but they deter investment if much of the final output is shipped back to the 
home country, as are a large market size or a friendly business environment in terms of 
government policies (Dunning, 1988; 2000).  
Finally, internalization advantages (I-advantages) represent the question of how to 
engage in international production. Transferring the possessed O-advantages across countries 
within the organization, in other words, engaging in foreign production, may involve lower 
transaction costs than relying on the market by for example subcontracting or leasing the 
right of use to foreign-based enterprises (Dunning, 1988). The lower transaction costs are in 
that way the source of I-advantages. Then again, the eclectic paradigm claims that three 
conditions influence whether or not a firm will engage in FDI: first, the more ownership-
specific advantages a firm possesses, the more likely it is to engage in FDI; secondly, the 
greater the need for location-specific advantages of a foreign country for the value-added 
activity, the greater the probability of favouring a foreign presence; and, thirdly, the greater 
the benefits of internalizing markets, the more likely it is that the firm engages in FDI rather 
than using a lower commitment mode of entry (Dunning, 2000).   
The eclectic paradigm thereby integrates the diverse former poles of thought into a 
more holistic view. Further, it provides an umbrella for different aspects when thinking about 
FDI and the motives behind FDI as well as for analysing and explaining how the situation 
varies between firms, industries and countries over time (Dunning, 1988; Tahir & Larimo, 
2005). In that way, it is an analytical framework for facilitating empirical investigation, 
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drawing researchers’ attention to the relevant theories rather than being a theory in itself. The 
OLI advantages can be referred to as the drivers or determinants of FDI and may be 
explained as the parameters that are the precondition for FDI, that is, the elements needed for 
firms to find FDI desirable (Dunning, 2000). The more OLI advantages available, the more 
likely a firm is to engage in FDI, that is, if managers identify extensive options for using OLI 
advantages, they will be more eager to exploit those. However, enterprises will only invest 
abroad if there is something that motivates them, that is, if they are seeking something and 
realize that they can exploit the existing OLI advantages to attain their goals. To underpin the 
interrelationship between the OLI parameters and motivation, Dunning (1980) stated: “The 
more the ownership-specific advantages possessed by an enterprise, the greater the 
inducement to internalize them; and the wider the attractions of a foreign rather than a home 
country production base, the greater the likelihood that an enterprise, given the incentive to 
do so, will engage in international production” (Dunning, 1980: 9). According to Dunning 
(1993; 2000), scholars have identified four main types of foreign-based MNC activity 
representing the different motives behind FDI: resource-seeking, market-seeking, efficiency-
seeking and strategic asset-seeking activities. One or more of these factors may motivate 
businesses to engage in FDI. Moreover, motives may differ over time and motives for initial 
versus sequential investments may differ (Dunning, 1997); there can also be more than one 
motive behind each investment. In this way, resource- and market-seeking motives are 
claimed typically to characterize initial FDI while efficiency- and strategic asset-seeking 
motives are said to characterize sequential FDI (Dunning, 1997).  
Scholars have claimed that firms from small countries have been found to 
demonstrate particular patterns when it comes to OFDI. As already stated in the introductory 
chapter, the most commonly used criteria in the international business literature for 
classifying the size of markets and, hence, economies are: a) population and b) different 
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measures of gross domestic product (GDP) – absolute size of GDP, GDP per capita and 
growth of GDP (see e.g. Bora, 2002; Merrett, 2002; Thomas & Grosse, 2001; Veugelers, 
1991; The World Bank Group, re trived January 10th 2008). Whereas measures such as GDP 
and territory size have been found to be highly correlated with population, population can be 
concluded to be a good indicator of size. Benito et al. (2002) argued that MNCs from smaller 
economies have a higher propensity to internationalize than firms from larger home 
economies. Moreover, it has been concluded that MNCs from small countries tend to be 
competitive in a few niche sectors (Hogenbirk & Narula, 1999) as a result of their limited 
resources and a preference to engage in activities in a few targeted sectors rather than 
spreading the available resources thinly across several industries. In addition, Bulatov (2001) 
and Mulino (2002) showed that the leading factors for OFDI include the striving of parent 
companies to know the business situation and provide their presence on foreign markets in 
order to provide assistance to their own export and import operations via foreign affiliates, 
whilst Hsien and Yang (2003) found that smaller MNCs play a vital role in foreign 
investment. In particular, considerable attention is given to the location-specific advantages 
of the particular host countries, analysing the specific attributes of the host countries that are 
attractive to the investing firms from small open economies (SMOPECs). Studies have, for 
example, concentrated on the incentives for MNCs from specific small countries to invest in 
a particular target country or region, including Johansen et al. (2000), studying Nordic 
MNCs’ investment in the Baltic countries, and Tahir and Larimo (2006), who investigate 
Finnish MNCs’ expansion in Asia. In an investigation into the OFDI of the Nordic economies 
where the purpose was specifically to analyse the role that domestic MNCs play in their 
respective home economies, Herstad and Jonsdottir (2006) indicate that the main overall 
driver of internationalization of Nordic MNEs is market access. Additionally, the access to 
cheap factors of production is historically found to be of fairly low importance. These results 
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are reported with a notice that the large diversity in motives between different sectors is 
neglected. It should be noted that the report synthesizes data from all of the five Nordic 
countries, but these countries have been found to differ from each other in many ways despite 
their many resemblances (Davidsdottir, 2006) and therefore maybe should not be taken as 
one when investigating their motives for undertaking outward FDI. In addition to the above 
review, motives behind outward FDI from particularly small countries have sometimes been 
summarized as an introduction to other FDI subjects. Blomström and Kokko (1994) 
summarize the motives and patterns of Swedish FDI. They discuss how Swedish 
multinationals have mostly based their competitiveness on either local raw materials or 
technological assets. The motive behind FDI in Sweden has been to avoid transportation costs 
and trade barriers and to become closer to customers. “The foreign operations of Swedish 
multinationals have seldom been undertaken to secure access to foreign raw materials, and 
access to cheap foreign labour” (Blomström & Kokko, 1994: 3). Also, they point out that the 
motives for foreign production have remained largely unchanged over time but that some 
motives changed in the late 1980s as industries needed to prepare for the European Single 
Market possibly excluding Sweden, creating a stronger need for market access.  Varblane et 
al. (2001), in their analysis on motives behind Estonian OFDI, revealed that market-related 
motives, and more specifically, gaining additional market shares and facilitating exports of 
goods and services, are predominant among the factors that make Estonian firms invest 
abroad. Further, Reiljan (2002) claims Estonian firms to show some efficiency-seeking 
behaviour. 
Empirical research on the determinants of outward FDI from small economies has 
also investigated why MNCs from small economies invest in foreign R&D; in particular, 
Arvanitis and Hollenstein’s research focuses on the motives behind Swiss firms’ investment 
in R&D abroad, and finds O- and I-advantages to be the main drivers and market seeking the 
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most important motive followed by an intermediate importance of knowledge- and human-
resource seeking. Andersson (1998), on the other hand, particularly discusses the role of 
outward FDI for R&D in small countries and analyses both the causes and consequences of 
the internationalization of R&D in this context, using firm-specific data from Swedish-based 
manufacturing firms in the period 1965–1994. He finds that the main causes for the 
internationalization of Swedish R&D, in the period under investigation, is the need to reduce 
transfer costs and, moreover, he finds support for the need for a higher level of technical 
progress to push the internationalization process of firms.  Carr and Garcia (2003) compare 
Spanish MNCs and local players and their internationalization strategies. 
Outward FDI from Slovenia is covered by Svetlicic et al. (2007). He emphasizes how the 
motives of Slovenian firms have changed over time. According to Svetlicic, the main motives 
during the early stages of internationalization of national firms were market seeking, 
followed by strategic-asset seeking, efficiency seeking and resource seeking. While cost 
considerations were not an overwhelming reason for outward FDI in the past, they are now 
gaining importance. Also, resource-seeking and strategic asset-seeking (augmenting assets or 
the desire to become major players in local markets) motives have also become more 
important than before for Slovenian MNCs in the last few years. This is consistent with 
Dunning’s (1998) argument concerning an increasing importance of strategic asset-seeking 
motives. Further, Svetlicic finds the small domestic market and relatively high labour costs in 
Slovenia to be the key drivers of outward FDI. Expanding foreign market shares, utilizing 
excess production capacity and the need to be close to customers are therefore all factors that 
play a decisive role for Slovenian investors.  
Gugler (2008) studies the motives of the internationalization of R&D by Swiss 
MNCs, where he compares the motivation behind the internationalization of R&D in 
developing countries, developed countries and then in China. Finally, in regard to Icelandic 
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MNCs, Portes and Baldursson (2007) touch upon the motives of Icelandic banks to 
internationalize in their report on The Internationalisation of Iceland’s Financial Sector and 
claim that the main factors leading to foreign expansion are generally the same as within 
other national sectors, namely: going beyond exhausted market opportunities in Iceland, 
decreasing risk through income diversification and capitalizing on favourable economic 
conditions. They also point out that other Icelandic businesses engaging in foreign expansion 
and the banks have complemented each other in their advance into new markets. Óladóttir 
(2009) discusses the motivation of leading Icelandic companies where the main motive is to 
access new markets. 
Methodology: Sample and Data Collection 
The study reported in this paper is a cross-border multiple-case study, which is based on an 
in-depth analysis of four MNCs from Iceland. The study aims to understand the motives of 
leading Icelandic MNCs within the given industries to engage in outward foreign direct 
investment. The case study offers an excellent opportunity to understand these issues (Yin, 
2003). Moreover, a multi-case study improves generalizability compared with a pure single-
case study (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The literal replication method, building on earlier 
theories, improves robustness and allows generalization from the sample, although this 
generalization does not have statistical grounds (Saunders et al., 2003; Silverman, 2005; Yin, 
2003). This “analytic generalization” tactic follows the recommendations of Eisenhardt 
(1989) and Yin (2003). In the literal replication method, the cases that all predict similar 
results will be chosen (Silverman, 2005: 127; Yin, 2003); that is, the case companies in this 
study were selected from typical examples, rather than randomly. In this type of purposive 
sampling method, the aim is for the cases to provide illustrative and rich data to focus on 
specific research questions/propositions (Saunders et al., 2003; Silverman, 2005). This 
method enables comparisons with theories of motivations of MNEs from small countries, but 
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also allows new interpretations (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The multi-case study protocol was 
built based on the recommendations of Pauwels and Matthyssens (2004) and Yin (2003). The 
primary data for the empirical analysis derived from a study conducted on Icelandic MNCs 
that have been investing broadly abroad (Óladóttir, 2009). Four case companies were chosen. 
Those companies are Actavis, a generic pharmaceutical company; Bakkavör, a producer of 
fresh prepared food; Baugur Group, which operates within media, property and retail; and 
Kaupthing, a commercial and investment bank. 
 
The criteria for the selection of the four case companies were as follows: 
- the companies had to be leading companies in their sector 
- the investments had to have taken place between 2001 and 2006 
- the companies must have had a minimum of 10 FDI projects in that time period 
- the companies had to generate a minimum of 50% of their turnover from abroad 
- the companies had to have at least 2000 employees 
- the companies can be both listed companies and private companies 
 
The data were gathered in the period 2005–2007 from the websites of the relevant companies, 
from the website of the Icelandic stock exchange as well as from databases of Icelandic and 
foreign newspapers. The data sets collected were broader in scope than those presented in the 
present study. Among the data collected about each company were the year of establishment, 
investments undertaken, investment year, country and industry, financial data and finally the 
motivation behind the foreign direct investments. Having established these criteria, a list with 
information about each company was sent to the CEO of the company to verify the 
information. The collected data cover the period 1992–2007. To enrich the database, 
interviews were carried out with managers of the companies, the CEOs, deputy CEOs and 
managers of corporate communications where ever information was missing. Those 
 74 
 
interviews were semi-structured, starting with very open questions on the companies’ 
internationalization processes and the motivations behind each investment, but using the 
conceptual framework and a research-question form to ensure that all the important areas 
were covered. The interviews were recorded and transcribed. In addition, annual reports, 
company presentations, press releases, journal articles, books and book chapters, newspaper 
articles and public statistics were used in case study analyses. Out of several approaches to 
case-based empirical research identified in related literature (Eisenhardt, 1989; Ragin et al., 
1994; Yin, 1993), the choice was made to follow the procedure of comparative case analysis 
as presented by Eisenhart (1989) and Ragin et al. (1994). This procedure consists of three 
steps. First, within-case analysis is conducted for each case. The task of this analysis is to 
determine the direction of dependencies between the studied variables in a concrete 
individual case so that a comparative analysis can ensue. The second step is to compare the 
results of individual cases in order to find cause–effect dependencies between the occurrence 
or non-occurrence of some variables and the occurrence or non-occurrence of other variables. 
Finally, the results of comparisons between cases are contrasted with the results of theoretical 
inquiry, making it possible to draw hypotheses and conclusions. This way, a generalized 
theoretical model of dependencies can be constructed. This model may be later subject to 
further empirical research to test its adequacy. In this sense, the results obtained are of an 
exploratory character. 
Description of the Case Companies 
Actavis was originally founded in 1956, under the name Pharmaco, as a purchasing alliance 
of Icelandic pharmacists. A few years later, it began production of its own pharmaceuticals 
for the domestic market. In 1981, Pharmaco established Delta to manufacture registered 
pharmaceutical products. A decade later, the ties between Pharmaco and Delta were severed 
because of a conflict of interest, only to merge again in 2002. At that time, the advance on 
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foreign markets had already begun with Pharmaco’s acquisition of Balkanpharma in 1999. 
This deal was a major milestone in Icelandic business history and laid the foreground for 
what was coming in other industries. In May 2004, Pharmaco Group changed its name to 
Actavis Group, aiming to benefit from a single strong brand name. Actavis is derived from 
two Latin words, “acta”, meaning action, and “vis”, meaning strength. The name is supposed 
to reflect the attitude and mindset of the company as a whole. Actavis’ expansion process has 
been both aggressive and fast. For the last decade, the total sales have grown intensely with 
multiple acquisitions and the market value has grown even faster. So far, the acquisition 
strategy seems to have been successful and focused. Upcoming years will reveal how well 
Actavis will succeed in gaining benefits from synergy and integration.  
The Actavis Group is now one of the world’s leading players in the field of high-
quality generic pharmaceuticals. It is among the world’s five largest companies in the 
industry and shows no intentions of slowing down. The group, headquartered in Iceland, has 
11,000 employees operating in 40 countries around the globe. The sales in 2006 were €1.4 
billion. The EBITDA was 20.8%, net income 8% and equity value €2.6 billion (Annual 
Report, 2006). The Actavis Group has development and manufacturing facilities in Europe, 
the US and Asia. The location of Actavis’s activities can be seen in table 1 and their 
internationalization process can be seen in figure 1 below. 
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Table 1. Location of Actavis’s activities 
 
Source: Company reports various years and author compilation.  
 
 
 
 
Country Manufacturing R&D facilities
Sales & 
marketing
Third party 
sales
Asia Pacific Region X
Africa X
Australia X
Austria X
Balkans X
Baltics X
Bulgaria X X
Czech Republic X
China X X
Germany X X
Hungary X
Iceland X X X
India X X
Indonesia X X
Italy X
Malta X X X
Mongolia X
Netherlands X
Nordic region X
North America X X X
Poland X
Portugal X
Romania X X
Russia X
Serbia X
Slovenia X
Slovakia X
Switzerland X
The Middle East X
The Common wealth 
of Independent states X
Turkey X X
Ukraine X
United Kingdom X X X
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Source: Company reports various years and author compilation.  
Figure 1. The internationalization process of Actavis 
Bakkavör 
Bakkavör was founded in August 1986. In the beginning, operations were primarily focused 
on processing and exporting cod roe to Scandinavia. Ten years later, the company had 
become a medium-sized Icelandic company and had reached its goal of manufacturing and 
selling fully processed goods directly to European retailers. The year 2000 became a turning 
point for the Bakkavör Group. The company was listed on the OMX Nordic Exchange in 
Iceland and announced that it would change its strategic focus from seafood to fresh prepared 
foods. The fresh prepared foods market was the most dynamic segment of the food industry 
and therefore represented an excellent growth opportunity. The final step in the transition was 
taken in 2003, when Bakkavör sold the seafood part of its operations. The Bakkavör Group is 
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now the largest provider of fresh prepared foods and produce in the UK, and develops and 
produces meal solutions under its customers’ own brands. Its key customers are food retailers 
(mainly in the UK, but also in continental Europe and China). The group manufactures 4,700 
products in 17 product categories, such as ready meals, pizzas, convenience salads and leafy 
salads. The group operates nearly 50 factories and employs over 17,000 people in 8 countries 
with a pro-forma turnover in 2006 of over £1 billion. The group’s Head Office is in 
Reykjavík, Iceland. In addition to the UK and Iceland, the group also has business operations 
in France, Belgium, Spain, China, the Czech Republic and South Africa and is well 
positioned for further expansion. The two brothers who founded the company have 
successfully managed Bakkavör Group’s growth through its 20-year history and they are still 
the group’s largest shareholders through their ownership of Exista hf in Iceland, which owns 
the single largest stake in Bakkavör Group. The turnover in 2007 was £1.5 billion. EBITDA 
was £149 million in 2007 (Annual Report 2005; 2006; 2007). 
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Source: Company reports various years and author compilation.  
Figure 2. The internationalization process of Bakkavör 
Baugur Group 
The history of Baugur Group can be traced back to the establishment of Bónus, an Icelandic 
grocery retailer, in 1989. It started off as a family business and operations grew considerably 
during the next few years as several new Bónus stores opened. In 1992, the owners of 
Hagkaup, an Icelandic retailer, acquired a 50% share in Bónus. In the following year, 
Hagkaup and Bónus established a joint purchasing company named Baugur and eventually 
the companies merged under that name. Baugur was listed on the OMX Nordic Exchange in 
Iceland in 1998, and acquired several other Icelandic retailers before the company started its 
advance on foreign markets. In 2002, proposals were approved to change the name of Baugur 
to Baugur Group hf and to rearrange the company’s organizational structure. In May 2003, 
Mundur ehf. a holding company mainly owned by the original Bónus family, acquired all the 
outstanding stock of Baugur Group and, soon afterwards, the company was delisted from the 
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OMX Nordic Exchange. Since then, Baugur’s operations have changed dramatically, 
primarily emphasizing influencial investments in the Danish and British retail markets. The 
company has also been active on the real estate markets in those countries, especially in 
Denmark. Now, Baugur Group’s main policy is to focus on investments in the retail, service 
and real estate sectors, in Iceland and Northern Europe. The company seeks out shares in 
companies that have a strong market position, yet also show potential for further growth, and 
are run by a strong team of managers interested in cooperating with the company. Companies 
related to Baugur Group employ close to 74,500 people worldwide in over 3,700 stores. The 
annual turnover for companies in which Baugur Group is a major shareholder totalled GBP 
8.7 billion in 2005. The foreign advance of Baugur Group has been extensive, and its status 
as an unlisted company means that the demand for detailed information is not as strong. 
Therefore, the following coverage of its acquisitions will include only the company’s main 
investments, and a brief enumeration of its foreign investments is provided. 
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Source: Company reports various years and author compilation.  
Figure 3. The internationalization process of Baugur Group 
 
 
In March 2009, the structure of one of the largest companies in Iceland, Baugur Group, 
looked like this: 
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Source: Company reports various years and author compilation.  
Figure 4. The structure of Baugur Group 
As can be seen in figure 4, there are quite a few holding companies operating around Baugur 
Group. In Iceland, it has been quite fashionable to separate companies into holding 
companies, operational companies and property companies. The reason for showing the 
structure of Baugur Group is because the structure of the company is the key to the business 
model that was used in Iceland and is only showed here to give an example of the structure of 
the Icelandic MNCs and will be discussed more in the concluding chapter. 
Kaupthing 
Kaupthing hf. was originally established at the dawn of financial liberalization in Iceland, in 
1982. It started off as a small agency for financial advisory services and securities brokerage. 
In the mid 1990s, Kaupthing began to flourish in securities brokerage and asset management. 
At the same time, it widened its focus to include opportunities abroad. Kaupthing Bank 
became licensed as an investment bank in 1997 and was granted a commercial banking 
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licence in January 2002. Kaupthing Bank is a European bank offering financial services to 
companies, institutional investors and high net-worth individuals. These services include 
corporate banking, investment banking, capital markets services, treasury services, asset 
management and comprehensive wealth management for private banking clients. Kaupthing 
Bank has continued to strengthen its international operations through acquisitions and the 
establishment of subsidiaries, expanding beyond the Nordic region’s borders and defining its 
presence in Northern Europe. Initial developments include the acquisitions of the brokerage 
house Sofi Oyj in Finland in 2001 as well as the Swedish bank JP Nordiska AB (now 
Kaupthing Bank Sverige AB) in November 2002. In 2003, the investment bank, Kaupthing 
Bank and Búnardarbanki, a corporate and retail bank, merged under the name Kaupthing 
Bank. The two most recent acquisitions, of Danish bank FIH Erhversbank A/S and Britain’s 
Singer & Friedlander Group plc (now Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander), are the most 
significant. Kaupthing Bank hf. is an Icelandic public limited company with its registered 
office and headquarters in Reykjavík. The bank is the parent company in a financial group 
that provides a wide range of financial services and products.  
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Source: Company reports various years and author compilation.  
Figure 5. The internationalization process of Kaupthing 
 
Motivation and Geographical Expansion of Icelandic MNEs 
According to Dunning (1993), firms will only invest abroad if the configuration of OLI 
advantages is desirable and, moreover, if some incentives exist, they are seeking something 
and realize that they can exploit the existing OLI advantages to attain their goals. The 
competitiveness of all of the case companies is based on strong ownership advantages, for 
example technological specialization, know how and broad scope of experience. Exploiting 
the specialized O-advantages in international markets has therefore been a fundamental 
driving force in their internationalization. In this way, strong O-advantages have influenced 
the companies’ motives for investing abroad, making it desirable to capitalize on the firm-
specific assets in order to achieve the goals of the companies. The motivation to exploit O-
 85 
 
advantages in foreign markets is closely related to the market-seeking behaviour as the small 
domestic market has limited the opportunities to exploit the possessed O-advantages fully.  
If we look at the case companies, it can be seen that the main motivation for OFDI is 
to gain access to new markets. For instance, Actavis aimed to grow faster than the 
competition in any given market and to gain a top five position in all of its key markets. 
“Building a business organically in different countries is not always easy”, says the former 
CEO of Actavis, Robert Wessman. The company is constantly gaining access to new markets 
through acquisitions, and it works to ensure that all products are cross-registered in Actavis’s 
main market segments around the world. Today, Actavis has located business units and 
developed partnerships strategically where cost efficiencies can also be achieved. It continues 
to expand its market reach through the opening of new offices and strategic acquisitions. 
Acquiring a base will enable the firm to penetrate the market with its products more quickly 
and those acquisitions must add value on a stand-alone basis. “We look specifically for 
companies that can strengthen our core business and create synergies within our Group. To 
date we have acquired almost 20 companies” (Robert Wessman, CEO, Interview with Wall 
Street Reporter, 24 March 2005). In 2008, it acquired more than 25 foreign companies. 
Another case company, Bakkavör, operates in a high-growth market too (the fresh 
prepared foods market, which grew by 11% in 2007). Bakkavör recently entered the Asian 
market where, in China for example, the annual market growth for food is around 15%. 
Looking at the motivation behind Bakkavör OFDI, it has mainly been market seeking, 
through acquisitions. The company has increased its market share in certain countries by 
acquisitions and strengthened its sales and marketing network through both acquisitions and 
greenfield investments.   
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In recent years, Kaupthing Bank has been one of the fastest growing financial groups in 
Europe. In 1998, Kaupthing was the first of the three Icelandic banks to expand its operations 
abroad, when it started Kaupthing Luxembourg SA, a securities firm. The bank’s expansion 
has been achieved through organic growth and a number of strategic acquisitions. The aim of 
this growth was to enhance further the bank’s ability to provide comprehensive services to its 
client base in the UK, the Nordic countries and elsewhere in Northern Europe. Kaupthing has 
been by far the most aggressive of the Icelandic banks in relation to acquisitions. The total 
value of the companies it has acquired during the past decade is approximately EUR 5 billion. 
The largest ones have been the acquisition of the Danish FIH bank in 2004 (approx. EUR 1 
billion), which at that time doubled the size of the bank, and Singer & Friedlander in the UK, 
which was acquired in 2005 (approx. EUR 0.8 billion).   
The need to be close to large and fast-growing international markets as well as the 
need for geographical proximity, in terms of being close to customers, adapting to local needs 
and extending the network of services worldwide are also all factors that fall within the 
market-seeking criteria and are reported as incentives behind the OFDI of Kaupthing Bank.  
All of the companies are also driven by the desire to grow within specialized market 
niches, not only by exploiting firm-specific ownership advantages, but also by augmenting 
these with foreign acquisitions of companies that complement their core capabilities and 
enable them to expand their operations and value chains. The sequential investments all 
comply with these focused strategies and add capacity, specialization and knowledge to the 
investing companies’ operating assets. All of the case companies have coordinated their 
cross-border activities effectively. 
Reviewing the importance of location-specific advantages, large and growing markets 
appear to be the most desirable source of L-advantages in selecting host countries. From the 
case analyses, a notable common emphasis was put on the objective to gain access to large 
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and attractive growth markets. On the other hand, other location-specific advantages such as 
cheap factors of production, for example in terms of natural resources, cheap labour or a 
friendly business environment are not found to have influenced the FDI engagement of the 
case companies. Rather, the existence of and a relatively easy access to large markets 
(compared with the small domestic one) in which strong O-advantages may be exploited are 
the most prominent attraction and market-seeking behaviour is deemed as the most important 
motive behind outward FDI for all our case companies. Although Europe and North America 
tend to attract the majority of Icelandic OFDIs, it is interesting to see how the motives differ 
between regions.   
Europe 
Eastern and Southern Europe 
The empirical literature provides several studies that investigate scope, structure and motives 
of Western FDI in Eastern Europe on a regional level (Borsos, 1995 for the Finish–Baltic 
region; for the Greek–Bulgarian–Albanian region see Petrakos, 1996; for the Austrian–
Slovakian region see Altzinger et al., 1998). All these studies report the predominance of 
market-driven FDI. Empirical studies of firms from Austria present the motives of FDI in the 
CEECs (Altzinger, 1998). Most of them present the results from a survey that is based on the 
self-assessment of the investors. These studies testify that the predominant motive of 
Austria’s FDI in the CEECs is “market access/to secure sales”. Out of the four case 
companies, only Actavis and Bakkavör have invested in Eastern Europe. Bakkavör has two 
acquisitions in Eastern Europe, i.e. the acquisition of Norpol Sp. Z.o.o in Poland in 2000 and 
it also has a 51% share in Heli Food Fresh in the Czech Republic. The motives are mainly 
market-seeking motives in an effort to strengthen their position in this region. Actavis has 
mainly been market seeking in the Eastern European countries as well. It has extended that 
focus to sales and marketing, a strategy reflected in its acquisitions in Poland, the Czech 
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Republic and Slovakia for example. In 2004, Actavis entered Poland by the acquisition of 
Biovena. That acquisition was mainly carried out to expand its presence in Eastern Europe. 
The same motive was behind its investment in the Czech Republic with the acquisition of 
Pharma Avalanche. Its investments in Eastern Europe are mainly motivated by seeking new 
diversified markets. Hoskisson and Hitt (1988) and Simpert and Duhaime (1997) argued that 
diversification could lead to lower levels of investment in new product and process 
technologies. Similarly, Bettis (1981) revealed that narrowly diversified firms had higher 
levels of expenditures on R&D and on advertising. In order to strengthen their sales and 
marketing strategy and to control a larger part of the value chain, it acquired Higia AD in 
Bulgaria in 2005 and a few weeks later it acquired Keri in Hungary. The same can be said 
about the acquisition of Sindan in Romania in 2006. The motive was to gain access to the 
market of oncology, which is a new market for Actavis. By that acquisition, Actavis was able 
to compete in a new market segment. Its acquisition of ZiO Zdorovje in Russia goes under 
the same category, market access. By controlling factories in Russia, Actavis could 
participate in public tenders and thus overcome institutional barriers to foreign investors. It 
has been quite a challange for the Russian authorities to improve the business climate and 
make the private sector thrive within the market environment and a lot of restructuring has 
taken place. To meet this challenge, structural concentration and discretion in regulatory 
practices and barriers to new entry have to take place (Broadman, 1999). 
Out of the four case companies, Actavis is the only one that has invested in Southern 
Europe. Actavis entered the southern part of Europe when it acquired Fako in Turkey. With 
that acquisition, it wanted to build a strong platform, enabling the company to register its 
products in those markets. Fako was a major investment for the small Actavis at that time in 
2004 so the investment scope was quite large. It provided a launch pad for the growing 
Turkish market and the expansion of the company into countries that are adjacent to Turkey 
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in Southern Europe. In 2008, Actavis entered Southern Europe when it acquired a 
manufacturing site, Pfizer, in Italy. The main motive was strategic asset seeking as, behind 
that acquisition, the aim was to meet the growth projections for an injectable oncology 
(cytotoxic) product portfolio over the coming years.   
Western Europe  
The Nordic countries and the UK play a dominating role as host countries for Icelandic 
OFDIs. By comparison with most regions in the world, the Nordic countries constitute a 
homogenous area. Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway are of about the same size; their 
history is intertwined and their economies relatively similar. Because their economies are 
open, Nordic firms depend extensively on countries outside the region for business 
(Björkman & Forsgren, 2000). The influence of Cyert and March (1963) and of Penrose 
(1959) largely explains why many Nordic researchers have perceived the internationalization 
of a firm as an incremental process, which is the main characteristic of the Uppsala model. 
Managers are risk avoiders rather than risk takers, and decisions about foreign investments 
are primarily based on experiential, individual knowledge. This theoretical background still 
inspires Nordic researchers (e.g., Eriksson, Johanson, Majkgard & Sharma, 2000). When 
discussing the Uppsala model, it is necessary to mention the root of the model. It can be said 
that the starting point behind the model was a collection of articles published by researchers 
at the University of Uppsala (Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977; Welch & Wiedersheim-Paul, 1980). In those articles, it was outlined what later was 
acknowledged as the Uppsala internationalization model. In this model, the 
internationalization of a firm is seen as an incremental process in which the firm gradually 
increases its international involvement. A considerable effort has been made to test the 
validity of the Uppsala model empirically. According to Björkman & Forsgren (2000), the 
sequence of foreign markets entered has been studied in Sweden (Engwall & Wallenstal, 
1988; Johanson & Sharma, 1987; Lindqvist, 1991; Nordstrom, 1991), Norway (Benito & 
 90 
 
Gripsrud, 1992), Denmark (Strandskov, 1995) and Finland (Luostarinen, 1979; while the 
sequence of market-entry modes has been analysed by Swedish (e.g., Ågren, 1990; Hedlund 
& Kverneland, 1985), Danish (Petersen & Pedersen, 1997), Norwegian (Juul & Walters, 
1987) and Finnish researchers (Bjorkman & Eklund, 1996; Luostarinen, 1979). However, 
Iceland is almost like a black hole in the study of the Uppsala model but Óladóttir (2009) 
showed that some Icelandic firms have followed the Uppsala model in the past. 
In 2002, Actavis acquired UNP in Denmark to gain access to new markets. A year 
later it acquired another Danish firm, Colotech. The same year it established a new unit in 
Sweden. In 2006, Actavis acquired Pliva Nordic Region, mainly to expand its European 
presence in the Nordic markets further. Bakkavör has mainly been market seeking in its 
investments in Northern Europe. The internationalization of the firm started in 1994 when it 
entered the UK market with a greenfield investment and Bakkavör UK Ltd was established, 
but its first foreign acquisition was in Sweden in 1999 when it acquired Lysekil 
Havsdelikatesser. In 2000, Bakkavör acquired Vine and Dine in the UK. In 2001, the firm 
entered Finland through a greenfield investment. Bakkavör Finland OY was established. To 
strengthen its presence in the UK market, it acquired Katsourish Fresh Food in the UK in 
2001. In 2002, it established a new unit in the UK and in 2004 it went through its largest 
acquisition so far when it acquired shares in Geest. The acquisition was completed in 2005. 
In 2005, it acquired Hitchen Foods in the UK. In 2006, Bakkavör strengthened its position in 
the UK market by acquiring four more firms. 
In 2000, Kaupthing Bank entered the Danish market by establishing a unit in 
Denmark. The same year, Kaupthing Bank also opened up an office in the Faroe Islands, the 
USA, Sweden and Switzerland. In 2001, Kaupthing acquired Sofi Financial Services Oyj in 
Finland, which was its first acquisition abroad. That was its first step to establishing its 
 91 
 
presence in the Nordic region. In 2002, the bank only acquired one firm and that was in 
Sweden, when it acquired Aragon Holding AB.   
In the year 2003, the bank acquired several firms abroad: Tyren Holding AS in 
Norway, JP Nordiska in Sweden, Noversita Oyj in Finland and BMY Corporate Finance 
Limited in the UK. In 2004, Kaupthing Bank established another office in the UK and 
acquired A. Sundvall AS in Norway and FIH Ervhervsbank through its largest acquisition so 
far. The acquisition of FIH Erhvervsbank was a part of the bank’s strategy to increase its 
corporate banking capabilities and expand its presence in the Nordic region. The acquisition 
doubled the size of the balance sheet at the time and provided a leading position in the Danish 
corporate banking sector. Since the acquisition, the bank has focused on realizing revenue 
through expanding into new business areas and cross selling products.  That was achieved by 
the acquisition of Singer & Friedlander. Kaupthing Bank acquired Singer & Friedlander in 
the UK in July 2005. The acquisition formed part of the bank’s strategy to expand the product 
offering in the UK in order to be able to provide SMEs and high net-worth individuals with 
an integrated and wide range of banking services. The year 2006 was quiet for Kaupthing 
Bank: it only made one greenfield investment in the UK.   
It also entered the Isle of Man by the acquisition of Derbyshire Offshore. Derbyshire 
Offshore will be integrated into Kaupthing’s existing Isle of Man operation. Kaupthing’s 
strategy for the business is to increase deposits and cross sell additional products. Gudni 
Adalsteinsson, Chief Treasurer (2007), says: “This acquisition is in line with Kaupthing’s 
strategy to increase the level of deposits within the bank. Derbyshire’s Offshore business is 
very efficiently run and will be a great addition to our current operations in the Isle of Man.” 
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The Americas  
All of the companies except Bakkavör have invested in North America to gain access to 
much larger markets. A combination of dynamic market and strategic asset-seeking motives 
underscore Actavis’s expansion in the US. In 2003, Actavis wanted to gain access to the 
North American market so it established Pharmaco Inc in the USA. In 2005, Actavis further 
penetrated the US market by acquiring Amide. A few months later it acquired the human 
generic part of Alpharma. Through the human generic part of Alpharma, Actavis also gained 
access to markets in Western Europe, China and Indonesia and other countries in that area in 
which Actavis had not operated before. Through the human generic part of Alpharma, the 
company gained access to the UK, Germany and the Netherlands, where it had not had its 
own brands distributed before and it managed to cover a larger part of the Nordic countries 
and Scandinavia through this acquisition. In November 2007, Actavis entered into the 
speciality generic markets by the acquisition of Abrika Pharmaceuticals Inc in the US to gain 
a stronger foothold in the high value controlled release market. Bakkavör is the only firm of 
the case companies that has invested in South America. That was in 2000, when Bakkavör 
acquired Pesquera Isla Del Rey in Chile. 
Asia 
The main motive behind Actavis’s expansion in Asia can be claimed to be strategic asset and 
efficiency seeking. In 2005, Actavis wanted to gain access to lower-cost contract research 
organization (CRO) capabilities in India, so it acquired the firm Lotus. Lotus Laboratories in 
India plays an important role in Actavis’s R&D capabilities. Actavis continues to strengthen 
Lotus Laboratories’s operation, including its bio-analytical and clinical capacity where the 
unit now has a capacity of over 300 beds. What is interesting here is that a generic 
pharmaceutical company seeks knowledge in an emerging economy like India, which has 
emerged as a significant force in the global biotech industry, according to Ernst & Young’s 
report for the year 2002. Two more acquisitions followed in India, i.e. in 2006 Grandix 
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Pharmaceuticals in India was acquired to gain access to low-cost manufacturing capability 
and in 2007 the company acquired the API division of Sanmar Speciality Chemicals Ltd, 
India. The rationale behind that acquisition was to gain the ability to develop and 
manufacture its own active pharmaceutical ingredients. With this acquisition, Actavis gained 
access to R&D activity, so the main motive was strategic asset seeking but also efficiency 
seeking as this would lead to lowering the manufacturing costs of such operations. China was 
also targeted by Actavis for strategic and efficiency-seeking purposes. In 2008, Actavis 
acquired Zhejiang Chiral, which is a medicine chemical company in China specializing in 
R&D and the production of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs).   
Discussion and Conclusions 
Recent developments in the international investment scene, such as the rise of MNCs from 
emerging economies, has put emphasis on the contextual nature of the configuration of the 
OLI parameters. The situation facing each particular firm, the response of the firm to the OLI 
configuration at hand and, thus, the decision to engage in FDI reflect the contextual variables 
specific to each firm (Dunning, 2000).  In this contextual framework, we distinguished 
certain key characteristics of Icelandic MNCs. These characteristics are labelled as the three 
Ss, which stand for scope, speed and specificity. In particular:  
Scope: reflects OFDIs that are intended to capitalize on a strong customer base and 
reputation. Building on Dunning (1988), scope reflects primarily asset-related ownership 
advantages (Oa). In this sense, the MNC (in our case the Icelandic MNC) either exploits its 
existing ownership advantages or acquires, instead of generating, foreign proprietary assets in 
order to meet the pressures of international competition. At the same time, as Dunning 
suggests, there is an element of transaction ownership advantages (Ot) in scope as the MNC 
decides to internalize additional unique proprietary assets by acquiring a foreign firm instead 
of using the market mechanism, i.e. licensing or franchising. In such a case, the coexistence 
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of Oa and Ot determines the nature of the scope. Scope also reflects locational advantages: 
the exploitation of Oas is related to a particular market. Thus, scope reflects the 
interdependence between ownership advantages and location/market advantages (Dunning, 
1988: 4) and, contrary to Dunning, actually explains not only common ownership but also the 
mapping of the location of the subsidiary network of the MNC. Recent work by Rugman and 
Verbeke (2004) and also empirical work related to the OFDI of small countries does suggest 
that MNEs show a particular regional pattern in the spread of their subsidiary network. It is 
consequently logical to assume that scope bridges common ownership with the location 
choice and identity of foreign subsidiaries. For example, Icelandic firms seem to have 
followed an investment strategy where they grew significantly in size through single 
investments. As such, they seem to have aimed for relatively large, well-known and 
established companies with a strong customer base instead of buying small and unknown 
companies as a stepping stone into the foreign market. All of the four case companies have 
invested in this way. For Kaupthing Bank, the acquisition of the Danish bank FIH 
Erhvervsbank was by the far the largest takeover that the bank had been involved with in the 
year 2004. Sigurdur Einarsson, the chairman of the board of Kaupthing Bank said, “I believe 
that FIH Erhvervsbank is an exceptional company and this acquisition will prove to be a first-
rate investment. It has balanced the income distribution of the Bank and increased its 
geographic diversification. Having FIH on board presents a broad range of growth 
opportunities in Norway, Sweden and Denmark” (Annual Report, 2004). For Actavis, the 
acquisition of Alpharma was a really large acquisition that placed Actavis at number five in 
the world of generic pharmaceutical companies. 
Speed assesses the efficiency of investment execution, from target screening to deal 
making and purchase. Speed falls primarily into a transaction ownership advantage (Ot) as it 
reflects efficiency in the internal decision-making process and coordination implementation. 
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In extending the argument, speed also captures internalization advantages (I) as it reflects the 
effectiveness of management control (Dunning, 1988: 12, Figure 1). Internalization theory 
suggests that the growth of an MNC may come through cross-border transactions providing a 
more macro view of OFDI. If a micro view of OFDI is taken, then the ultimate focus will be 
on the quality of a specific managerial decision (Dunning, 2000). In such a case, the 
experience of the manager, the strategic goals of the firm alongside its O advantages, as well 
as the L advantages, result in very complex and specific investment decisions. As Dunning 
(2000) stated, organization scholars and transaction costs theorists emphasize the role of 
management (such as Prahalad, Doz and Williamson). In this case, the unit of analysis is even 
narrower, to that of the manager, and eventually these unique managerial capabilities, which 
are very tacit in nature, reflect dynamic Oas. Speed in a contemporary context brings forward 
the contribution of corporate governance scholars who explicitly address the role of boards in 
the decision and implementation of strategic investment and it also stresses the role of 
institutions as a distinctive location factor in monitoring the impact of management 
processes. At the same time, speed is related to the internationalization model of MNCs. 
Efficient management processes should be evaluated in terms of the pool and quality of 
information surrounding the prospect OFDI. This could eventually explain either a gradual or 
more aggressive foreign market entry. This explains the “born global” nature of many 
Icelandic MNCs (Óladóttir, 2009). Speed is a clear characteristic of Icelandic FDI. 
Investment execution, from the target screening to the deal making and purchase, of Icelandic 
companies seems to have been very fast. As an example, one of the fastest-growing Icelandic 
companies has a record of purchasing close to 30 foreign companies over a period of 6 years, 
from 2000–2006. In May 2007, according to a study conducted by Deloitte International, 
Baugur Group was the company that had grown the most of all retail companies in the whole 
world, or about 106% per year for the previous 5 years. The other 3 case companies have also 
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grown extremely fast in recent years. The former deputy CEO of Actavis, Svafa Grönfeldt, 
said: “Our flexibility is a strength, our decision making is quick amd we make speedy 
implementations like Robert Wessman will tell you. We educate each and every member of 
staff about our progress and our goals. For years, we have built a winning mindset within a 
winning team” (Grönfeldt, 2007). To give an example of the speed during the investment 
process, in the year 2005, Actavis acquired 6 different firms overseas or 1 every other month. 
The chairman of the board of Kaupthing Bank, Sigurður Einarsson, says in the Annual Report 
of 2003 that “Despite the Bank’s rapid growth rate, lines of communication have always been 
short and clear. A critical component of Kaupthing Bank’s competitive edge is its swift 
decision making process, and this is something appreciated by our customers. The careful and 
considered decision making process is not compromised by speed but is driven by the 
efficiency of the Bank’s organisation.”   
Finally, specificity assesses the OFDI in terms of the relative position of OFDI among 
its competitors. Thus, it provides a supply-side element of the OFDI project that Icelandic 
firms look into when they invest abroad as they need to augment their competitive 
advantages.  Specificity, like scope, reflects mainly Oa advantages. However, in contrast to 
scope, specificity reflects the potential for asset-generating ownership advantages and thus 
embodies the characteristic of dynamic ownership advantages. Specificity incorporates the 
elements of uniqueness and stickiness and thus non-replicability (Hymer, 1960). MNCs from 
small countries would mostly tend to acquire unique assets abroad as their foreign operations 
would play a more extensive role in the internationalization process compared with 
headquarters. Foreign operations are also more exposed to global competition compared with 
domestic operations and thus are more sensitive in assessing the dynamic context of the Oa 
necessary for sustainable competition. Thus, the third characteristic of the Icelandic 
investments is specificity, where investment focus seems to be very narrow, i.e. Icelandic 
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companies seem to follow an investment pattern (or strategy) of obtaining a leading position 
and size in a given market niche. Firms in the food processing industry and generic 
pharmaceuticals, to name two, would evidently fall into this category. Bakkavör has 
specialized in the fresh prepared foods markets, which is a growing market, especially in 
Asia. Actavis has focused on the generic pharmaceutical market and has, as mentioned above, 
placed itself at number five in the world. Kaupthing Bank has focused on a special market 
niche as well. For example, the bank acts as an integrated financial services provider for 
SMEs, institutional investors and high net-worth individuals, whom the bank believes are not 
adequately served by larger financial institutions (Kaupthing Annual Report, 2007). The 
retail, property and media company, Baugur Group, has also been quite focused and has 
changed the structure of the company to fit its strategy better.  A research by  Dimitratos, 
Johnson, Slow & Young (2003) shows that MNCs have to develop and nurture their key 
resources in order to satisfy, in an apparently unique way, customer needs in their market 
niches. 
In concluding, one or more factors may motivate each firm to engage in FDI. 
Moreover, motives may differ or change over time and often motives for initial versus 
sequential investments may differ (Dunning, 1997). In assessing the relationship between the 
3 Ss with different motivations, we would expect scope to be related mostly to market 
seeking (as it reflects a static Oa). Specificity would then be related to strategic asset seeking 
(being a dynamic Oa). Although we could expect efficiency seeking in the deployment of 
speed, we could claim that Speed, being a dynamic Ot, transcends OFDIs regardless of the 
motivation.  Finally, it is important to note that, for scope and specificity, the unit of analysis 
is the firm, whilst for speed, the unit of analysis is the manager and/or the Board of Directors. 
The comparison of the four case companies showed considerable consistency 
regarding their motives. All of them emphasize strongly that a great deal of self-confidence in 
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their respective firm-specific ownership advantages has driven them to internationalize. This 
can mainly be seen in the scope of their investment and in the speed of the international 
expansion. Limited growth potential in the domestic market was a major impetus for all of 
the companies to invest abroad, and their primary objective to sustain future growth and 
increase profitability. All of the companies have followed a focused corporate strategy with 
highly ambitious goals of becoming market leaders in their market niches (Kaupthing Bank is 
the only company that has not achieved this already but its goal was to become one of the 
fifty largest banks in the world). Furthermore, the investments of the case companies have 
served both to replicate the domestic services in foreign countries as well as to expand their 
portfolio of activities further. Recent developments cast doubt on the efficient application of 
the 3 Ss. Future research should evaluate the failure of the 3 Ss by investigating issues such 
as the decision-making processes (an Ot characteristic) and the lack of institutions- as a 
determining L- characteristic- controlling for the decision-making process in both Iceland and 
the host countries that were affected by the collapse of Icelandic MNCs.  
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Abstract 
The aim of the paper is to analyse the overseas activities of multinational corporations 
(MNCs) coming from small economies and their global expansion strategies behind outward 
foreign direct investments (OFDI). The focus countries are Ireland, Iceland, and Israel which 
are listed in the top 20 most dynamic outward investors in the World Investment Report 
(2007). Using a sample of 1089 foreign operations, of which 187 are Icelandic, 444 are Irish, 
and 458 are Israeli operations, we explore the geographical and industrial pattern of their 
direct investment strategies. Our analysis reveals several important facts. Firstly, most of the 
OFDI is directed to finance, insurance, and real estate services for all the countries. Secondly, 
by far the majority of investment projects are carried out in Europe and North America, 
which are almost equal in terms of frequency of investments. Finally, with regard to their 
investment strategies, risk-diversification strategies seem to be the dominant expansion 
strategy choice followed by horizontal integration expansion strategies. 
 
Keywords: OFDI, MNC, Horizontal integration, Vertical integration, Lateral integration, 
small economies, Iceland, Ireland, Israel.
                                                 
12 Corresponding author;Ásta Dís Óladóttir, Bifröst University and Copenhagen Business School:  Emails: astadis@bifrost.is or ado.int@cbs.dk  
Telephonenumber 00354 -4333000 
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Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is one of the main engines of growth for national economies. 
In particular, many small and medium-sized countries have grown through promoting and 
attracting FDI. At the same time, FDI enables a country to integrate better into an intensive 
globalized economic environment and successfully face the challenges set by international 
competition (Pearce, 2009). Recent data (UNCTAD, 2007a) indicated that newcomer small 
economies lead in the growth of global outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). Iceland 
holds the leading performance position as an outward investor, Ireland is ranked eighth, and 
Israel ranks in place 15: all of them are among the 20 top countries (out of 140) in outward 
investment performance. All three countries are small countries and their multinational 
corporations (MNCs) are emerging as dynamic competitors in the international investment 
scene. In view of these facts, the main purpose of this paper is a) to analyse the determinants 
of the global integration strategies of Icelandic, Israeli, and Irish MNCs by focusing on a 
number of firm- and country-level factors and b) to map the network of their foreign 
operation activities. In order to quantify our research, we constructed a categorical strategy 
variable by comparing the four-digit industrial classification of each operation abroad in the 
sample with that of its ultimate parent. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the 
next session, we analyse our theoretical thoughts and the relevant literature. We proceed with 
the data and country presentation and then we analyse the econometric results. Finally, we 
conclude.
 
Theoretical background and literature review 
There is considerable evidence that there are certain common characteristics in small open 
economies (e.g., Bellak & Cantwell, 1998; Dunning & Narula, 1996; Freeman & Lundvall, 
1988; Hoesel & Narula, 1999; Van Den Bulcke & Verbeke, 2001) that cause their firms to be 
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more globalized than firms from larger countries. Globalization, as used here, refers to 
economic globalization, which we define as the increasing cross-border interdependence and 
integration of production and markets for goods, services, and capital. This process leads both 
to a widening of the extent and form of international transactions and to a deepening of the 
interdependence between the actions of economic actors located in one country and those 
located in other countries (Narula & Dunning, 2000). The literature has illustrated that small 
open economies tend to be more internationalized, with a relatively large share of the value-
added activity being conducted with the explicit purpose of serving overseas markets. 
Furthermore, firms from these countries tend to be competitive in a few niche sectors, as 
small countries tend to have limited resources and prefer to engage in activities in a few 
targeted sectors, rather than spreading these resources thinly across several industries (Benito 
et al., 2002). At the same time, there is appreciable variation between countries because small 
and open economies (SMOPECs) are by no means a homogenous group. There can be many 
factors that encourage a firm from a small economy to expand outside its home market. The 
limited domestic market size means that, if such firms are to achieve economies of scale in 
production, they must seek additional markets to that of their home location in order to 
increase their market size (Bellak & Cantwell, 1998; Narula, 1996; Walsh, 1988). First, a 
small market size constitutes a disadvantage in the development of process technology as 
economies of scale are not present, but may provide a competitive advantage in product 
innovation (Walsh, 1988). Second, firms from small countries have access to fewer kinds of 
created location advantages at home. That is, the infrastructure and national business systems 
tend to be focused on fewer industrial sectors. Globalization has also meant that firms 
increasingly need to maintain competencies in several areas, as products become increasing 
multi-technological in nature (Granstrand, Patel, & Pavitt, 1997; Krugman, 1998). In this 
context, it is well documented in the international business literature that MNCs can generate 
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and implement a wide range of global integration strategies that eventually fit into certain 
organizational structures, which in turn correspond to distinctive expansion motives. 
Traditionally, there are two main, distinct motives for companies to invest in foreign 
countries. The two main reasons are to serve a local market better and to access lower-cost 
inputs. The desire to serve a local market better is often referred to as horizontal FDI 
(Dunning, 2003; Grossman, Helpman, & Szeidl, 2003). It typically involves the duplication 
in foreign locations of the activities of the firm in the home market in order to supply foreign 
customers better. It can be said that the main motive here is to reduce the costs involved in 
supplying the foreign market and also to improve the firm’s competitive position there. It can 
be said that horizontal FDI arises as a substitute for exporting and from a desire to place 
production close to customers and thereby avoid trade costs, being both transportation costs 
and trade barriers (Buckley & Casson, 1981). This may be particularly appealing to a 
company when its home market is small and saturated and there are barriers to exporting. 
Accessing lower-cost inputs or resource seeking is another motivation for FDI. This form of 
foreign investment is often characterized as vertical FDI, since it involves breaking up the 
vertical chain of production and relocating part of the firms’ activities in a lower-cost 
location. Firms with labour-intensive operations, but based in advanced high-cost countries, 
may establish operations in lower-wage countries to cut costs. Markusen and Maskus (2001) 
note that the choice between vertical and horizontal production structures basically depends 
on country characteristics. Relative size and relative endowment differences and trade and 
investment costs, respectively, can determine the choice of foreign strategic expansion. Their 
review of recent empirical work leads to the conclusion that most OFDI is of the horizontal 
type. Since horizontal FDI is most prevalent among countries that are similar in both size and 
relative endowments, they say “that it is similarities between countries rather than differences 
that generate the most multinational activities” (Markusen & Maskus, 2001: 39). Vertical FDI 
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is traditionally related to the desire of MNCs to carry out unskilled-labour-intensive 
production activities in locations that have relatively abundant unskilled labour (Braconier, 
Norback, & Urba, 2005; Dunning, 2003; Grossman et al.,1986; Markusen, 1995).13 It is well 
known that the distinctions between horizontal and vertical FDI can become a little fuzzy 
sometimes because overseas investments may serve more than one purpose, for example to 
lower costs and improve sales in a foreign market or even some other purpose, or because 
firms may also invest overseas to acquire new technologies perceived as being important for 
future competitive success. It could also be argued that firms want to spread the risk or risk 
diversify through the global exploitation of unique assets as yet another reason to invest 
abroad (Hymer, 1976).   
Nevertheless, the investment choices of many multinational enterprises today are far 
more complex. Firms often follow strategies that involve vertical integration in some 
countries and horizontal integration in others. Grossman et al. (1986) conclude that MNCs 
can pursue more complicated international integration strategies that are determined by 
factors such as transport costs, productivity, and the relative size of the host market. 
  Yet another important aspect that can explain the pursuit of complex investment 
strategies is inspired by the transaction cost literature. Location factors should then be 
complimented with firm-level factors to explain the form of integration a firm will pursue 
through its network of affiliates (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Luo, 2002). This is the case for 
lateral integration. Associated with efficiency-seeking motives, it can be said that lateral 
integration is affected by the organizational infrastructure and the strategic capabilities of a 
firm (Dunning, 1993; Luo, 2002). A distinct variant of lateral integration is the pursuit of new 
                                                 
13 Vertical FDI and horizontal FDI have been tested in a number of empirical papers, including those by Brainard & Riker 
(1997), Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (1998), Markusen and Maskus (1999), Markusen and Maskus (2001), and Yeaple 
(2003).  
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competences in the form of new knowledge in other markets (Hashai & Almor, 2008). In this 
paper, we support that MNCs from small economies pursue complex integration strategies 
beyond the combination of horizontal and vertical strategies, which also include lateral 
integration as well as risk- diversification strategies through the network of their overseas 
subsidiaries. Indicatively, the Icelandic firm Actavis has 28 units abroad,14 11 of which 
reflect the horizontal integration strategy, in four cases lateral integration and in 13 cases the 
company was diversifying risk. In Ireland, Experian Group Ltd has 19 overseas production 
operations, 12 of which were integrated horizontally and seven were for diversification. 
Finally, in Israel, the RAD Group reports 10 units abroad. Four of them are involved in 
horizontal integration strategies, four in lateral integration, and two in diversification. In this 
paper, we use country-level MNC subsidiary data for Iceland, Ireland, and Israel in order to 
understand the determinants of the four types of international expansion strategies of 
Icelandic, Irish, and Israeli MNCs’ overseas operations or OFDIs. In the following parts, we 
define four types of expansion strategies via OFDI and we analyse the determinants of each 
strategy based on the examination of firm- and country-level factors.  
Data, Descriptive Statistics, and Variables 
In this section, we explore the investment trends and patterns of Icelandic, Irish, and Israeli 
MNCs. To this end, we use a sample of 1089 overseas operating units,15 of which 187 are 
Icelandic, 444 are Irish, and 458 are Israeli. These data are for the year 2008 and are obtained 
from the Spring 2008 edition of the Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations Plus directory, which 
contains detailed information on the firm-level variables used in our analysis. Companies 
listed in the Directory usually report revenues in excess of $10 million and employment 
larger than 300 persons.   
 
                                                 
14 See section 3 on definitions 
15 We use the terms overseas production units or operations in order to avoid confusion with the term subsidiary, which in 
this paper is used a proxy for the legal status of the overseas unit. 
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Location has been a key consideration for foreign investment activities (Buckley & Casson, 
1976; Dunning, 1998; Porter & Sölvell, 1998; Root, 1994). Market potential or size (Agarwal 
& Ramaswami, 1992; Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000), political and legal environments (Delios 
& Beamish, 1999; Gomes-Casseres, 1989), and production and transportation costs (Root, 
1994) have been emphasized as major factors that an MNC should consider before selecting 
target countries. Recently, international locations have gained additional strategic importance 
as sources of new learning, of knowledge creation, and of new or enhanced competitiveness 
(Dunning, 1998; Dunning & Lundan, 1998; Frost & Zhou, 2000; Makino, Lau, & Yeh, 2002; 
Porter & Sölvell, 1998).   
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Table 1: Geographical distribution of overseas operating units 
 
Source: Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations Directory, 2008 ( authors’ calculations) 
 
Table 2: Regional distribution of subsidiaries 
 
Source: Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations Directory, 2008 ( authors’ estimations) 
 
Host Country Iceland Ireland Israel Host Country Iceland Ireland Israel
Argentina 2 5 Korea (South) 2
Australia 5 5 Lithuania 1
Austria 1 Luxembourg 3 1
Belgium 1 4 4 Malta 1
Brazil 1 1 5 Mexico 1 4
Canada 4 5 8 Netherlands 7 12 10
China 1 5 New Zealand 1
China (Hong Kong) 1 4 8 Norway 9 4
Chile 1 1 Paraguay 1
Colombia 1 Philippines 1 3
Cyprus 1 Poland 4 14 4
Czech Republic 1 1 7 Portugal 1
Denmark 9 4 Romania 2
Faroe Island 1 Russia 1 1
Finland 2 1 Serbia 1
France 4 5 15 Singapore 1 2 4
Germany 6 10 24 Spain 4 10 7
Greece 1 1 South Africa 1 1
Guernsey 2 Slovakia 1
Hungary 4 Sweden 7 2
India 2 1 1 Switzerland 3 2 4
Indonesia 1 Taiwan 1
Ireland 4 1 Turkey 1
Israel 1 100 Thailand 1 3
Italy 1 4 6 USA 30 238 155
Isle of Man 1 Uruguay 1 1
Japan 1 4 10 United Kingdom 73 96 26
Jersey 2 1 Vietnam 1
Kazakhstan 1 Total 187 444 458
Africa Asia Pacific Europe Middle East North America South America Total
Iceland 0 9 132 0 34 2 177
Ireland 1 18 172 1 244 4 440
Israel 1 43 142 0 167 14 367
Total 2 70 446 1 445 20 984
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Table 1 shows the geographical distribution of foreign units by host country. The 
geographical distribution reveals that there are 57 host countries in which Icelandic, Irish, and 
Israeli firms have established operations. Among them, Icelandic, Irish, and Israeli firms have 
the highest number of operating units in the USA and the UK. If, however, the focus is set on 
the geographical distribution of these units (see Table 2), we would observe that, instead of 
being globally distributed, there is a strong regional dimension, with almost an equal number 
of units being directed to Europe and North America. The second distant destination is Asia 
Pacific, hosting 70 units, followed by South America. In contrast, Africa and the Middle East 
are hosting very few operations from the three countries. 
Table 3:  Definition of expansion strategies 
 
As the aim of this paper is to analyse the global expansion strategies of MNCs coming from 
small economies, we have constructed a categorical variable by comparing the four-digit 
industrial classification of each overseas unit in the sample with that of its ultimate parent. 
Based on this, the strategy is deemed to be horizontal integration if the overseas unit operates 
in the same core or related industry as its parent.  In order to distinguish among resource and 
efficiency seeking motivated investment (Dunning, 1993) we  identified two types of 
strategies i.e. vertical integration capturing  overseas investment  in natural resource 
industries and  lateral integration  capturing investment in different stages of the value chain, 
forward or backward. Finally, we identified a fourth strategy, i.e. that of diversification if the 
overseas unit and its parent operate in unrelated industries.16 
 
                                                 
16  Most of the subsidiaries had multiple industrial profiles, i.e., more than one industrial classification. The data allowed us 
to distinguish the core industry of the subsidiary as well as the core industry of the parent.   
Parent Expansion strategy
Same core industry Horizontal integration
Subsidiary Natural resource industries Vertical integration
Operate in the same industry/different stages Lateral integration
Unrelated industries Risk diversification
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Table 4: Regional Distribution and Expansion Strategies by Icelandic, Irish and Israeli firms. 
Expansion 
Strategies 
Horizontal
Integration
Vertical
Integration
Lateral
Integration
Risk 
Diversification 
Total
Country of Origin & Regional 
Distribution 
Icelandic   
Africa 0 0 0 0 0
Asia Pacific 5 0 1 3 9
Europe 55 0 22 55 132
Middle East 0 0 0 0 0
North America 14 0 7 13 34
South America 2 0 0 0 0
Irish   
Africa 1 0 0 0 1
Asia Pacific 9 0 9 0 18
Europe 48 10 92 22 172
Middle East 0 0 1 0 1
North America 48 27 72 97 244
South America 4 0 0 0 4
Israeli   
Africa 1 0 0 0 1
Asia Pacific 16 0 19 8 43
Europe 49 9 54 30 142
Middle East 0 0 0 0 0
North America 34 17 26 90 167
South America 7 4 3 0 14
Source: Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations Directory, 2008 ( authors’ estimations) 
 
Table 4 looks at the expansion strategies by country of origin. It can be seen that Irish firms 
are mainly investing in North America and Europe, and that their expansion strategy is 
mostly lateral integration in Europe and diversification in North America. Icelandic firms 
have mainly focused on Europe as their host region for OFDI and their dominant expansion 
strategy is horizontal integration and diversification. Israeli firms have invested mainly in 
North America, through horizontal integration and diversification, whilst lateral integration is 
the dominant strategy of expansion in Europe. 
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Table 5:  Industrial Distribution of Icelandic, Irish and Israeli overseas units 
Industry Number of Icelandic 
Firms 
Number of Irish 
Firms 
Number of Israeli 
Firms 
Total 
Agriculture, Forestry & 
Fishing 
0 8 0 8 
Mining & Construction 0 4 1 5 
Manufacturing: Food, 
Textile, Furniture, 
Chemicals.  
62 43 68 173 
Manufacturing: Rubber, 
Leather, Stone, Electronics 
and Transportation 
Equipment 
19 132 75 226 
Wholesale & Retail Trade 0 26 11 37 
Finance, Insurance & Real 
Estate 
89 136 89 314 
Transportation, 
Communication, Electric, 
Gas and Sanitary Services 
7 23 17 47 
Services: Hotel, Business 
Service 
5 50 86 141 
Services: Health and Legal 
Services 
5 18 11 34 
Total 187 440 358 985 
Source: Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations Directory, 2008 ( authors’ estimations) 
 
Table 5 shows the distribution of overseas units across industries defined at the SIC four-digit 
level. Across all three origin countries, subsidiaries are concentrated in the manufacturing and 
finance, insurance, and real estate industries with no or very few investments in agriculture 
and in mining and construction. 
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Table 6: Size Distribution of overseas operations by country of origin 
 
 
Source: Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations Directory, 2008 ( authors’ estimations) 
 
Analysing the scale of investment would have required data on investment spending for each 
country. In their absence, we use sales as a proxy for the size of investment projects/units. 
For the purposes of this analysis, we have classified units into five groups according to the 
sales revenue they generate17 as follows and can be seen in Table 6: those generating up to 
100 million dollars in sales, those generating between 100 and 500 million dollars, those 
generating between 500 million and 1 billion dollars, those generating between 1 and 1.5 
billion dollars, and those generating more than 1.5 billion dollars. 
As Table 6 shows, most of the OFDIs are of a relatively small size. Out of a total of 
965 operations for all of the three countries,18 810 generate sales under 500 million dollars. 
For all the countries, most firms generate sales between 100 and 500 million dollars. 
Table 7. Distribution of global expansion strategies of Icelandic, Irish and Israeli MNCs by 
ownership control. 
Expansion 
Strategies 
Icelandic Irish Israeli 
Affiliates Subsidiaries JV Affiliates Subsidiaries JV Affiliates Subsidiaries JV 
Horizontal 
Integration 
12 48 10 18 77 15 16 78 13 
Vertical 
Integration 
0 0 0 7 27 3 5 21 4 
Lateral 
Integration 
5 22 3 25 130 19 15 76 11 
Diversification 11 49 11 16 88 15 16 81 12 
Total 28 119 24 66 322 52 52 256 40 
Source: Lexis Nexis Corporate Affiliations Directory, 2008 ( authors’ estimations) 
                                                 
17 We do not possess data on the exact level of sales. Rather, we have data on the interval where sales fall. In constructing 
the intervals, we have balanced the need to keep their number manageable and not to pool together firms of substantially 
different sizes. 
18 The number of observations may differ due to a lack of information per variable analysed.  
Sales
Number of 
Icelandic 
Firms
Number of 
Irish Firms
Number of 
Israeli Firms Total
Up to 100 million $ 48 147 112 307
100 - 500 million $ 87 211 205 503
500 million - 1 billion $ 26 39 16 81
1 – 1,5 billion $ 11 18 10 39
More than 1,5 billion $ 5 25 5 35
Total 177 440 348 965
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Reviewing the ownership control of establishment in foreign markets (see Table 7) shows 
that subsidiaries are the most preferred mode of establishment, across the origin countries. 
According to the definitions provided by the Corporate Affiliations Directory, subsidiary 
indicates majority ownership (more than 50%), affiliate indicates ownership less than 50%, 
and joint venture indicates a share of ownership. 
  Out of 171 overseas units for Icelandic firms, 119 are established as subsidiaries, 28 
as affiliates, and 24 as joint ventures. Furthermore, Icelandic MNCs prefer diversification and 
horizontal expansion strategies and do not use vertical expansion strategies. Regarding Irish 
firms, out of 440 establishments, 322 are subsidiaries, 66 affiliates, and 52 joint ventures and 
their preferred expansion strategy is lateral expansion, followed by diversification. Similarly, 
most Israeli firms are established as subsidiaries and their preferred expansion strategy is 
diversification, followed by horizontal and lateral integration. Hence, we notice that, 
regardless of the nationality of foreign units and the expansion strategy, MNCs desire to have 
majority control over their overseas operations with subsidiaries being the dominating 
ownership control. The MNC achieves advantages through both vertical and horizontal 
integration (Buckley & Ghauri, 2004). 
Variables and Hypotheses 
Dependent Variables: Our dependent variable is the type of investment strategy. The 
strategy is deemed to be horizontal integration if the overseas unit operates in the same core 
or related industry as its parent; vertical integration if investment abroad is made in natural 
resource industries; lateral integration if the overseas unit and its parent operate at different 
stages of the value chain; and diversification if the overseas unit and its parent operate in 
unrelated industries.19 
                                                 
19  Most of the subsidiaries had multiple industrial profiles, i.e., more than one industrial classification. The data allowed us 
to distinguish the core industry of the subsidiary as well as the core industry of the parent.   
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Independent variables: Based on Dunning (1993), Markusen and Maskus (2001), and 
Narula and Dunning (2000), we assume that different ownership- and location-specific 
advantages will stimulate different expansion strategies. Thus, the set of independent 
variables consists of both firm-specific and location-specific ones.  
Firm-specific variables include:  
The ownership control of establishing an operation abroad, namely, the affiliate , subsidiary, 
or joint venture, captured by their respective dummies. Multinationals can choose between 
establishing an affiliate or acquiring existing firms when entering foreign markets. However, 
regardless of the choice, they control full equity (i.e., majority owned subsidiaries) or shared 
ownership with local partners (i.e., joint ventures). Therefore, depending on the stake taken in 
the targets, international acquisitions can be classified into two major categories, full or 
partial. This distinction is missing in many previous studies (Chen, 2008).  
In addition, it is common knowledge that the share of ownership falls under the literature on 
entry mode (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986).  The understanding is that the higher the 
ownership share the higher the desire to control foreign operations.  Key underlying factor is 
the need for the MNCs to secure and also to develop proprietary capabilities through their 
overseas subsidiaries.  In this context, when the foreign unit is pursuing a strategy that is 
driven by the requirement of unique resources the more likely it would be for the MNC to 
secure a high ownership control (Berry and Sakakibara, 2006). We thus formulate hypothesis 
one as follows: 
 
 H1:  The higher the ownership  and thus  the more demanding the strategy in deploying and 
developing resources the higher the probability for the subsidiary to be engaged in 
diversification strategies. 
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The hierarchy within the MNC also plays a significant role in the chosen investment 
strategies. We include a measurement on Hierarchy which identifies the reporting node of 
subsidiaries within their MNC group with 1 being the value of the node of the  ultimate 
parent.  Subsidiaries reporting to higher value nodes suggest that their have different 
immediate reporting parent companies. As it has been stated in the international management 
literature corporate business and functional strategies are not hierarchical necessarily. They 
are contemporaneous and interactive. Instead of a hierarchy of strategies, we should also 
think in terms of a heterarchy of strategies (Hedlund, 1986). In a hierarchy, every strategic 
decision-making node is connected to at most one parent node. In a heterarchy, however, a 
node can be connected to any of its surrounding nodes without needing to go through or 
obtain permission from some other node (Chakravarthy & Henderson, 2007). In a 
heterarchical MNC we will find more autonomous subsidiaries which will pursue strategies 
that end up in developing products and services adding to the existing trajectory of the MNC. 
This type of subsidiaries have been labelled in the relevant literature as strategic leaders 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1986). We thus formulate hypothesis two as follows: 
 
H2: The less likely for the subsidiary to report to the ultimate parent the more it pursues 
diversification strategies. 
 
Firm size has often been operationalized in prior research using sales, a measure also adopted 
in this study. Since Hymer (1960) and Horst (1972), firm-level empirical studies have 
identified a firm’s size as a key determinant of its propensity to undertake FDI. Blomström 
and Lipsey (1991), Swedenborg (1979), and Trevino and Daniels (1994) have found that firm 
size (as well as R&D expenditures, export intensities, and previous investment experience) 
contributes to increased FDI likelihood.  As sales reflect also the performance of the firm we 
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would expect that higher sales to represent riskier strategic choices. In this light we formulate 
hypothesis three as follows: 
 
H3:  The higher number of sales the higher the probability for the subsidiary to pursue 
diversification strategies 
 
Parent age controls for possible effects of firm age and accumulated experience on 
integration decisions. It is constructed as the difference between 2008 (the year to which the 
data belong) and the year of establishment. Few papers in the literature have incorporated the 
parents’ age variable into the investment strategy. More experienced firms are expected to 
have the managerial capacity to integrate their activities (Chandler, 1990; Rumelt, 1974) so 
they could follow much more complicated integration strategies than firms that have less 
experience. Various studies support the positive relationship between firm age and degree of 
internationalization (Kotha, Rindova, & Rothaermel, 2001).  In this context parent age can be 
explained through the literature on the “liability of foreignness” as experienced parents equip 
their subsidiaries with the necessary management skills to overcome the adversities of a new 
business environments (Zaheer, 1995; Peng, 2001; Luo 2000). 
We thus formulate hypothesis 4 as follows, 
 
H4: The more experienced the parent company is the more likely for the subsidiary to pursue 
lateral integration and/or diversification strategies. 
 
MNC international network experience is measured as the number of overseas units each 
parent company has reported in a given year. It is included in order to capture how the 
MNC’s international network experience affects the investment strategy of its overseas 
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operating units. Feinberg and Keane (2003), who conducted a study on U.S. multinationals 
with affiliates in Canada, and showed that 69% of the companies in the study use complex 
integration strategies. Foreign operations are often seen as means to assimilate new 
capabilities from their local, external network and integrate these capabilities into the 
multinational corporation (Schmid & Schurig, 2003). Further to this argument, Rugman and 
Verbeke (2004) support that short- term strategies seem to be negatively affected by wide 
geographical operations as these would put a constraint on resources availability. We 
consequently expect that larger MNC groups, with a diversified network of foreign 
operations or with international experience, will tend to pursue more complex integration 
strategies, have a long-term perspective than MNCs with a limited foreign presence (Elang, 
2009).  Thus hypothesis five is formulated as follows: 
 
H5:  The higher the number of overseas subsidiaries of the MNC group the higher the 
probability for the subsidiary to engage in lateral and/or diversification strategies. 
 
Finally, and  following the literature on small countries -which shows that a handful of MNCs 
are responsible for the majority of OFDI- we  created a variable of top tier MNCs 
international network which estimated the number of foreign units for the top five parent 
companies. Information from FORFAS (2006) on Ireland states that 10-15 companies were 
responsible for the majority of OFDI. According to Bellak (1996) the leading 20 
manufacturing Austrian MNCs comprised of almost 75% of total employment in overseas 
subsidiaries in 1989 through a network of 669 subsidiaries.  On top of that significant was the 
role of a single MNC namely that of Austria Industries AG.  As Bellac states their investment 
in 1990 represented 40% of the total Austrian OFDI. Similarly a study by Oxelheim and 
Gartner (1996) showed how the top 10-15 MNCs from Finland, Sweden, Denmark and 
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Norway respectively were the main engines of growth for the Scandinavian economies.  In 
this context and building on Pfaffermayr and Bellak (2000) and Eden et al. (1997) we would 
suggest that firm specific advantages (FSAs) can be a distinctive source of difference 
between larger and smaller MNCs. In addition larger MNCs would have also the capability to 
operate in international value chains (Porter, 1990) and thus “inducing further gains from 
specialisation of affiliates vis-à-vis smaller non fragmented firms”( Pfaffermayr and Bellak , 
2000, p.11). Thus, we formulate hypothesis six as follows: 
 
H6: Leading MNCs subsidiaries would be more likely to be engaged in lateral integration 
and/or diversification strategies 
 
Location-specific variables include  
Country-level data collected from publicly available statistics such as the World 
Development Indicators, the World Intellectual Property Organization, and the International 
Labour Organization (ILO). These variables consist of: gross domestic product (GDP in 
constant prices), included to account for the market size of the host country. A larger market 
makes the realization of economies of scale in production more feasible and thus favours FDI 
servicing rather than export (Venables, 1999; Vernon, 1966). Various studies use GDP as a 
core determinant of an MNC’s decision to invest, with the underlying hypothesis of a positive 
sign (Barrell & Pain, 1996; Braunerhjelm & Svenson, 1996; Culem, 1988; Veugelers, 1991; 
Wheeler & Mody, 1992). We thus formulate hypothesis seven as follows: 
 
H7: The larger the host market the more likely for the subsidiary to pursue lateral and/ or 
diversification strategies 
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Trade openness, measured by two alternative measures, namely, merchandise trade as a 
percentage of GDP and ores and metals exports as a percentage of total exports. Assuming 
that trade is a sign of country competitiveness, value chain based OFDI  (Porter, 1990; Amiti 
and Wakelin, 2001) we would expect that subsidiaries operating in such an environment will 
be part of FDI stimulating trade activities  creating a virtuous  growth cycle for the host 
economy (Markusen, 1997). In this context we would formulate hypothesis eight as follows: 
 
H8: The more trade open the host economy the more likely for the subsidiary to be engaged 
in vertical, lateral and /or diversification strategies.  
 
In order to capture the capability of the host country to generate new knowledge we used two 
technology and knowledge related variables, i.e. R&D expenditures as a percentage of the 
GDP of the host country and the number of patents granted by the host country,.  We build on 
Syrneonidis (1996) who distinguishes between “innovative input” and “innovative output” 
and Neven and Siotis (1996) who calculated an R&D intensity ratio at a host country level 
and, as they do, we also assume that a country committed to R&D would attract FDI 
associated with knowledge and technology sourcing.  Filippaios and Papanastassiou (2008) 
used patents as an indicator of the efficiency use of innovate inputs.  
We hence formulated hypothesis nine and ten as follows: 
 
H9: The higher the share of R&D expenditures in the host country the more likely the 
subsidiary to be engaged in lateral and /or diversification strategies. 
 
H10: The higher the number of patents granted in the host country the more likely the 
subsidiary to be engaged in diversification strategies. 
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 Labour cost is measured as constant hourly labour cost, included to account for the cost of 
production. Labour cost is a major component of the cost of production, and thus is 
frequently tested in the literature. However, there are no uniform empirical results for the 
effect of labour cost on investment incentives. While some studies have shown no significant 
role for labour costs, others have shown a positive relationship between labour costs and FDI. 
The latter result is often attributed to the level of labour productivity or the quality of human 
capital that may be reflected in the wage variables (Bevan & Estrin, 2000; Egger & Stehrer, 
2003; Holland & Pain, 1998; Weise, Bachtler, Downes, McMaster, & Toepel, 2001). We then 
formulate hypothesis eleven as follows: 
 
H11:  The higher the labour costs in the host country the less likely for the  subsidiary to be 
engaged in horizontal, vertical  and lateral integration strategies. 
 
The last location variable tested is the Economic Freedom Index (EFI) which serves as an 
indicator of the institutional environment of the host country. The political stability of a 
government and a sound rule of law are important factors to foster the inflow of FDI. 
Uncertain political environments and their related risks may impede FDI inflows in spite of 
favourable economic conditions (Aizenman and Noy 2005; Wei, 1997).  In the past we 
experienced how trade barriers encouraged import substituting FDI in the form of horizontal 
integration. The index ranks annually more than 150 countries (with lower values standing 
for freer countries) and takes into account 10 factors of “economic freedom” of the host 
economy.20 It is therefore an indicator of the “market-friendliness” of the economic policies 
of the host country.   In this spirit we formulated hypothesis twelve as follows: 
                                                 
20 Such factors include trade policy, taxation, government intervention in the economy, monetary policy, foreign investment, 
banking, wage and price controls, property rights, regulation, and black market activity. 
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H12: The more market friendly the host country is, the more likely for the subsidiary to be 
engaged in vertical, lateral and diversification strategies. 
 
Control Variables: include country dummies and parents’ industry affiliation dummies. 
 
Table 8: Correlation Matrix of Key Variables 
 
Constructs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.Sales/Firm Size 1          
2.Host Country GDP  0.12 1         
3.R&D Expenditure 0.08 0.48 1        
4.Merchandise Trade 0.10 0.54 0.29 1       
5.Ores and Metals 
Trade  
0.05 0.49 0.23 0.13 1      
6.Patents 0.03 0.11 0.58 0.51 0.59 1     
7.Economic Freedom 
Index 
0.14 0.26 0.13 0.44 0.29 0.19 1    
8. Labor Cost 0.21 0.28 0.10 0.44 0.52 0.08 0.34 0.55 1  
9.Parent Age 0.25 0.34 0.22 0.31 0.19 0.46 0.11 0.15 0.17 1 
 
Table 9: Variance Inflation Factor Test for the Pooled Sample 
 
Constructs VIF 1/VIF
Sales/Firm Size 1.98 0.51
Host Country GDP  2.04 0.49
R&D Expenditure 2.38 0.42
Merchandise Trade 3.67 0.28
Ores and Metals Trade 2.12 0.47
Patents 2.61 0.38
Economic Freedom Index 3.11 0.32
Number of Subsidiaries per Parent 2.82 0.36
Labor Cost 1.26 0.79
Parent Age 2.83 0.35
The correlation matrix of the independent variables, Table 8, shows that the pairwise 
correlations do not seem to present serious multicollinearity problems for the multivariate 
analysis, as none of the variables have correlation coefficients above 0.60. This conclusion is 
further confirmed by the VIF test, which reveals values much smaller than 10. 
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Econometric framework and empirical results 
In the empirical analysis, we investigate the determinants of investment expansion strategies, 
employing a multinomial logistic regression approach where the probability of a firm having 
a particular strategy for investing is modeled as a function of firm-specific and location-
specific variables. This model is appropriate as it is used to model relationships between a 
multiple response variable and a set of regressors (Greene, 2003; Wooldridge, 2002). The 
specification that we estimate then is the following: 
 
ijccijijij uZXY +∗+∗+= δβα 0         (1) 
where ijX is a vector of variables for firm i in industry j, cZ is a vector of host-country-
specific variables, and iju is the error term. The dependent variable, ijY , is the categorical 
investment strategy variable for firm i in industry j, where the investment strategy is divided 
into the following categories: 
1 = horizontal integration; 2 = vertical integration; 3 = lateral integration; 4 = diversification. 
The probabilities estimated in the multinomial logistic model are: 
∑ = ∗+∗
∗+∗
+== 4
1
1
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k
ZX
ZX
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, for k(category) = 2, 3, 4  (2) 
For the base category, k = 1, the probability estimated is: 
∑ = ∗+∗+== 4 21
1)1(Pr
k
ZXij ccijije
Yob δβ         (3) 
 
The maximum likelihood estimates are obtained using Stata 10. It is customary in the 
literature to report the estimates of multinomial regression analysis as relative risk or odds 
ratios. The coefficients are then interpreted as changes in the relative risk of the respective 
category over the base category. While important in understanding the determinants of firm 
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motivations behind decisions to invest, relative risk ratios are not directly interpretable in 
terms of incremental impacts on probabilities of respective motives. This is done through the 
calculation of marginal effects or elasticities, reported in Table 10 for all the strategic 
categories. 
Table 10. Marginal Effects of Explanatory Variables on Motivation for Outward DI for Pooled 
Sample1.  (with GDP and R&D Expenditure and Parent Age)   
 Horizontal 
Integration
Vertical 
Integration
Lateral 
Integration 
Diversification
Affiliate  -0.064***
(0.003) 
0.038
(0.218) 
-0.095** 
(0.018) 
0.047**
(0.025) 
Subsidiary -0.097 
(0.311) 
0.134
(0.167) 
-0.032** 
(0.016) 
0.035*
(0.067) 
Hierarchy 0.012 
(0.568) 
0.014*
(0.071) 
0.058 
(0.276) 
0.006*
(0.095) 
Sales/Firm Size -0.108 
(0.196) 
0.034
(0.127) 
-0.093 
(0.254) 
0.018**
(0.042) 
Host Country GDP  0.011**
(0.047) 
0.031**
(0.027) 
- 0.024 
(0.218) 
0.079**
(0.028) 
Parent Age - 0.025**
(0.026) 
0.052
(0.134) 
0.105 
(0.218) 
0.031*
(0.073) 
R&D Expenditure 0.025* 
(0.088) 
0.025**
(0.031) 
0.121 
(0.269) 
0.013*
(0.071) 
Merchandise Trade 0.031**
(0.025) 
0.003
(0.163) 
0.001 
(0.412) 
0.005
(0.274) 
Ores and Metals Trade 0.127 
(0.407) 
0.089
(0.216) 
0.077** 
(0.031) 
0.047
(0.216) 
Patents 0.003 
(0.195) 
-0.044**
(0.017) 
0.026 
(0.196) 
0.027
(0.471) 
Economic Freedom 
Index 
-0.068**
(0.018) 
0.026**
(0.031) 
0.025 
(0.117) 
0.027
(0.371) 
Subsidiaries per Parent 0.153**
(0.015) 
0.084*
(0.058) 
0.063 
(0.173) 
0.185**
(0.037) 
Subsidiaries for top 5 
Parents 
0.211***
(0.009) 
0.107
(0.116) 
0.016 
(0.218) 
0.076*
(0.084) 
Labor Cost -0.012**
(0.021) 
- 0.018***
(0.000) 
0.027 
(0.167) 
-0.016**
(0.027) 
Food Industry Dummy 0.145 
(0.457) 
0.048
(0.167) 
0.134 
(0.197) 
0.028
(0.381) 
Rubber Industry 
Dummy 
0.017 
(0.332) 
0.003
(0.105) 
0.081 
(0.148) 
0.021
(0.218) 
Manufacturing 
Dummy 
0.015**
(0.048) 
0.093*
(0.082) 
0.011 
(0.227) 
0.007**
(0.024) 
Finance Dummy 0.005**
(0.015) 
0.004
(0.137) 
0.001 
(0.162) 
0.002***
(0.005) 
Iceland*Affiliate  - 0.018 
(0.349) 
 -0.008** 
(0.017) 
0.031*
(0.059) 
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Iceland*Subsidiary -0.107* 
(0.062) 
 -0.107* 
(0.063) 
0.034
(0.318) 
Iceland*Hierarchy 0.000 
(0.187) 
 0.003 
(0.568) 
0.072
(0.418) 
Iceland*Sales/Firm 
Size 
-0.117* 
(0.0723) 
 0.231 
(0.194) 
0.104
(0.217) 
Iceland*Parent Age - 0.017*
(0.069) 
 0.145 
(0.148) 
0.021*
(0.057) 
Iceland*Host Country 
GDP  
0.024 
(0.172) 
 0.116 
(0.583) 
0.084
(0.379) 
Iceland*R&D 
Expenditure 
0.085 
(0.662) 
 0.183 
(0.286) 
0.059*
(0.063) 
Iceland*Merchandise 
Trade 
0.041 
(0.179) 
 0.106 
(0.274) 
0.112
(0.108) 
Iceland*Ores and 
Metals Trade  
0.183 
(0.533) 
 0.017** 
(0.022) 
0.043
(0.143) 
Iceland*Patents 0.034**
(0.047) 
 0.000 
(0.206) 
0.029
(0.347) 
Iceland*Economic 
Freedom Index 
-0.028**
(0.015) 
 0.027 
(0.371) 
0.031
(0.375) 
Iceland*Unit Labor 
Cost 
-0.004**
(0.044) 
 0.038 
(0.523) 
-0.014*
(0.083) 
Iceland*Subsidiaries 
per Parent 
0.026**
(0.037) 
 0.006 
(0.267) 
0.108**
(0.027) 
Iceland*Subsidiaries 
for top 5 Parents 
0.076**
(0.047) 
 0.007 
(0.438) 
0.018*
(0.021) 
Iceland*Food Industry 
Dummy 
0.037 
(0.319) 
 0.127 
(0.218) 
0.014
(0.431) 
Iceland*Rubber 
Industry Dummy 
0.033 
(0.178) 
 0.019 
(0.214) 
0.011
(0.127) 
Iceland*Manufacturing 
Dummy 
0.003* 
(0.067) 
 0.018 
(0.105) 
0.013**
(0.019) 
Iceland*Finance 
Dummy 
0.013***
(0.002) 
 0.003 
(0.171) 
0.008**
(0.012) 
Israel*Affiliate  -0.047 
(0.286) 
0.027
(0.449) 
-0.073** 
(0.021) 
0.072
(0.318) 
Israel*Subsidiary 0.169 
(0.331) 
0.029
(0.178) 
-0.104** 
(0.028) 
0.037**
(0.027) 
Israel*Hierarchy 0.001 
(0.197) 
0.041
(0.178) 
0.031 
(0.365) 
0.019*
(0.093) 
Israel*Sales/Firm Size -0.047**
(0.033) 
0.101
(0.481) 
0.086 
(0.418) 
0.018
(0.538) 
Israel*Parent Age - 0.009**
(0.032) 
0.021
(0.218) 
0.085 
(0.237) 
0.014*
(0.71) 
Israel*Host Country 
GDP  
0.000 
(0.572) 
0.081
(0.117) 
0.027 
(0.371) 
0.091*
(0.073) 
Israel*R&D 
Expenditure 
0.022 
(0.108) 
0.021**
(0.047) 
0.083 
(0.127) 
0.013**
(0.037) 
Israel*Merchandise 
Trade 
0.041* 
(0.085) 
0.018
(0.733) 
0.002 
(0.267) 
0.055
(0.174) 
Israel*Ores and Metals 
Trade  
0.125 
(0.298) 
-0.005***
(0.000) 
0.019** 
(0.042) 
0.015
(0.638) 
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Israel*Patents 0.013 
(0.381) 
0.034
(0.196) 
0.006 
(0.137) 
0.011
(0.482) 
Israel*Economic 
Freedom Index 
-0.024**
(0.048) 
0.011**
(0.024) 
0.008 
(0.185) 
0.205
(0.348) 
Israel*Unit Labor Cost -0.018**
(0.042) 
- 0.037**
(0.028) 
0.028 
(0.306) 
0.029
(0.137) 
Israel*Subsidiaries per 
Parent 
0.027* 
(0.086) 
0.017
(0.178) 
0.045 
(0.163) 
0.032**
(0.032) 
Israel*Subsidiaries for 
top 5 Parents 
0.017* 
(0.058) 
0.106
(0.278) 
0.007 
(0.178) 
0.004
(0.186) 
Israel*Food Industry 
Dummy 
0.093 
(0.319) 
0.041
(0.175) 
0.071 
(0.208) 
0.018
(0.185) 
Israel*Rubber Industry 
Dummy 
0.011 
(0.218) 
0.001
(0.127) 
0.078 
(0.219) 
0.020
(0.198) 
Israel*Manufacturing 
Dummy 
0.018**
(0.031) 
0.037*
(0.061) 
0.009 
(0.175) 
0.012**
(0.017) 
Israel*Finance Dummy 0.002 
(0.315) 
0.001
(0.128) 
0.004 
(0.184) 
0.005***
(0.002) 
LR Chi2 
p=value 
187.12 
0.00 
144.67
0.00 
156.71 
0.00 
111.06
0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.22
Number of 
Observations 
283 67 306 309
1 *** denotes significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
 
In order to account for country-specific effects, we have included in the regression the 
interactions of country dummies for Iceland and Israel with all the independent variables. 
Consequently, the variables without interactions indicate the respective marginal effects for 
Ireland. We estimate different versions of our equations by experimenting with the variables 
included in the specifications. For instance, we run regressions with GDP per capita or GDP 
growth. Standard model selection criteria, such as individual coefficients’ significance, the 
pseudo R2, Akaike Information Criteria, and Schwartz Information Criteria, were then used 
to discriminate among models. The results presented are those for the best performing model.  
Overall, the results of Table 10 provide evidence that both firm-specific and location-specific 
factors are important in the determination of the motive when investing.  
Focusing on firm-specific variables, the ownership control of establishing an 
operation abroad, indicated by dummies for establishing an affiliate or subsidiary versus 
establishing a joint venture, is a significant determinant of the motivation to invest. In fact, 
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the results on ownership control confirm H1 and underline the importance of ownership 
control when it comes to risk-diversifying strategies, with subsidiaries and affiliates being a 
more preferred form of controlling foreign assets.  These results also seem to be consistent 
across countries. For instance, Icelandic firms significantly increase the probability of 
engaging in risk-diversification (0.031, p < 0.059) investment and decrease the probability of 
lateral integration (-0.008, p < 0.017), while at the same time decreasing the probability of 
engaging in other types of investment strategies. Similar pattern holds for the other countries 
as well. 
Our results on hierarchy differ according to the investment strategy the subsidiaries 
are pursuing. We see that H2 is verified for diversification strategies, and we also find a 
positive statistically significant result for vertical integration strategies suggesting a flatter 
organization form. For example, for Israeli firms, hierarchy is of statistical significance in 
risk-diversifying subsidiaries, indicating some form of transnational organization structure, 
i.e., more independent subsidiaries (e.g., product mandates) and a less authoritative centre 
(Papanastassiou & Pearce, 2006). Hierarchy is of no significance for Icelandic firms.  
Our results on firm size point to the significant role of firm size in adopted investment 
strategies and in particular in risk-diversifying strategies confirming H3. Thus, larger firms 
tend to become involved in strategies seeking new knowledge through involvement in new 
sectors whilst smaller firms tend to follow market-seeking strategies capitalizing on an 
established portfolio of products with a less fragmented structure (via horizontal integration). 
At country level, as revealed by the interactions, for Icelandic firms, the size significantly 
decreases the probability of having horizontal integration (-0.117, p < 0.069), suggesting that 
smaller firms tend to pursue horizontal strategies of a market-seeking nature, but it is of no 
significance to other types of investment strategies.  
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Results confirm the importance of parent age in a chosen integration strategy. In 
particular, our results show, in accordance to H4, that experienced firms are more likely to 
choose a risk-diversifying strategy compared with younger corporations, which are more 
likely to choose a market-seeking strategy in the form of horizontal integration. Specific 
results per country show that the older and more experienced the Icelandic and Israeli firms 
are, the lower the likelihood of having a horizontal integration investment and the higher the 
likelihood of diversification.  In the international business literature, it has been assumed for a 
long time that the parent company is the sole source of important capabilities within the firm 
(Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Birkinshaw, Hood, & Jonsson, 1998; Lipparini & Fratocchi, 
1999). Furthermore, the literature also acknowledges that multinational corporations can 
enhance their pool of capabilities through foreign operations. Hanson, Mataloni, and 
Slaughter (2001) state that the literature’s benchmark distinction between horizontal and 
vertical FDI does not capture the range of strategies that multinationals use. Hence, we see 
more internationalized firms that tend to pursue horizontal, lateral, and risk-diversifying 
strategies.  Results on the MNC international network experience confirm partially H5 as 
they show a statistically positive relationship with diversification strategies.  At the same time 
we see that MNC network experience is positively associated with horizontal integration 
suggesting a hybrid nature of MNCs from small economies in the sense that they operate both 
on fragment value chain operations and on non- fragmented value chain operations.  The later 
reflects the characteristic of small firms which suggests that MNCs from these economies 
have not reached an established MNC large status (Pfaffermayr and Bellak, 2000).  
Comparing results for individual countries, the number of foreign units per parent company 
shows that for Icelandic firms, the number of foreign units increases the likelihood of 
horizontal integration (0.026, p < 0.037) investment and also of diversification (0.108, p < 
0.027). For Israeli firms, the number of foreign units per parent company increases the 
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likelihood of horizontal integration (0.027, p < 0.086) and diversification (0.032, p < 0.032), 
as for Icelandic companies.  
In regards to the top tier MNCs international network, as for the previous variable, we 
assume that leading MNCs with an expanded network of foreign units will pursue complex 
integration strategies. The results for this variables, as in the case of H5, partially confirm H6 
and they show that very large MNCs  from small countries are usually more likely to be 
involved  both in horizontal integration (which reflects the geographical expansion of  small 
MNC groups) and in diversification (which reflects the diversified portfolio of  larger 
MNCs). These mixed results confirms the unique capabilities of large MNCs from small 
countries compared to other MNCs but at the same time confirm their relative small size 
compared to other international competitors. Focusing on country differences we see that the 
number of subsidiaries for top 5 parents significantly increases the likelihood of Icelandic 
firm to engage in horizontal integration (0.076, p<0.047) and diversification strategies (0.018, 
p<0.021), whereas significantly increases the likelihood of Israeli firm to engage only in 
horizontal integration (0.017, p<0.0058).   
Results on size of the host country market, captured by GDP, support H7. In addition, we find 
a statistically significant positive relationship with horizontal integration suggesting that 
capturing a foreign market, probably larger than the home country with an existing array of 
products and services characterizes a serious strategic option for MNCs coming from small 
countries. The size of the market of the host economy is thus an important determinant of 
horizontal, vertical, and risk-diversification strategies. In particular, it does not seem to 
impact the same strategies followed by Icelandic and Israeli firms. It also increases the 
likelihood of vertical integration (0.031, p < 0.027) strategies and risk-diversification (0.079, 
p < 0.028) strategies. The results show that, for Icelandic firms, the host country GDP is not 
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significant; however, for Israeli firms, the host country GDP is significant in the risk-
diversification (0.091, p < 0.037) strategy.  
Trade openness captures the importance of a country’s openness to international 
trade. However, it is also an indicator of competitiveness and thus can be used as an indicator 
of economic reforms, where domestic reforms and foreign trade reforms go hand in hand. It 
is expected that FDI and trade openness are positively related (Helpman, 1984), because FDI 
is encouraged if the trade regime of the host economy is liberal (Bevan & Estrin, 2004). Both 
measures of trade openness seem to have a positive effect. However, contrary to H8, trade 
openness measured by merchandise trade has a positive significant effect on horizontal 
integration in the case of Israel (0.041, p<0.085). This result may suggest that horizontal 
types of activities tend to be directed to countries with documented competitive firms. In 
addition, trade openness measured by trade in ores and metals is positively related to lateral 
integration, suggesting that, when investment is directed to resource-rich but also 
economically advanced countries, further processing is necessary before exporting takes 
place. For instance, ore and metals trade increases the likelihood of lateral integration for 
Israeli firms (0.019, p < 0.042), as well as for Icelandic firms (0.017, p<0.022).  
With regards to R&D expenditure, the majority of overseas operations of the MNCs 
in our sample are located in advanced technological regions, i.e., Europe and North America. 
The classic ownership advantage involves some form of technological superiority, namely, 
competitive advantage, and because of property rights protection, a firm will set up 
production facilities in a foreign country through FDI as long as there are specific advantages 
in the host country that make FDI preferable to exporting (Buckley & Casson, 1976; 
Dunning, 1979, 1988, 1993). More recent literature, such as by Cantwell (1989, 1991) and 
Pearce (1999), has characterized such advantages as being generated through R&D and 
linked to the exploitation of economies of scale. Recent work in this area attempts to 
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characterize ownership advantages in a given location (Criscuolo & Martin, 2004; Griffith, 
1999; Griffith & Simpson 2001). Thus, results confirm H9 and the statistically significant 
positive result on horizontal integration shows that these operations are of a dynamic nature, 
reflecting the fact that even horizontal types of operations face serious competitive pressures 
that push firms to look constantly for new sources of ideas and knowledge. Our results show 
that R&D expenditure for Icelandic firms increases the probability of having diversification 
(0.059, p < 0.063) but is not significant in other integration strategies. In Israeli firms, R&D 
expenditure significantly increases the likelihood of vertical integration (0.021, p < 0.047) 
and diversification (0.013, p < 0.037) (Almor & Hashai, 2004; Hashai & Almor, 2008). 
Results on patents do not support H10 as they are proven statistically insignificant.  
The statistically significant negative relationship with vertical integration suggests that small 
country MNCs will pursue this type of strategy in countries that they do not possess 
companies with explicit ownership advantages in the exploitation of natural resources and are 
thus less superior to MNCs from small economies.  
Results on labour cost suggest that higher labour costs are detrimental to the strategy 
chosen with labour costs having a negative impact on the probabilities of horizontal 
integration, vertical integration, and diversification supporting partially H11 as we would 
expect that labour costs as an indicator of the quality of labour to have potentially a positive 
relationship on diversification strategies. 
Regarding the Economic Freedom Index (EFI), the negative and significant results 
across all three countries the results show that countries with a more liberal business 
environment do not tend to attract horizontal types of foreign operations. On the contrary, the 
positive sign for vertical integration confirms H 12 and suggests ease of controls and 
liberalisation in sensitive sectors such as primary resources in advanced economies. This 
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creation of friendly business conditions in the exploitation of primary resources reflects the 
increased pressures of competitiveness that lead countries and firms to work closer together.  
Finally, looking selectively at the results for the control variables, namely, the dummy 
variables for the three countries and their respective industries, we see that Israeli 
manufacturing firms are more likely to engage in horizontal integration (0.018, p < 0.031), 
vertical integration (0.037, p < 0.061), and diversification (0.012, p < 0.017), while Icelandic 
manufacturing firms are likely to engage mainly in horizontal integration (0.003, p < 0.067) 
and diversification (0.013, p < 0.019). Regarding the financial sector Icelandic firms are more 
likely to engage in a horizontal integration strategy (0.013, p < 0.002) and diversification 
(0.008, p < 0.012), while Israeli firms will mostly use diversification (0.005, p < 0.002). 
Conclusion 
Using a sample of 1089 subsidiaries, of which 187 are Icelandic subsidiaries, 444 are Irish 
subsidiaries, and 458 are Israeli subsidiaries, we explored the geographical and industrial 
pattern of their direct investment strategies. In this paper, we distinguished four different 
types of expansion investment strategies. For this reason, we constructed a categorical 
variable by comparing the four-digit industrial classification of each subsidiary in the sample 
with that of its ultimate parent. Based on this, the strategy is deemed to be horizontal 
integration if the subsidiary operates in the same core and related  industry as its parent, it is 
deemed to be vertical integration if investment abroad is made in natural resource industries, 
it is deemed to be lateral integration if the subsidiary and its parent operate in different stages 
of the value chain, and, finally, it is deemed to be diversification if the subsidiary and its 
parent operate in unrelated industries. A set of firm- and location-specific variables seem to 
exert a different influence on each strategic choice. In our empirical work, in order to 
investigate the determinants of investment expansion strategies, we employed a multinomial 
logistic regression approach where the probability of a firm having a particular strategy for 
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investing is modelled to be a function of firm-specific and location-specific variables. Our 
empirical results confirmed the differentiating effect of firm and location variables on each 
strategic choice. For instance, mature and experienced MNCs tend to expand via risk-
diversification strategies whilst younger MNCs tend to prefer horizontal integration. 
Similarly, we saw that certain location factors, such as the Economic Freedom Index, tend to 
favour vertical integration and not horizontal integration. In addition, we saw that the three 
countries exhibit different investment patterns, which nevertheless are commonly 
characterized by the adoption of a complex global strategy plan that involves the adoption of 
more than one strategic option. In all cases, the network of overseas operations is the key 
implementer of such strategies and thus plays a crucial role in the sustainable competitiveness 
of small country MNCs.  
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Appendix 
 
Definition of variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Motivation 
 
 
 
 
Type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sales range 
 
 
 
 
Hierarchy 
 
 
Merchandise Trade 
 
 
Ore and Metal Exports  
 
 
R&D expenditure 
 
 
 
Economic freedom index 
 
 
Patents Granted 
 
 
Labor cost 
 
 
Parent Age  
 
 
Number of subsidiaries per 
parent   
 
Number of subsidiaries of the 
leading 5 firms 
A categorical variable defined as follows: 1 – Market seeking motive, 2 – 
Efficiency seeking motive, 3 – Resource seeking motive, 4 – Risk 
Diversification motive. Constructed by comparing the 4-digit industrial 
classification code of the relevant company and that of its ultimate parent. 
 
Classifies companies by their legal relationship to their parent as affiliates, 
branches, divisions, joint ventures, operations, group insurers, plants, 
subsidiaries or units. 3 dummy variables were constructed as follows: 1 if 
the company is a subsidiary and 0 otherwise, 1 if the company is a joint 
venture and zero otherwise, and 1 if the company is any other form than 
subsidiary and joint venture and zero otherwise. 
 
An interval measure of yearly company sales as follows: 1) Up to 100 
million USD in sales 2) between 100 and 500 million USD in sales 3) 
between 500 million and 1 billion USD in sales 4) between 1 and 1,5 billion 
USD in sales and 5) over 1,5 billion USD in sales. 
 
Classifies companies by the reporting hierarchy within the multinational.  
 
 
Measured as percentage of GDP. Obtained from World Development 
Indicators. 
 
Measured as percentage of merchandise exports. Obtained from World 
Development Indicators. 
 
Measured as percentage of GDP. Obtained from World Development 
Indicators. 
 
 
The index takes values between 1 and 10, with 10 denoting the country with 
the most liberal economic environment 
 
Number of patents granted by host countries in 2005, obtained from World 
Intellectual Property database. 
 
Constant 2000 dollar hourly labor cost. Obtained from ILO database. 
 
Defined as the difference between 2008, that is the year the data belong to, 
and the year of establishment. 
 
 
The absolute number of subsidiaries each parent has. Obtained from the 
Corporate Affiliations directory 2008. 
 
The sum of subsidiaries for top 5 parents with the highest number of 
subsidiaries. Obtained from the Corporate Affiliations directory 2008. 
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5.  Integrative capacity: The relationship between headquarters and 
subsidiaries 
 
Ásta Dís Óladóttir21 
Abstract 
The past decades have been characterised by profound changes and an increased rate of 
globalisation. These rapid changes in the nature of global competition have caused 
international managers and international management researchers alike to search for new 
ways to frame problems and answer questions about how to manage complex multinational 
corporations most effectively. When a corporation establishes a subsidiary in a foreign 
country, through greenfield or acquisition, its managers must decide how much control they 
need to maintain over the subsidiary. Should the company operate separately or should it be 
integrated into the corporation? The control relationship between headquarters and foreign 
subsidiaries can be either centralised or decentralised. Too much centralisation or 
decentralisation can lead to an ineffective corporation so there has to be a good balance. A 
good balance is attained when the managers in the headquarters have a global vision, core 
values, and cultural principles that are shared by all the subsidiary managers. The managers 
in the headquarters make decisions based on an understanding of the cultural and other needs 
of foreign subsidiary managers. They also have to have an understanding of the needs of 
specific organisational situations; they have to have integrative capacity in the corporation. 
Integrative capacity builds on the ability of the MNC to learn from its experience and also 
how it plans and executes its acquisitions. The lessons learned from previous acquisitions are 
those that must be fed into the planning and execution of the next. Only then do they provide 
the feedback loops for each other. 
 
Keywords:  Integrative capacity, roles of subsidiaries, Iceland, MNCs 
                                                 
21 Ásta Dís Óladóttir, Department of International Economics and Management, Copenhagen Business School, 
and Faculty of Business at Bifröst University, Iceland. 
 
 147 
 
Introduction 
When businesses establish operating subsidiaries in foreign countries, headquarters’ 
management must establish an effective relationship between headquarters and the foreign 
subsidiary. Traditional management thinking posits that a relationship may be one of 
centralisation, where the managers of the headquarters do not give much autonomy to the 
subsidiary managers and they make the most of the important decisions that affect all the 
local operations, or it may be one of decentralisation, where the subsidiary managers are 
given a great deal of autonomy and they make the most of the important decisions relating to 
local operations.  
A recurring theme in the literature on the strategy of the multinational corporation 
(MNC) has been the important role played by subsidiaries as contributors to the development 
of firm-specific advantages within the corporation. Scholars like Bartlett and Ghoshal (1986), 
Gupta and Govindarajan (1994), and Hedlund (1986) introduced the subsidiary as an active 
participant in the formulation and implementation of strategy within the network. Firm-
specific advantages shifted from being the concern of the headquarters to being a collective 
responsibility of the whole network, which means that the headquarters have to have 
integrative capacity to handle the network substantively. The integrative capacity of a firm 
can be seen as the strategic infrastructure of a firm, which is a multidimensional system that 
contains strategic resources or capability, and organisational infrastructure, which could 
provide a foundation for global expansion and latent linkages within the MNC. The strategic 
infrastructure is necessary for the coordination and integration of business units that are 
geographically dispersed, while also maintaining internal differentiation and local 
responsiveness amongst individual subunits. The MNC must have such integrative capacity 
embedded in the firm.   
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In this paper, we introduce the concept of integrative capacity in the context of 
Icelandic MNCs with special focus on mergers and acquisitions. To define the concept of 
integrative capacity, two things have to be kept in mind, that is, learning from previous 
experience and how to plan and execute acquisitions. The lessons learned from previous 
mergers and acquisitions are those that must be fed into the planning and execution of the 
next acquisition. Consequently they provide the feedback loops for each other. The concept 
will be discussed in more detail below. 
 There are a number of articles that have examined the different roles of subsidiaries 
and how they can contribute to the corporation (Birkinshaw, Morrison, and Hulland, 1995) 
Ghoshal and Nohria, 1989; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991; Jarillo and Martinez, 1990; Roth 
and Morrison, 1991). In this paper, we try to see the development of the role of the 
subsidiaries within the MNC and the importance of having the capacity integrated into the 
corporation. We pick out the subsidiaries’ participation in the strategy of the firm and how 
well subsidiaries are integrated into the network following an acquisition. We think that 
subsidiaries are not only receiving the given strategy of the MNC, but they are participating 
more. Have the case companies chosen in this paper learned from their previous acquisitions 
and do they utilise that knowledge in the planning and execution of their next acquisition? 
 
It can be argued that mergers and acquisitions are the fastest way for a company to grow. The 
reason why foreign acquisitions are chosen as an entry mode is because other entry modes do 
not include close integration between headquarters and subsidiaries. In this paper, we only 
discuss acquisitions and greenfield investments. Jemison and Sitkin (1986) differentiated 
between making a merger and acquisition (M&A) decision and making an M&A work.  
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Making an M&A decision has to do with the selection process (recognising the synergistic 
potential). Making an M&A work has to do with the management of the integration process, 
i.e. releasing the potential.   
Theoretical background and literature review 
It has been pointed out by several scholars within the field of international business that 
implementing global strategies can give headquarters a significant role in controlling the 
behaviour of a subsidiary (see, for example, Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Chakravarty and 
Doz, 1992; Cray, 1984; Doz and Prahalad, 1981; Doz et al., 1990; Hedlund and Rolander, 
1990; Kogut, 1985). Using the terminology from Williamson (1985), one can say that 
corporate control over a certain subsidiary can be thought of as a governance mechanism 
used by the corporation to regulate transactions between the headquarters and the subsidiary 
under focus. It is argued that such transactions occur along three key dimensions: the flow of 
knowledge, capital, and products. This flow is in line with the corporate strategy. To put it 
differently, the MNC can be thought of as a network of transactions of knowledge, capital, 
and products among subsidiaries located in different countries and coordinated by the 
headquarters. This is a perspective that is consistent with the analyses of Bartlett and Ghoshal 
(1989), Calvet (1981), Lessard (1979), and others. It is clear that many MNCs assign 
different strategic roles to different subsidiaries (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Doz, 1978; 
Hedlund, 1986; Poynter and Rugman, 1982). There has also been extensive discussion about 
the mechanisms that can be used by headquarters to accomplish the required control (see, for 
example, Baliga and Jaeger, 1984; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1995; Doz and Prahalad, 1981; 
Edström and Galbraith, 1977; Egelhoff, 1984, 1988; Martinez and Jarillo, 1989).  
Headquarters’ control becomes more difficult because, rather than being a single 
entity facing a homogeneous environment, the multinational corporation (MNC) is composed 
of a set of differentiated structures and processes, each of which exists in one of the subunits 
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of the organisation (Ghoshal and Westney, 1993; Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991). For instance, 
it has been argued that the control mechanisms used by the headquarters, formal as well as 
more informal and subtle means, must be adapted to the environmental and resource 
contingencies faced by the different subsidiaries (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Ghoshal and 
Nohria, 1989). 
As mentioned above, the multinational corporation can be viewed as a network of 
transactions that helps pinpoint the following specific ways in which the strategic contexts of 
various subsidiaries can differ. We could start by looking at the scope of transactions. For 
each type of transaction (i.e. capital, product, and knowledge flows), subsidiaries can differ 
regarding whether or not they engage in any intracorporate transactions, and, if they do, the 
volume and criticality of these transactions. For instance, it would generally be true that the 
extent of capital flows from a parent to a subsidiary would be greater for subsidiaries located 
in larger and/or growing rather than smaller and/or mature national markets. Similarly, the 
extent of knowledge flows to a subsidiary may be greater for subsidiaries located in less 
developed rather than more developed national markets. We could also look at the 
directionality of these transactions. To the extent that subsidiaries engage in intracorporate 
transactions, they can also differ regarding whether they are either the receivers or the 
providers of what is being transacted. For example, a pharmaceutical manufacturer’s sourcing 
subsidiary in India might be primarily a provider of product flows, whereas a marketing 
subsidiary in the Nordic countries might be primarily a receiver of product flows. Similarly, 
subsidiaries that serve as global platforms for the MNC (Porter, 1986) are likely to have 
major responsibility for knowledge outflows to other subsidiaries. In contrast, subsidiaries 
that do not serve as global platforms are likely to engage primarily in knowledge inflows. It is 
all a matter of the integrative capacity of the multinational corporation, how much capacity 
the MNC has to control its subsidiaries, how well the subsidiaries are integrated within the 
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MNC, and how this flow is controlled by the headquarters. Many researchers have dealt with 
the process of integration within a firm (see, for example, Bower, 2001; Croyle and Kager, 
2002 and Gammelgaard, 2002). Integration per se is not enough, however; the subsidiaries’ 
local context has to be taken into consideration, the size and function of the organisation, the 
management preferences and leadership, the culture, and how much integrative capacity the 
organisation has.  
Different roles of subsidiaries and centres of excellence 
A great deal of literature deals with the different roles that subsidiaries play within the MNC, 
ranging from sales channels to very independent R&D units (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1986, 
1989; Birkinshaw, 1996; Birkinshaw, Morrison, and Hulland, 1995; Forsgren and Pedersen, 
1998; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1994; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1997; Papanastassiou and Pearce, 
1997; Roth and Morrison, 1991). More recently, the centre of excellence approach has 
emerged in the literature and the focus is on the creation of competence that takes place 
within certain subsidiaries.   
In multinational companies, it is really important to consider ‘centres of excellence’ 
because they are able to access different resources in different countries (Frost, Birkinshaw 
and Ensign, 2002). Centres of excellence can be defined as business units that produce or 
develop particular competences, services, or products that place the subsidiary in charge 
within a well-defined area. The theoretical point of origin is the resourced-based view where 
administrative systems and heterogeneous resources display a capability that is hard for 
competitors to imitate (Barney, 1986; Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984). What 
the headquarters needs to decide is whether it should place the future development of 
competence centrally or disperse this into subsidiaries. It is obvious that not every unit can be 
a superior centre of excellence or a competence centre so it is up to the managers of the MNC 
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to decide which subsidiaries deserve the mandate and the necessary resources for the 
development of competences (Gammelgaard, 2000). 
In the study of foreign direct investments, this term may prove even more important 
to the understanding of multinational firms. That is because firms that are brought together 
may have different capabilities which can be traced to their different background and location 
and thereby can be a ground for centres of excellence (Frost, Birkinshaw and Ensign, 2002).  
It is important that all parts of the MNC can benefit from knowledge and other activities of 
the centres of excellence.  When acquiring a firm the acquirer can utilize the knowledge from 
the acquired firm and the other way around and that can lead to or increase the competitive 
advantage of the MNC (Dimitriades, 2005; Peteraf, 1993). Knowledge-sharing is facilitated 
between the two previously separate firms in what is called a network organisation (Hedlund, 
1994).  The MNC could also pursue preservation. If that is done, the acquired firm will to a 
large extent be kept separate from the acquirer because it needs to remain its autonomy.  Such 
firms can be acquired because they possess certain capabilities that are needed in the 
acquirer’s firm and which must be kept autonomous.  However, the flow of knowledge 
between the units is really important.  A research conducted by Gammelgaard (2005) shows 
that if there is a low level of inflow of knowledge from the acquirer into the acquired unit, 
and the autonomy is kept high, the created knowledge will be disparate from the rest of the 
MNC. Firms that were acquired because of their possession of particular competences, 
however, would often be sources of specialised knowledge that could feed into larger 
knowledge creation projects within the MNC. 
Planning and executing acquisitions  
First, to argue what has been proposed above, the firm must acquire continuously. As part of 
acquiring often and continuously, companies must screen many targets that they do not 
acquire (Aiello and Watkins, 2000). If the firms know what is ´on the market´they will better 
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understand their own capabilities and can easily compare them selves to what ´is on the 
market´(Rigby and Zook, 2002).   By acquiring frequently, the result will not only be good 
performance of the units eventually acquired, but will also provide the company with a very 
good way of assessing its own core competences and needs. Those firms that acquire 
frequently seem to perform better over time compared with those that only acquire 
occasionally (Rovit and Lemire, 2003).   It is not enough to know what is on the market.  A 
careful due diligence must be undertaken before the acquisitions to get better knowledge of 
the target firm.  Due diligence is almost always performed before an acquisition but a post-
merger due diligence is hardly ever performed.  To make it more clear, employees from both 
firms are needed that can help to explain and introduce the integration plan in the firms.  This 
can also be a facilitation of knowledge-gathering (Burgelman and McKinney, 2006). 
Naturally, the lessons learned by previous acquisitions are those that must feed into the 
planning and execution of the next. Consequently, they provide the feedback loops for each 
other. 
Learning from previous experience 
Acquisitions create complex organisational challenges, and both individual and 
organisational experience may be required to avoid integration problems (Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991). On the individual level, a lack of acquisition experience may make a CEO 
particularly susceptible to escalation of commitment, which can lead to the completion of 
deals at an unreasonably high cost (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). Additionally, experience 
from past acquisitions may build facilitating processes for the identification (Hitt, Harrison, 
Ireland, and Best, 1998) and integration of acquired firm resources, which may be required to 
improve post-acquisition performance. Consistent findings on the relationship between 
acquisition experience and post-acquisition performance do not, however, exist. Prior 
acquisition experience has been found to predict success in later acquisitions (Bruton, Oviatt, 
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and White, 1994), to predict a decline in performance as the number of acquisitions increases 
(Kusewitt, 1985), and to have no impact on acquisition performance (Lahey and Conn, 1990). 
Still, Hitt, Harrison, and Ireland (2001, p. 55) caution that the importance of the link between 
managerial experience and M&A success should not be underestimated. As mentioned above, 
it is necessary to codify the experience gained by each acquisition or establishment of a new 
unit. To acquire the knowledge in the subsidiary and transfer it to the headquarters so the 
headquarters will have the integrative capacity within it, the acquisitions of companies must 
be institutionalised in the headquarters. Knowledge needs to be transferred from the acquired 
units to the headquarters. In order to create and develop an effective integrative capacity, the 
headquarters have to invest time and effort in the attempt to extract all the relevant lessons to 
be learned from previous experiences, codify those lessons into paper-based or electronic 
support tools and update these tools after every new experience. Learning from rare, 
heterogeneous, and complex experiences such as mergers and acquisitions does not happen 
automatically through a learning-by-doing process: one has to work hard at it (Singh and 
Zollo, 1998). Whether or not an MNC should and can maintain high integration or high 
responsiveness associated with particular businesses depends on interrelated systems of 
information, coordination, and resource flows (Roth and Morrison, 1991). A subsidiary with 
greater experience is more likely to commit resources, knowledge, and investment to local 
operations (Chang, 1995). This configuration reduces financial risks and operational 
uncertainty in a volatile environment, where lack of experience is an important obstacle to 
market expansion. In contrast, firms with little experience may need high integration because 
it can reduce a subsidiary’s vulnerability to the contextual hazards precipitated by a host 
country’s institutional and task environments (Miller, 1992; Luo, 2002). Such hazards are 
generally beyond organisational control, thus calling for internalisation. Internalisation is an 
effective mechanism for attenuating risk propensity and economic exposure to such an 
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environment (Root, 1988). When making a decision about the right headquarters–subsidiary 
relationship, managers will have to take into consideration all that has been mentioned above: 
the local context of the subsidiary, the size of the firm, management preferences and 
leadership, the culture, and how much integrative capacity the firm has. 
Integrative capacity 
Integrative capacity is a new concept in the international business theory. Given different 
organisational dynamics, different firms may have idiosyncratic abilities to cope with 
environmental conditions by reducing their dependence on or increasing their control over 
external resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This perspective is of importance in 
diagnosing the differentiation–integration balance for multinational corporations (MNCs) 
because complex organisations are characterised by structural indeterminacy, internal 
differentiation, fuzzy boundaries, and business multidimensionality (Doz and Prahalad, 
1981). When there is such complexity and heterogeneity, firms need to establish a solid 
strategic infrastructure, which can quickly adapt to external hazards and contextual changes. 
Strategic infrastructure is seen as a multidimensional system that contains strategic resources 
or capability and organisational infrastructure which could provide a foundation for global 
expansion and latent linkages within the MNC. When the firm boundaries are fuzzy, a 
conventional organisational structure is unable to satisfy the internal need for ecological 
evolution within its network (Egelhoff, 1988). In a situation like this, a strategic infrastructure 
is necessary for the coordination and integration of business units that are geographically 
dispersed, while also maintaining internal differentiation and local responsiveness amongst 
individual subunits. The MNC must have integrative capacity embedded in the firm. 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) touch upon the capability to integrate but do not develop the 
idea further. Likewise, many authors have touched on parts of the issue, such as codifying 
previous mergers and acquisition experience (Zollo and Singh, 2004), involving line 
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management early (Rovit and Lemire, 2003), appointing a specialised integration manager 
(Ashkenas and Francis, 2000), and how to ensure a focus on the corporate customers 
(Gammelgaard, 2002). We believe, however, that there is need for a compilation of this 
dispersed set of thoughts, which we have divided into two separate, generic points. First, 
learn from previous experiences and, second, plan and execute acquisitions. This has to be 
embedded in the firm’s culture both tacitly and explicitly. Naturally, the lessons learned from 
previous acquisitions are those that must feed into the planning and execution of the next. 
Consequently they provide the feedback loops for each other and the capacity of a firm to 
integrate following a merger or acquisition; this is how we define integrative capacity, which 
is essential for headquarters that manage and control subsidiaries. 
It is clear that the headquarters office has to have familiarity with local conditions of 
subsidiary units and provide an explanation for all final strategic decisions. The subsidiary 
has to have the ability to challenge the headquarters’ strategic decisions and there has to be 
two-way communication between the headquarters and the subsidiaries, meaning that some 
parts of the operation have to be centralised but the firm also has to have a flexible approach 
to other things (Rodriques, 1995). 
Integrative capacity in general has two levels. First, it can be explicit. The subsidiary 
managers can read about it; they can attend seminars and courses. The second level is tacit 
and has not been written down or communicated in other ways. One actually has to do it 
oneself and gain experience in order to become a good integrator in the corporation. Being 
able to have a good integrative capacity embedded in the firm means that the persons who are 
responsible for all the mechanisms in the firm have to make an intelligent choice of 
integration techniques and that choice is contingent upon a number of factors. In a particular 
situation, the relevant integration techniques and the ability to pursue them is part of the 
integrative capacity of the firm. What could be a really interesting question in the 
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international business literature and in the field of integration following an acquisition is 
whether the headquarters actually learns something from its subsidiaries and if it utilises that 
knowledge for the corporation’s benefit. Despite the large global M&A activity, only very 
few companies consistently execute merger activity well and it seems that firms that go 
through mergers and acquisitions, and therefore would have first-hand experience to make 
this work, do not retain the knowledge they need to be able to execute a merger or an 
acquisition well the next time around. They don’t seem to integrate the knowledge into the 
corporation and therefore they do not have a good integrative capacity.   According to Zollo 
and Singh (2004) experience accumulation from previous mergers in general do not influence 
future performance but if knowledge is codified (tacit knowledge is made explicit) it can at 
least at a higher levels  of integration, influence the performance.  The experience, the tacit 
knowledge of how to integrate two companies into one can´t be kept tacit, it has to made 
explicit so others within the firm can have access to that knowledge. 
Rovit and Lemire (2003) argued that the processes of acquiring firms must be 
institutionalised, which sits very well with the argument of making tacit knowledge explicit 
as stated above.  It is really important that processes are in line so tacit knowledge can be 
made explicit and stored within the firm.  
 
Methodology: Sample and data collection 
The empirical evidence for this paper is drawn from a study of two MNCs and their 
subsidiaries abroad. Case study research was adopted as the method here, since it permits in-
depth understanding and appreciation of the dynamics present within a single setting and is 
especially suitable for poorly-explored phenomena such as post-acquisition integration and 
‘how?’-type research questions. Furthermore, a case study was chosen because it is a suitable 
method for examining context-bound phenomena in situations where the boundaries between 
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the phenomenon and the context are blurred, just as in the natural, real-world setting. 
Integration is inherently embedded in the overall merger and acquisition context and thus the 
case study approach is suitable for studying it and for understanding the mechanism in the 
MNC. The case study approach permits a flexible and iterative approach where the researcher 
interacts with a problem domain and along the way gains a more profound understanding. In 
our quest to extend existing theories and explore their match with and suitability for the post-
merger context, this flexibility is vital. The cases in the study were selected for their 
similarities as well as their differences. To shed light on their mechanism and their level of 
integrative capacity, we chose two contrasting companies.   
First, a review of the existing theories on the topic of the relationship between 
headquarters and subsidiaries was conducted, and, second, primary data were collected by 
conducting interviews with managers of Marel Iceland, Scanvægt Denmark, Carnitech 
Denmark, and AEW Delford UK: all in all, 12 interviews. For Actavis, only two formal 
interviews were conducted and that was because they could not provide more at that time, in 
the middle of a big acquisition, but we gained access to a few managers who did not want to 
grant an interview but told us their story and how they felt. Unfortunately, their comments 
cannot be presented in this paper because they were not part of formal interviews, even 
though everything said was very positive. The approach stems from our interest in advancing 
the current understanding of this relationship between headquarters and subsidiaries. 
Data collection 
The overall strategy of this paper is a case study of two MNCs, where the headquarters of 
Marel and its subsidiaries and Actavis and its subsidiaries are the primary focal point. 
Primary data were collected through interviews with 14 people of all levels of the 
organisation in Marel, and with the CEO and the Deputy CEO of Actavis. Additionally, 
secondary data issued by Marel and Actavis have been used to complement and supplement 
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the gathered data and account for any missing information in the interviews. Initial primary 
data were collected through lengthy unstructured interviews with two employees of Marel 
and Actavis. This meant that information regarding the industries in which the companies 
work and the historical background of the companies and the acquisitions was gained. The 
following interviews at manager level were semi-structured, allowing for the comparison of 
the answers and to gain a more complete look at both the strategic level and the more 
practical level of their activities. The interviews took place in four series in the end of 2006 
and in the beginning of 2007, the interviewees, their positions, and the companies they work 
for are listed below:  
 
Table 1. List of interviews conducted 
Company Interviewees 
 
Marel 
Manager in the Marketing Centre of Marel and a manager 
from the Business Centre of Marel and the CEO of Marel 
 
Actavis 
The CEO of Actavis, the Deputy CEO of Actavis and the 
Manager of Corporate Communications (which was not 
recorded) 
Several interviews were conducted but not recorded owing to certain circumstances as the 
managers did not wanted their name or their statements into the thesis and therefore are not 
referred to in this thesis.  However some of their responses are referred to as “manager at 
Marel”. These interviews did, however, provide valuable background information on the 
companies and their industries.  
The primary data collection was conducted through on-site semi-structured 
interviews, which allowed for subjects to arise during the interviews that might otherwise 
have been excluded from fully-structured interviews. The secondary data consist of material 
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from the companies, corporate websites, promotion material, and internal communiqués, 
press coverage, and public data, for instance from the Icelandic Stock Exchange, ICEX. The 
use of largely primary data allowed in-depth investigation of the research topic and provided 
first-hand understanding of the industries, the companies, and the process they were going 
through.  
Validity and reliability 
Even though the interview guide for all the interviews was semi-structured, there was a 
difference in the direction the interview took, depending on each interviewee and the role 
s/he played within the organisation. Furthermore, the interviews were conducted in four 
series over a period of six months, which could have resulted in the questions being 
incoherent owing to the time lapse and/or the different dispositions of the interviewers. In 
terms of reliability, this could have yielded observer errors. As the answers unfolded, 
however, and since the interpretation was not conducted individually but rather discussed 
openly, the potential observer error and observer bias were limited. Various internal data 
from both Actavis and Marel and their subsidiaries were made available, which was 
appreciated.  
To ensure relevance, the substantive area discussed, integration after an acquisition, was 
conducted on similar terms. Furthermore, in both cases, the business environment was in a 
state of dramatic shift simultaneously with the post-merger integration processes. Differences 
were sought in organisational and acquisition-related dimensions, such as industry, size, and 
management preferences, and the subsidiaries’ local context, integration speed, structure, and 
culture. These differences should allow useful contrasts to be made during data analysis, 
which in turn should challenge and elaborate the emerging framework. 
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The background of the case companies 
The following section briefly outlines the case companies’ histories and background, current 
market focus, and respective organisational cultures. The information is extracted from the 
interviews that were conducted and through use of the respective companies’ websites. 
Additionally, a brief outline of the integration approaches that were assessed as suitable is 
given. 
Marel 
Marel manufactures equipment for the protein industries. Despite its early history as a 
supplier to the fishing industry, the company has changed and focuses on fish, meat, and 
poultry alike. The company’s products are part of the processing chain from primary 
processing onwards with the intention of strengthening its position in further processing but 
no intention of entering the slaughtering process segment. 
Marel was founded in 1983 as a spin-off from a university enterprise when a group of 
engineers began developing and manufacturing scales for fish production plants. In 1985, 
Marel started exporting its scales to Norway and the same year established a wholly-owned 
subsidiary in Canada. Its initial public offering in 1991 led to further international expansion 
over the next few years, and its first acquisition was conducted in 1997 when Carnitech was 
the target. This acquisitive behaviour lay dormant for four years until the German equipment 
manufacturer, TVM Maschinenbau, was acquired in 2001 followed by Pols, a small Icelandic 
manufacturer, which became part of Marel in 2004. In early 2006, Marel announced its plans 
to increase its turnover to between 400 and 500 million euros over the span of three years, 
fuelled by internal growth as well as acquisitions of two to four companies. With the 
acquisition of UK-based AEW Delford and Danish company Scanvægt later that same year, 
the company took large steps to meet that end. The end of September 2006 was Marel and its 
subsidiaries employing 2080 people in 22 countries, almost half of those employees in 
Denmark. There were 358 in Iceland, 330 employees in the UK and the rest around the 
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world, as will be addressed in the discussions. With these two acquisitions, the group’s 
combined annual turnover is 270 million euros. The US market is by far the largest, 
accounting for approximately 40% of the group’s sales (Hörður Arnarsson, CEO of Marel) 
Actavis 
Actavis Group, headquartered in Iceland, was founded in 1956 as a local purchasing alliance 
under the name of Pharmaco. The company started producing pharmaceuticals for the local 
market in 1972, and by the time Pharmaco went public on the Icelandic Stock Exchange 
(ICEX) in 1997 it was the largest domestic pharmaceutical company. In 1999, the company 
had around 100 employees, generic sales were around fourteen million euros, and it suffered 
from heavy losses. The company was illiquid. In 1999, Actavis undertook the first step to 
expand its business internationally with the acquisition of the Bulgarian pharmaceutical 
manufacturer Balkanpharma. This deal was a major milestone in Icelandic business history 
and laid the foundation for what was coming in other industries. In 2006, the number of 
employees was around 11,000 and the company had a presence in 40 countries. The sales 
were about 1.4 billion euros and the equity value was over three billion euros. Actavis in 
2006 had over 650 products on the market and 397 products in the pipeline. Their research 
and development sites were in the US, Romania, Malta, and India. In 2006, Actavis had 
major manufacturing sites in the US, India, Bulgaria, and Malta and a total of 21 plants. That 
same year, the firm completed 26 international acquisitions. 
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Performance of the case companies 
To give a brief overview of the growth of the case companies, we studied the increase in their 
turnover from 1998 until 2005, as can be seen in figure 1, and whether the turnover came 
from Iceland or abroad. Around 95% of Actavis’ turnover came from abroad and so did 
almost 73% of Marel’s total turnover. 
 
 
Figure 1: Increase in turnover from 1998 to 2005 
Source: Company reports various years and author compilation 
There has been a considerable increase in the firms’ equity from 1998 until 2005, especially 
in Actavis, as can be seen in figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2: Increase in equity from 1998 to 2005 
Source: Company reports various years and author compilation 
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Figure 3: Increase in number of employees from 2000 to 2006 
Source: Company reports various years and author compilation 
 
As can be seen in figure 3, there has also been an enormous increase in employees from 2000 
to 2006, especially for Actavis, which grew from 146 employees in 2000 to 10,000 
employees in 2006. That is an increase of 6800% in six years. Marel had 1,400 employees in 
2006 but 543 employees in the year 2000 so it is two and a half times larger if only 
employees are studied.  
Understanding Icelandic multinationals 
In order to understand Icelandic MNCs it is important to understand the business 
environment where the headquarters of these case companies are located. ‘We have a joie de 
vivre. Enjoy what we are doing’, says Róbert Wessman, CEO of Actavis. ‘Work hard, play 
hard. Conquer, vanquish, and then celebrate our victories. And we and women share the 
burden as equals, as in the Viking days. Danes spend 80% of their time planning, 20% of 
their time implementing. We Icelanders spend 5% of our time planning, 80% implementing, 
15% correcting mistakes. We don’t have time for long conversations—we may make 
mistakes, but we never lose time. We look for the 2-3 page business plan’, says Róbert 
Wessman. According to Jóhannesdóttir and Óladóttir (2008), the Nordic management styles 
are similar but each nation has its own character, which is strongly related to the nationality 
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of the manager. Icelandic managers have set themselves apart by being fast at decision-
making, hard-working, and extremely optimistic in the way that they believe that everything 
is possible (e.g. a ‘just do it’ attitude). 
 
Roles of subsidiaries 
Multinational business operations can take several different forms. The multinational 
companies (MNC) have fully autonomous units operating in multiple countries. These 
companies have traditionally given their foreign subsidiaries a great deal of latitude to 
address local issues such as consumer preferences, economic trends in different regions of the 
world, and political pressure, to cite examples. These subsidiaries, however, are frequently 
run as independent companies, without any integration. 
As of 2008, Marel Food Systems is a multinational corporation (MNC), with subsidiaries in 
24 countries and more than 4,000 employees worldwide, made up of eight business units 
located in the Netherlands, Denmark, the United States, Iceland, Slovakia, and Singapore. In 
addition, its extensive global sales and service network spans more than 40 countries. The 
largest number of its employees is based in the Netherlands (37%), followed by Denmark 
(23%), the United States (20%), and Iceland (9%), with the remainder (11%) spread out 
around the globe – from Brazil and several other locations in South America all the way 
across to Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific. Most of the company’s products are 
manufactured in Iceland, Denmark, the UK, and Slovakia, with smaller production facilities 
in Singapore and Brazil. In addition, the company operates a network of 60 agents and 
distributors in about 40 countries that market, sell, and service the company’s products 
around the world. 
. Actavis is one of the world’s leading players in the development, manufacture, and 
sale of generic pharmaceuticals. Founded in 1956, as stated above, the company has led an 
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assertive programme of expansion, making close to 30 acquisitions in the past eight years 
while maintaining strong organic growth. As of 2008, the group has approximately 11,000 
employees operating in about 40 countries around the globe. The global corporation Actavis’ 
headquarters are in Iceland. 
 
Globally dispersed companies 
The global corporation can be viewed as a multinational firm that maintains control of 
operations back in the home office. This kind of firm tends to treat the world market as a 
unified whole and tries to combine the activities in each country to maximise efficiency on a 
global scale. These companies operate much like a domestic firm, except that they view the 
whole world as their market.  In terms of the relationship between the headquarters and the 
subsidiaries, we can see that the managers’ preferences for learning from the subsidiaries are 
quite good. Hörður Arnarsson CEO of Marel says, ‘Yes, we learn a lot. The biggest change 
will probably be in Marel. So we are definitely taking up a lot of things from the other 
companies. For example, the way Scanvægt are running their service organisation will have a 
big effect on Marel’. 
Actavis’ top management consisted of three groups of people reporting to the CEO 
and Deputy CEO in the headquarters. One group included the regional managers, who were 
responsible for the major revenue-generating areas: North America, Western Europe, and 
Central and Eastern Europe. In the second group there are functional executives responsible 
for finance, R&D, operations for Europe and the rest of the world, operations for India and 
the United States, and the global supply chain. The third group includes the staff experts 
covering M&A, quality, human resources, legal, business development, hospital business, 
product launches, global product portfolio, and in-licensing says Róbert Wessman.  Only a 
small fraction of the executive group was located in Actavis’s headquarters in Iceland. The 
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top management team had a one-hour meeting every Monday, with other specialists attending 
as needed, this was done to see what resources were missing in each unit and how the 
subsidiaries could support each other and what the headquarters could do to make it work. 
Svafa Grönfeldt commented about Actavis being a globally dispersed company: ‘It is neither 
an advantage nor disadvantage to be located in Iceland, it doesn’t matter and like Róbert 
stated once: Headquarters is an old-fashioned word’.  
The strategy Marel has implemented of establishing centres of excellence is one that will lead 
to its being a multi-centre firm. To ensure the coherence of the company, it is necessary to 
facilitate a similarity between the organisational units as well as implementing measures for 
organisational learning. 
Carnitech displays the clearest example of the contours of the globally dispersed firm 
that Marel may develop into. By keeping the company separate for so many years before 
transferring the responsibility for the global salmon industry to Carnitech Salmon, Marel has 
effectively created a separate division with aspirations of independence while possessing the 
cutting-edge technology in that specific segment. For Marel to be able to harness the learning 
from that part of the group it must implement a structure to do so.  
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Planning and executing acquisitions 
Both Marel and Actavis have been quite active in foreign direct investments in the 
recent years and their growth has mainly been through acquisitions as can be seen in table 2. 
 
Table 2.  The major foreign direct investments of Actavis and Marel 
 
Source: Company reports various years and author compilation 
´We have been quite aggressive in our acquisitions´ says Svafa Grönfeldt, ´but aggressive in 
a good way’  says Róbert Wessman, ‘We had good R&D capabilities and we understood the 
regulatory environment. What Actavis lacked was scale in manufacturing and marketing as 
well as R&D. So the choice was simple: we could either remain a small, uninteresting R&D 
Actavis Major FDIs Year Marel Major FDIs year
Balkanpharma 1999 Marel Enquipment 1985
Pharmamed 2001 N/A 1991
Zdravlje 2002 N/A 1996
UNP 2002 Marel USA 1996
Velefarm 2003 Carnitech 1997
Colotech 2003 Marel UK 1998
Fako 2003 Arbor 2000
Pharmaco Inc 2003 TVM Maschinenbau 2000
N/A 2003 OL-Tool Production Aps 2001
Pliva Pharma Nordic 2004  CP Food Machinery a/s 2001
Pliva Pharma Nordic 2004 N/A 2002
Biovena 2004 N/A 2003
Higia 2005 Marel Russia 2003
Pharma Avalanche 2005 Marel Spain 2003
Ophtha 2005 Röscherwerke GmbH 2004
Kéri Pharma 2005 Pols 2004
Lotus 2005 Dantech Food PTE 2005
Alpharma 2005 n/a 2005
Lorabid 2005 Marel Carnitech Tailand 2005
Amide 2005 AEW Delford 2006
Sindan 2006 Scanvægt 2006
Zio Zdorovje 2006 Stork Food systems 2008
Abrika 2006
Manufacturing plant 2006
API 2007
Manufacturing site 2008
Zhejiang Chiral medicine 2008
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group or we could become global. The banks and board were completely puzzled by this 
approach, and sceptical. They said, ´It is your reputation on the line here´.  I promised them I 
would succeed, and invested all of my personal assets in the shares of the company.  Hörður 
Arnarsson, CEO of Marel, says, ‘We can say we started in 2002 or 2003 when we had gone 
through a period of strengthening the infrastructure of the company and reached a level that 
we believed made us ready for takeovers. We took a strategic decision with the board. Then 
we did a lot of analysing work, where to position the company. And we can say that we did a 
lot of work analysing the current situation in the segment’. He continues, ‘The reason for the 
growth strategy is that we believe that our segment will develop as almost all segments have 
developed. You get this window of opportunity when you get these companies starting but 
then you get consolidation driven by many aspects: both the cost effectiveness, by economies 
of scale, but also being able to deliver a total solution. We believe that our segment will 
develop as any other, that we will get two or three competing companies with 15 to 20% 
market share that can become quite profitable. But then you get some niche companies that 
are very specialised that are also quite profitable in narrow segments with patents or high 
entry barriers. And then you get a lot of these companies with bad profitability. And we 
decided that we wanted to be one of these two or three companies and that we wanted to lead 
the consolidation and thereby select where we would position ourselves. So it is really to 
create a market leadership’, says the CEO about Marel’s growth strategy.In the interview 
with Svafa Grönfeldt, she mentioned that it was clear from the beginning that the new CEO 
of the company had plans and he had a vison to make something out of the almost bankrupt 
company he had taken charge of.  ‘Our vision was to be a major generic player, with world 
class research and development, a low cost global supply chain, and with presence in all 
major markets around the world. I had no doubt that we could accomplish this’, recalled 
Róbert Wessman.  So what did Actavis do to retain their goal to become a leading company 
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in their field?  They didn’t have the necessary resources.  To give an example of the strategic 
acquisition rationale of Actavis, six acquisitions will be mentioned. In Serbia and Bulgaria, 
Actavis acquired Balkanpharma. The purpose of the acquisition was to use opportunities 
created by privatisation efforts in Bulgaria to gain a strong foothold abroad, to gain a new 
market for the existing portfolio, to benefit from poorly-managed former government-
operated facilities through restructuring and to gain access to low-cost manufacturing sites. 
The acquisition of Biovena in Poland expanded the market scope for Actavis’s products in 
new markets to which they did not have access before. The same goes for the acquisition of 
Pharma Avalanche in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. When Actavis acquired Lotus in 
India, it provided the company with priority access to low-cost bio studies and clinical testing 
and the firm achieved a lower development cost. Amide in the US was a platform for Actavis 
onto the world’s largest generic market and gave the firm a rapid introduction of new 
products into the US market and obviously expanded their portfolio. The acquisition of 
Sindan in Romania was a platform onto the high value oncology sector for Actavis. In only 
eight weeks, the firm achieved full financial and development integration and acquired rapid 
product introduction into all Actavis’s markets ahead of schedule. Alpharma Generics was a 
gateway to the Western European markets and a market share increase in the US. The firm 
benefits from synergies through overlapping development projects, the consolidation of 
manufacturing capacity, new markets, and new product application.  ´As you can see, they 
are all a part of a big puzzle, we needed certain resources so we acquired the knowhow and 
the expertise we needed and we could move our manufacturing to low cost countries, that is 
how we reached our goal and maybe our only chance to be able to establish centre of 
excellence´says Svafa Grönfeldt. 
Svafa Grönfeldt continues,´We carefully planned our acquisitions, we have conducted 
over 200 due diligences so our decision process is streamlined: we don’t study and 
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recommend, we just do it quickly’. She continues, ‘Just three years ago we were a second-tier 
player, coming from out of the blue into the top tier, and we were not always seen as a 
serious acquirer, sometimes we were seen as too small players to participate, but we planned 
the whole process, even though we were a much smaller company than the one we were 
acquiring and we had the capacity that we needed to be able to integrate the new firms into 
the corporation´.   
Integrative capacity  
As mentioned above, different firms may have different ways of coping with environmental 
conditions by reducing their dependence on or increasing their control over external 
resources. This perspective is of importance in diagnosis of the differentiation and/or 
integration balance of firms that are located in many countries. The infrastructure of the case 
companies contains strategic resources like knowledge, capital, and products which can 
quickly adapt to external hazards and contextual changes if the headquarters has embedded 
integrative capacity in the firm. Often the firm boundaries are fuzzy and a conventional 
organisational structure is unable to satisfy the internal need for ecological evolution within 
the network. In a situation like this, a strategic infrastructure is necessary for the coordination 
and integration of business units that are geographically dispersed but the headquarters has to 
make sure it maintains internal differentiation and local responsiveness amongst individual 
subunits. It is interesting to see that the experience that is gained through acquisition can be 
maintained by an integration team that passes on its knowledge or articulates and codifies it, 
depending on how often managers expect to acquire a company. It is impossible to have an 
integration expert if the process is sequential but not continuous. For the headquarters, it 
could well be a good idea to codify the knowledge and the experience gained through those 
acquisitions and collect knowledge and experience from other subsidiaries. The level of 
integrative capacity depends on the frequency of the acquisitions. If the acquisitions are not 
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so frequent, then it is easiest to codify the knowledge that is accumulated through each 
acquisition. If a company acquires many firms each year, it is likely that the firm will have an 
integration team that has the knowledge, whether tacitly or explicitly. It is not so much what 
one buys, as what done does after one has bought it, and how well, that matters in 
distinguishing failure from success.  In figure 4 we summarise the dominating factors that 
were brought through in our interviews by our respondents: the most influencing factors of 
the integrative capacity, which is good planning and fast executing of mergers and 
acquisitions and  learning from previous mergers and acquisitions.  More analytically 
managers must have a clear global vision and core values, and it is important to note that 
culture also plays a significant role. This study, however, does not touch upon culture 
explicitly.  
 
Source: Authors interpretation of the concept 
Figure 4:  Integrative capacity 
As has been stated several times appropriating value from mergers and acquisitions presents 
its own set of challenges, which may be no less significant than those associated with internal 
growth. Until researchers can provide managers with better guidance on how value can be 
created through mergers and acquisitions, the apparent bias towards external growth over 
internal growth is likely to continue to result in disappointing performance outcomes. Second, 
and related to the preceding point, managers are advised to be as explicit as possible about 
where, why, and how acquisitions can be reasonably expected to strengthen their firms. 
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Vague rationalisations that go no further than the common synergy argument are advised to 
be viewed with scepticism. If managers cannot explain, in clear and compelling terms, how 
acquisitions positively serve the interests of their firms, those acquisitions will not be 
consciously managed to the best effect (King, Dalton, Daily, and Covin, 2003). The cadre of 
11,000 employees was the result of Actavis’ extensive acquisition activity, and close to 5,000 
people in total had been let go as part of those processes. Svafa Grönfeld commented, ‘I 
never liked it, but it had to be done. After the acquisition of Alpharma part of the executive 
team had to be squeezed out. Some people take it well when they are offered an alternative 
position that fits their skills, but sometimes people cannot grow with the company says Svafa 
Grönfeldt. ‘It is hard to combine speed of integrating acquisitions with making the right 
decisions, so we make mistakes. Often we put the wrong person in a key management role 
only to find out nine months later, and we have to replace them. But there are also many 
examples of people being able to turn around their behaviour and grow, as long as you sit 
with them honestly’, says Svafa Grönfeldt.  In Marel, Ingólfur Örn Guðmundsson on Marel 
marketing centre says, ‘Carnitech just happened, I think. It was about gaining market access 
into Denmark and gaining capabilities.  
Complementary products to the Marel line then. In addition, it had a better stronghold in the 
meat business, being pork’. ‘With AEW Delford and Scanvægt, those companies were 
selected by a team of consultants that worked with Marel and it laid down a list of 120 
companies that were feasible for buying. To have a good product fit, so to speak. Scanvægt 
was probably the company that we would have targeted as number one’, says Ingólfur Örn 
Guðmundsson and he continues, ‘After the acquisition of Scanvægt, the first months will be 
spent on, what the hell did we buy? What kind of company is it and how do they operate? 
The strategy is, we have learned, ´do not shake them up´. 
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The integration capacity of Actavis becomes quite clear through the following. 
Actavis made successful integration paramount, the achievement of which depended on 
Actavis aligning the goals, management systems, and understanding of widely disparate 
companies. The operation in Malta had been operated as a non-profit NGO prior to Actavis’ 
acquisition. Alpharma had been part of a publicly-listed American corporation. Serbia had 
been a privatised state-owned enterprise, and the Turkish operation had been run single-
handed by the owner for forty years. ‘The challenge is always to create one team with one 
vision living with one set of values’, explained Wessman. ‘When Alpharma joined us, they 
were surprised that we let their line managers be part of the integration, and our speed and 
our enthusiasm seemed to energise them. We flew a large group to Iceland for a retreat where 
we set specific integration targets, then we flew together to Alpharma’s major sites, after 
which we made the tough management decisions of whom to keep and whom to let go at the 
top. You make it sound easy’. Sometimes, significant restructuring is required. ‘When we set 
up our first major manufacturing site in Malta, where the work ethic was strong, costs were 
low, and government support was high, we had to double the plant size and then get EU 
certification. It is not unusual for us to completely refurbish the plants we buy’.   
Integration, however, is not always easy. That is why integration capacity is even 
more important than ever. Róbert Wessman continues, ‘In Serbia the integration was more 
volatile, because we had to make a thousand people redundant and change the management 
team, but they were violently furious at the lay-offs and one day surrounded us in the plant. 
Róbert Wessman met with ministers but they did not lift a finger to help at the time. Finally, 
there were floods and the town asked for their help, which they gave, but on the condition 
that their manager could come back. The country was still suffering from the shock of the 
recent war in Serbia. Róbert Wessman says, ‘In Bulgaria we found a guy hiding in the 
basement listening to all of our phone conversations and monitoring all of our emails’. Dr 
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Svafa Grönfeldt served as Actavis’ Deputy Managing Director for several years, as 
mentioned above, where she was in charge of the integration process: ‘‘We do not integrate 
just for integration’s sake, rather only where it creates additional, tangible value, areas that 
we identify even before we consummate the acquisition’. Each project is centred on key 
integration areas with task forces for each, and tasks are broken down into manageable pieces 
that the managers of Actavis can track financially and operationally. Svafa Grönfeldt says, 
‘Tracking of tangible synergies is important for all of the stakeholders, including our 
shareholders and other parts of the Actavis organisation. We start with low-hanging fruit, the 
major integration pieces that can be accomplished rapidly. Then we assess the quality and 
quantity of people needed and the available talent. Furthermore, we identify and retain key 
people, simplify structures and reporting lines, make sure roles and accountability are clear, 
and link performance rewards to integration success. Needless to say, strong project 
management is needed’. The last but certainly not the least important piece of the integration 
process is communication. ‘You can never communicate enough before, during, and even 
after a merger’, says Svafa Grönfeldt. The relationship between the headquarters and 
subsidiaries and between subsidiaries can be seen in the following statement: ‘We acquired 
Sindan primarily to get its R&D expertise in oncogenerics, and we could immediately offer 
their products in our other markets. We created a team of a dozen Sindan and Actavis people, 
met in Romania for a day, and then broke into small teams covering the different areas to 
estimate the sales potential of each new project, set specific objectives, establish market share 
and revenue metrics, and decide who would do what. Then Róbert and our finance people set 
bonuses for people in Romania and Iceland (including me) for achieving those objectives. 
This is a way of life for us, we are always integrating something, and it seems simple to us. 
We cannot figure out why our competitors don’t do it. They make it too complex’. Hörður 
Arnarsson, CEO of Marel, says, ‘Carnitech was bought much earlier than the others and was 
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bought on completely different arguments. It is not a part of the strategy that Marel has 
recently adopted. In 1997, when Carnitech was acquired, it was more of an opportunistic 
acquisition and in fact people were mainly buying production capacity. Marel at that time did 
not have the infrastructure to take over a company. Carnitech at that time had a much 
stronger infrastructure’. Marel and Carnitech did not merge. They were kept as separate 
companies. Hörður continues, ‘And I think it was definitely correct at that time, because 
Marel simply did not have the infrastructure. The companies were also very different’. When 
we study this, one question arises: can we measure the success of a merger or acquisition and 
how is the success of an acquisition measured? Hörður Arnarsson, CEO of Marel, says, ‘We 
do not measure it as such. The only thing we measure is the profitability of the company and 
the growth. You can never compare the current situation at this time to status quo two years 
ago. We mainly like to see growth and increased profitability in that profit are that we 
acquire’. Asked about how this is measured, Hörður says, ‘We use KPIs like return on 
investment (ROI) but you cannot look at an individual number. It is difficult to measure. But 
we do that with all our investments. We look at ROI. And then return on capital employed in 
the company. But those very often have a positive effect on other units in the group, so it is 
not so easy to measure them’. 
Róbert Wessman says, ‘Actavis had developed a set of nine KPIs, which were used to 
generate specific management targets and monitor achievement. These were revenue, cost, 
EBITDA, new product launches, number of complete tactical plans, integration synergies, 
exemplifying corporate values, employee satisfaction, and customer satisfaction. The KPIs 
were used to generate performance evaluation criteria that were applied throughout the 
company’. 
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Core values 
The development of global corporate core values, that is, values that cut across all the 
subsidiaries located throughout the globe, would help provide a balance. Corporate cultures 
reflect nationality, demographics of employees and managers, industry, and market; they are 
related to organisational structure and control systems; but all of these leave room for unique 
and idiosyncratic elements. Actavis’s executives inevitably referred to the Icelandic culture, 
relishing the contrasts with other Scandinavians, particularly Danes. ‘As Icelanders, we are 
people of the sea: when there are fish to be caught, you seize the moment and go out and 
catch fish, regardless of the weather, regardless of the time. In Europe, bankers say that when 
the European bankers go home, the Icelanders stay in the office. There is no line between 
personal life and business’, says Róbert Wessman. The atmosphere at Marel is a little bit 
different. Ingólfur Örn Guðmundsson says, ‘We are based on ideas from the University. So 
we are a pretty relaxed culture, we are pretty open-minded and not too bossy in terms of 
management style’. He continues, ‘The headquarters (Marel) is more innovative, more 
responsive, more flexible than Carnitech, our subsidiary’. Ingólfur Örn Guðmundsson says, 
‘We have shown them our ideas and they have followed. We have not told them that this is 
what you are supposed to do. We have said, this is a good example of what you can do, by 
working with their marketing people’. Georg Gísli Andersen is also a manager at Marel’s 
headquarters, operating in Marel business centre. He says, ‘I have been involved with 
Denmark since the year 2000’.  He continues, ‘I have often said that instead of teaching 
cultural differences between Iceland and China in schools, you should start teaching cultural 
differences between Iceland and Denmark, because there are quite a few. And then Iceland 
and Great Britain’. Marel bought Carnitech in 1997 ‘…without really realising the 
differences and then the humongous differences in company culture that are between the two. 
Carnitech is a totally different company, it could be located in China’, says Georg Gísli 
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Andersen. Managing a globally dispersed company can be difficult and is related to the 
culture, both national and corporate culture There is a lot of peer pressure here in the 
Icelandic school system, which is similar to others in the Nordic countries, but in Iceland 
there is not the same discipline as in the other Nordic countries. There is one good thing 
about it, however: nobody is punished for thinking outside the box. Icelanders are egalitarian; 
everybody is called by his or her first name, regardless of whether s/he is your neighbour or 
the president. ‘In general, Icelanders are much less organised than people in the neighbouring 
countries, willing to jump into things, think laterally. Many others plan things to death’, says 
Róbert Wessman.  
The  management team had specified six values that they would inculcate in the 
organisation to provide additional unity. An employee orientation document listed them: 
‘Ambition—Show ambition in every task you do. Customer care—Provide first class 
customer care. Teamwork—Foster teamwork to achieve more together than alone. 
Efficiency—Value resources and work efficiently every day. Flexibility—Be flexible enough 
to seize the opportunities around you. Pro-Activity—Be pro-active and be the one to make 
things happen´ says Svafa Grönfeldt. 
It is a management preference whether they decide to integrate a subsidiary or not. Do 
they want to maintain strong control, stability, or even adaptability and flexibility? The 
deputy CEO of Actavis says, ‘One of the issues in acquisitions is the uncertainty of key staff, 
“what will happen to me?”, and this can lead to in-fighting. We try to deal with the emotions 
by having very clear frameworks and timelines so that people know what needs to be done 
and their role in the process, particularly with those we want to retain so we start the 
integration process by identifying key managerial talent even before the deal is done, so we 
can move quickly to form teams to set targets and implement them. ´I used to be in charge of 
the implementation after mergers and the bulk of the integration is completed in 90 days. Day 
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1 of the integration is a town meeting-style kick-off meeting with a few people from Actavis 
and several dozen from the acquired company present’. Svafa Grönfeldt, deputy CEO of 
Actavis continues, ‘We do not have a corporate integration team, rather a steering committee. 
The integration team consists of managers from the acquired company mixed with people 
from various Actavis operations around the world, whoever makes sense, and they set up 
several task teams… After three days the teams have identified synergy targets, which are 
tracked. Teamwork is emphasised, so is our Winning Formula. We keep emphasising our key 
performance indicators. We strive to get the people who are responsible for setting and 
achieving the integration objectives involved in leading the process’. 
 
Conclusion 
In a global business, management competes worldwide against a number of other 
multinationals in the world market. A good balance within a MNC is attained when the 
managers in the headquarters have a global vision, core values, and cultural principles that 
are shared by all the subsidiary managers. The managers in the headquarters make decisions 
based on the needs of foreign subsidiary managers. They also have to have an understanding 
of the needs of specific organisational situations; they have to have integrative capacity in the 
corporation. Integrative capacity builds on the ability of the MNC to learn from its experience 
and also how it plans and executes its acquisitions.  Global vision and core values are very 
important.  The lessons learned from previous acquisitions are those that must be fed into the 
planning and execution of the next. Only then do they provide the feedback loops for each 
other and it must be embedded into the MNC culture.  As mentioned above, although culture 
is recognized as a factor in the integration process, it is not considered in detail in this paper. 
It should, however, be looked at in detail in further study.Strategy is centralised, and various 
aspects of operations are decentralised or centralised as economics and effectiveness dictate. 
 180 
 
The company seeks to respond to particular local market needs, while avoiding a compromise 
of efficiency of the overall global system. Many companies that adopt the global strategy 
approach also adopt the matrix organisational structure. In the matrix structure, there is 
extensive cooperation between all the operating subsidiaries. Both Actavis and Marel are 
examples of that, and the companies have a matrix structure.   
Both of the case companies have grown a lot in the past five years or so from local 
Icelandic firms into MNCs. In the acquisitions Actavis has made over the years, it has always 
changed the name of the acquired companies to Actavis, but the companies that Marel has 
acquired have kept their original names. Actavis has integrative capacity embedded in its 
headquarters and so does Marel, but Marel is not using it as effectively as Actavis does. The 
subsidiaries of Marel are more independent and less integrated than those of Actavis. The 
generic pharmaceutical market is totally different from the market that Marel is operating 
within. The flow of products, knowledge, and capital seems to be effortless for Actavis. The 
headquarters has a meeting every week, discussing the coming week, what the subsidiaries 
are lacking, and how the flow can be channelled that week so the resources of the company 
are best utilised. It can be said in general that Icelandic managers with globally dispersed 
companies are coming off a big wave of change. Actavis has more integrative capacity than 
Marel does and Actavis has examples of centres of excellence, where special knowledge and 
R&D functions are the core centres of the company with their centre of excellence in their 
headquarters in Iceland. Empirical evidence points to the need for a structure to facilitate the 
transfer of Marel’s knowledge to the subsidiaries. At present, the strengths are exploited 
where they originated, with the exception of the group’s first centre of excellence, Carnitech 
Salmon. To ensure that the group benefits from all its capabilities, Marel must instigate a 
learning measure. 
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 For Marel, in the cases of Carnitech and AEW Delford, there is the potential for 
sustaining a multi-centre firm, although an institution for continuous learning updates is 
lacking. Establishing centres of excellence would improve the management structure and 
clarify responsibilities. Since Scanvægt overlaps with Marel to a large degree, establishing it 
as a separate centre of excellence could be detrimental to the group.  
 Although there is a clear will within the organisations’ employees to learn from each 
other, structure is lacking to ensure that the learning takes place, resulting in the potential loss 
of reciprocated learning. 
The managers of these companies are strongly action- and success-oriented, but owing to 
the circumstances of the global financial markets, nobody is expecting any major acquisitions 
in the near future. Therefore, Icelandic managers—in particular managers at Marel and 
Actavis—must transition from being hunters to become farmers. That is their big challenge. 
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Appendix  
The interviews for the paper Integrative capacity took place in four series in the end of 2006 
and in the beginning of 2007, list of the interviewees, their positions, and the companies they 
work for are listed below:  
 
List of interviews conducted 
Company Interviewees 
Marel Manager in the Marketing Centre of Marel and a manager 
from the Business Centre of Marel and the CEO of Marel 
Actavis The CEO of Actavis, the Deputy CEO of Actavis and the 
Manager of Corporate Communications (which was not 
recorded) 
Several interviews were conducted but not recorded owing to certain circumstances as the 
managers did not wanted their name or their statements into the thesis and therefore are not 
referred to in this thesis. These interviews did, however, provide valuable background 
information on the companies and their industries.  The interviews were in Icelandic and 
sample questions who have been translated are below. 
The primary data collection was conducted through on-site semi-structured interviews, which 
allowed for subjects to arise during the interviews that might otherwise have been excluded 
from fully-structured interviews. The secondary data consist of material from the companies, 
corporate websites, promotion material, and internal communiqués, press coverage, and 
public data, for instance from the Icelandic Stock Exchange, ICEX. The use of largely 
primary data allowed in-depth investigation of the research topic and provided first-hand 
understanding of the industries, the companies, and the process they were going through.  
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Sample questions for the interviews for the Integrative capacity paper: 
Information given before the interviews: the size of the company, number of subsidiaries, the 
industry and number of employees. Note that the interviews were conducted in Icelandic and 
few examples are shown below. 
 
Which language is the official organizations language? 
Does the size matter in terms of controlling the organization (number of employees, number 
of units/subsidiaries etc...)? 
Does the size matter in regards of communications? 
Describe the subsidiaries local context. 
What is the function of each subsidiary? 
Describe the culture of the organization 
Is there a one single culture or is the culture fragmented? 
How are mergers and acquisitions planned? 
Is the knowledge and the experience codified in any way (if yes, how)? 
How is performance measured? 
Does the company have a clear vision? 
Can you describe the core values of the organization? 
Does the location of the headquarters matters? 
How does the headquarters search for new targets to acquire? 
Does speed matters in the acquisition process? 
Does it matters if the target companies are smaller companies than you are or larger? 
How are subsidiaries integrated into the organization? 
Does the company have an integration team? 
How is the organizational structure of the firm? 
Which is more important, internal growth or external growth? 
Is research and development important for the organization? 
Is technology important for the organization? 
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6. The business model of the boom period:  Some final critical 
thoughts 
 
Ásta Dís Óladóttir22 
 
Abstract 
The term ‘the business model of the boom period’ accounts for a number of business models 
which were once commonly used but are no longer appropriate. The world today is 
experiencing an almost unprecedented financial crisis of a global nature whose depth and 
breadth are equally great. It is not confined to any one geographic area or one specific 
industry sector but is hitting everybody and everything – to some extent at least. ‘The 
business model of the boom period’ is defined as aggressive growth through investments and 
especially foreign direct investments.  This paper attempts to analyse ‘the business model of 
the boom period’ that many Icelandic companies seem to have followed in recent years.  We 
study the enormous growth of Icelandic firms and how they have managed to grow so fast in 
only a few years.  What was the real motivation behind their aggressive growth through FDI? 
How was it possible for such a small economy to grow as fast as it did? 
Before analysing the actual growth of Icelandic companies it is necessary to understand 
which factors contributed to this growth and what triggered the growth in Iceland. The factors 
can be divided into both internal and external factors.  Is the ‘business model of the boom 
period’, hereafter ‘Yesterday’s Business Model’, gone for good or is it in fact ongoing? 
 
Keywords:  Growth, FDI, leveraged buyouts, performance, Iceland, Yesterday’s Business 
Model. 
 
 
                                                 
22 Ásta Dís Óladóttir, Department of International Economics and Management, Copenhagen Business School, 
and Faculty of Business at Bifröst University, Iceland. 
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Introduction 
The term ‘Yesterday’s Business Model’ can apply to any number of business models whose 
application was common practice.  The question that we address is whether yesterday’s way of 
doing business is now past or if it is ongoing. The phrase has been used a number of times in 
recent years to indicate some form of behaviour that is out-dated or something that worked 
yesterday but for some reason has become obsolete and is no longer viable (Spagat, 2009; 
Nambiar, 2008; Asay, 2007; Herbold, 2007). When viewed from the perspective of Icelandic 
firms the ‘Yesterday’s Business Model’ can be defined as a model that companies followed in 
the time leading up to the 2008 financial crisis. There seems to have been a pattern going on 
before the crisis, where many companies conducted their business in a similar manner, especially 
when it came to growing, expanding, and changes in the geographical operating areas. In the 
years leading up to the crisis companies were growing like never before, and this growth was 
mainly achieved through acquisitions, greenfields, mergers, buy-outs and takeovers. More often 
than not, the growth was highly leveraged and company stocks were used as payment. 
Companies were growing at breakneck speeds and there did not seem to be many barriers on 
where they could go and what they could do. Nothing seemed out of reach. It did not matter how 
large the target company was; if they wanted it, then companies found a way to acquire it.  Who 
would believe that Iceland would lead the world investment report list year after year?  Who 
could have imagined that Icelandic investors or Icelandic firms would acquire shares in the 
American airline, FIH, Store Brand, Sampo, Finnair, Refresco, Keops, Atlas ejendom, Hamleys, 
Magasin du Nord, Illum, Woodward, Goldsmiths, Mappin & Webb, Oasis, Karen Millen, LxB 
II, Julian Graves, MK One, Jane Norman, Sterling, Easy Jet, Finnair, Coast, Whistles, Merlin 
and many, many others?  Who would have believed that companies from Iceland could have 
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become leaders in their field? Bakkavör is one of the leading food processing companies in the 
world, Actavis is a leading generic pharmaceutical company, Promens is at the forefront in the 
roto-moulding industry, Össur in prosthetic and orthotic devices, Flaga Group in sleep 
diagnostics and services.  Their success is, however, understandable, given their core 
competences. For example, the Hampidjan Group is one of the largest suppliers to the fishing 
industry around the world.  This, then, raises the question of how it was all possible. How did 
they do it, what was their motivation? Are they behaving any differently from firms in other 
economies like Ireland and Israel? And how did they manage this rapid growth with their 
headquarters in Iceland and numbers of subsidiaries all over the world?  The research question 
that we attempt to answer in this paper is whether the Yesterday’s Business Model is gone for 
good or is in fact an ongoing way of doing business.  We will start by explaining the model, 
define it, discuss growth of firms and then discuss the questions raised above. 
Yesterday’s Business Model 
There appear to be several contributory factors, but no matter which way you look at it there 
seems to be one dominant factor: cheap money. In the last few years access to borrowed money 
has become increasingly easy, up to the point where it appeared as if anybody could borrow 
money for anything from anyone.  Icelandic and international financial institutions, investors, the 
government, the central bank, the financial supervisory authority and others were part of this 
game.  If they had not been, the situation in Iceland would not be as serious as it is today. The 
financial models were based on predicted cash flow generation of the businesses acquired and 
the ability to service the interest payment requirement.  This was accompanied by extreme 
optimism and a ‘things-will-work-themselves-out’ mentality where the only way was up – a 
typical mindset leading to a bubble. Bubbles, however, are known to burst, and that is exactly 
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what has happened; the managers simply thought it would not happen so soon.  We are 
experiencing an almost unprecedented financial crisis of a global nature whose depth and breadth 
are almost unprecedented It is not confined to any one geographic area or one specific industry 
sector but is hitting everybody and everything – to some extent at least. Many firms are facing 
bankruptcy, many have already gone bankrupt, and yet others are facing momentous struggles in 
order to avoid the same fate. There are some firms, however, which seem to be coping, as if the 
crisis is not affecting them as much.  
Scholars have found numerous reasons why a company fails. They include inability to 
adapt to a changing environment (Kim, 2007; Levinson 1994), psychologically illogical 
organisational structure and compensation schemes (Levinson, 1994), inability to recognise and 
manage cognitive complexity (Levinson, 1994), and high-risk growth strategies such as 
aggressive acquisitions (Fogg, 1976; Moulton, Thomas & Pruett, 1996). A study by Moulton and 
colleagues (1996) also found that ‘debt-funded, forced-growth strategies create a high risk of 
failure regardless of industry growth rate’.  Icelandic companies which have been following 
Yesterday’s Business Model  have been guilty of at least one or more of these peccadilloes yet 
some have faced extreme difficulty and bankruptcy while others appear to operate 
uninterruptedly. One thing which unites them all is that they have been growing aggressively 
through foreign direct investments. The Yesterdays Business Model can therefore be defined as 
aggressive growth through FDI, growth that happened at breakneck speed, acquiring companies 
that were larger than the acquiring company itself. 
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What Triggered the Phenomenal Growth? 
Before we explain the Yesterdays Business Model and analyse the actual growth of Icelandic 
companies it is necessary to understand what factors contributed to this growth. Only by 
understanding how it was possible can we understand what went wrong.  The factors can be 
divided into internal and external factors. Internal factors include the things that were happening 
within these companies. The external factors are things that were happening in the companies’ 
external environment. 
Internal Factors 
Increased Experience in the Business Sector 
For most of the twentieth century the Icelandic economy was heavily regulated, centralised and 
very dependent on its fishing industry. Therefore, the transformation of the economy into market 
capitalism is relatively recent and primarily caused by changes in the exporting of fish 
(Danielsson and Zoega, 2008:  2)The institutional experience and tradition of running a modern 
commercial banking system only go back a decade (Danielsson and Zoega, 2008).  As the 
Icelandic economic system quickly adopted a more capitalist and free market system, which gave 
rise to the growth in the banking system, there was increased demand from the banks for people 
with business-related education. The high salaries offered by the banks encouraged students to 
choose such studies. According to the Statistical Bureau the number of people studying business-
related studies has gone up considerably. The number of graduates from social sciences, law or 
business was 435 in 1995 but in 2007 this number had gone up to 1.372 (Hagstofa, 2009). 
Furthermore, an increasing number of individuals has sought education abroad, which has 
been an important factor driving the globalisation of Icelandic businesses. The percentage of 
Icelandic students enrolled in an institution of higher education abroad is much higher than the 
OECD average (Tómasdóttir, Ólafsson, Óladóttir, Thorláksson and Thorsteinsson, 2007).  
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Increased education opportunities created a young workforce, often educated abroad, which has 
given rise to an entrepreneurial class of executives.  The pension fund system also served as an 
indirect educational tool which helped train investment managers and provided challenging 
opportunities for young experts often educated abroad. The opportunity to manage the assets of 
the pension system provided opportunities for a new generation of financial managers who were 
also helped by a stable economic environment during the 1990s. The outcome was a vibrant 
financial market that quickly outgrew the Icelandic market (Tómasdóttir, Ólafsson, Óladóttir, 
Thorláksson and Thorsteinsson, 2007). 
 
Pressure for High Returns  
In the last couple of years there has been excessive pressure from stockholders in Iceland for 
high yearly returns (up to 20%). In the long run it becomes extremely hard to maintain such high 
returns and managing a company which is growing as fast as some of the Icelandic companies 
did would be extremely difficult for any manager. But stockholders are not the only factor. Many 
of the Icelandic companies were recently bought by new owners. When the owners of a company 
are the ones running it the manager’s income becomes directly related to the growth of the 
company. The benefits of growth in revenue are an immediate profit for them, and a loss (or 
reduction) in revenue results in an immediate loss in revenue for the owners. As a result, Eichner 
(1987) found that it became a natural instinct (or rationale) to try and maximise the short-term 
benefits, regardless of the long-term effect this might have on the organisation (as cited in 
Shapiro, 1990). In addition to that, Moulton and colleagues (1996) concluded that debt-funded, 
forced-growth strategies create a high risk of failure regardless of industrial growth rate.  
 
 195 
 
Excessive Risk-Taking  
Investments that offer an extremely high potential reward invariably come with a high level of 
risk (Little, 2009). The risk-adjusted return on capital must be higher than the cost of capital 
(Modigliani and Miller, l958).  Therefore, as risk aversion diminished, the threat of investment 
failure was growing. Yet in order to maintain such high returns some companies were faced with 
having to resort to risky business behaviour. Aggressive leveraging became common practice. 
The banks encouraged their customers to take loans in foreign currencies and would lend them 
up to 100% of the value of a house. According to Blum (2008) the crisis was caused by changes 
in the make-believe world of finance capitalism. The market believed value was being created, 
but in fact excessive growth is more like a machine which does not produce anything and the 
value created never materialised in any real value for the economy. Even though people like 
Sigurður Einarsson, chairman of the board of Kaupthing Bank, said ‘We take intelligent risk’, 
the risk was there.  Probably it was not such an intelligent risk they took after all and not just 
Kaupthing Bank, but everybody in Iceland, was trapped 
 
New Generation of Managers 
With increased globalisation (and different schools of thought) the mindset of a lot of managers 
changed. Leveraging to increase assets became an accepted practice both in business and private 
life. But the mindset of the managers was not the only thing that changed. There was also a 
change in the people running the companies.  We saw a new generation of managers. The banks 
were privatised, ownership of many companies changed and new managing directors could be 
seen, young well-educated managers. As the banks changed from a stable, government-run 
environment to a more dynamic environment, their competitive advantage became to react 
quicker than the competitor. Icelandic companies began an aggressive growth strategy through 
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FDIs yet, according to a study by Greening and Johnson (2006), firms whose top managers' time 
and energy is devoted to managing acquisition and divestment activities are more likely to 
experience crisis events.  If we look at the managers and the chairmen of the companies that 
invested the most around 2005 and 2006 we see that there have been some changes since then.  
The name of the CEOs and the chairman of the board can be seen in table 1. 
 
Table 1: CEOs and chairmen who ran Icelandic companies in 200623 
 
 
Source:  author data 2006. 
 
There have been a lot of changes in only a year or so.  For companies like Actavis, FL group, 
Glitnir, Kaupthing, Landsbankinn and many others, a lot has changed since they started the 
internationalisation of their firms.  The managers and the chairmen of these companies are all 
gone and new persons have taken over. The Icelandic government took over the three big banks 
in Iceland, Kaupthing, Glitnir and Landsbankinn in October 2008.  Baugur Group went bankrupt 
in March 2009 and many other companies are today facing a lot of problems.  As we can see in 
                                                 
23 Age of the CEOs and the chairman of the board of the companies can be found in table 5 in the Appendix of the thesis. 
Company CEOs Chairman of the board
Actavis Róbert Wessman Björgólfur Thor Björgólfsson
Alfesca Xavier Govare Ólafur Ólafsson
HF Eimskipafélag Íslands (Avion Group) Magnús Þorsteins Magnús Þorsteins
Bakkavör Ágúst Guðmundsson Lýður Guðmundsson
Baugur Group Jón Ásgeir Jóhannesson Hreinn Loftsson
Eimskip Baldur Guðnason Magnús Þorsteins
FL Group Hannes Smárason Skarphéðinn Berg
Flaga Group David Baker Bogi Pálsson
Fons Pálmi Haraldsson Pálmi Haraldsson
Glitnir Bjarni Ármannsson Einar Sveinsson
Hampiðjan Jón Guðmann Pétursson Bragi Hannesson
Icelandic Group Björgólfur Jóhannesson Magnús Þorsteins
Kaupþing Hreiðar Már Sigurðsson Sigurður Einarsson
Kögun Bjarni Birgisson Örn Karlsson
Landsbankinn Sigurjón Árnason Björgólfur Guðmundsson
Marel Hörður Árnason Árni Oddur Þórðarson
Norvik Jón Helgi Guðmundsson Jón Helgi Guðmundsson
Plastprent hf Sigurður Bragi Guðmundsson Ásgeir Thoroddssen
Promens Ragnhildur Geirsdóttir Geir A. Gunnlaugsson
Samskip Ásbjörn Gíslason Ólafur Ólafsson
Össur Jón Sigurðsson Niels Jacobsen
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table 1, there is only one woman in charge in these companies.  Usually the CEOs are men and 
the board of directors are usually a group of three, five or seven men, with possibly one or two 
women.  Since March 2009 Kaupthing, which was the largest company in Iceland, has had a 
board of five women.  There is no man on the board, unheard of in Iceland.  This is very unusual, 
and from the corporate governance perspective, it will be interesting to see what kind of changes 
will be made and how the board will perform in the future. 
 
External Factors 
There are without a doubt many external factors that supported the growth in Iceland. One of the 
most powerful forces in the evolution was when Iceland joined the European Economic Area in 
1994 and thereby adopted the legislation relating to the so-called ‘freedom of four’ (Tómasdóttir, 
Ólafsson, Óladóttir, Thorláksson and Thorsteinsson, 2007). By joining the EEA, Iceland gained 
access to the internal market of the EU and therefore took a big step towards integration into the 
global economy. The fact that Iceland had to adapt to the EEA rules and legislation as well as to 
ensure obligations according to the agreement was a big factor in enabling the economy to grow. 
This is because the adaptations to the Icelandic regulations that affect business, for example 
legislation regarding mergers, state monopolies, cartels, abuse of dominant positions, had the effect 
of increasing Iceland’s competitiveness as the legislation regarding business became more parallel 
with that of the European markets (Tómasdóttir, Ólafsson, Óladóttir, Thorláksson and 
Thorsteinsson, 2007). This meant that financial institutions had the opportunity to expand to other 
countries within the European Economic Area and had the same rights and responsibilities as other 
countries within the area. This really gave their growth great dynamism (Tómasdóttir, Ólafsson, 
Óladóttir, Thorláksson and Thorsteinsson, 2007; Danielsson and Zoega, 2008).  
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It was not only the deregulation or change in legislation, however, that made the growth of 
Icelandic companies possible. There were of course other factors that supported the growth. With 
the turn of the century a golden era began worldwide Global economic growth was high and an 
unusual situation was created in global financial markets where interest rates were lower than they 
had been for a century and capital seemed to be unlimited. The result was that the Icelandic 
financial institutions as well as other Icelandic companies were able to take advantage of what 
seemed to be endless resources of cheap capital to boost their growth with a high degree of 
leverage (Tómasdóttir, Ólafsson, Óladóttir, Thorláksson and Thorsteinsson, 2007). 
The Icelandic nation was not the only one that believed in the Icelandic growth and what was 
behind it. Credit rating agencies all around the world gave the Icelandic banks good ratings, which 
made it even easier for them to get cheap capital and enter into the bond market. All of a sudden 
the nation that had been depending on fish had become a modern country that was a popular 
member in the world of market capitalism (Danielsson and Zoega, 2008).  Other factors are a 
limited home market, the growth of pension funds in Iceland, access to finance and other factors. 
 
Limited Home Market   
In the last ten years or so, Iceland’s advance on foreign markets has been a rapid process, caused 
by a number of domestic factors. The local market (and population) of Iceland is very small and 
companies felt they needed to expand to other countries in order to become competitive 
(Oladottir, 2009). Trade barriers and legislation were not very strict with regard to this and the 
privatisation of the banking system provided new sources of financing for companies wishing to 
expand operations abroad. In addition to that, an increasing proportion of the young workforce 
had been educated abroad, bringing with them international knowledge and an entrepreneurial 
mindset (Tomasdottir, Ólafsson, Óladóttir, Thorláksson and Thorsteinsson, 2006).  
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Privatisation of Banks 
The two state-owned banks, Landsbanki and Búnaðarbanki, were privatised in stages between 
1999 and 2003. FBA (which later merged with Íslandsbanki) was privatised between 1998 and 
1999. The development of banks and firms abroad was made possible by the state’s efforts at 
privatisation. The total assets of the Icelandic banking system grew from approximately 120% of 
GDP in 2001 to more than 500% at the end of 2006. By any standard, this is a high figure, but it 
would be higher if assets of subsidiaries were included. The privatisation of the banking system 
is one of the factors that created incentives to invest abroad (Tómasdóttir, Ólafsson, Óladóttir, 
Thorláksson and Thorsteinsson, 2007). When the banks changed from being state-owned to 
being owned mainly by private investors and pension funds their main aim became shareholder 
return and profitability on investment. The shareholders encouraged senior management of the 
banks with generous share option schemes which in certain cases comprised both call and put 
options (Glitnir, 2007) meaning that senior management was rewarded when the share price went 
up, but had no downside risk. This encouraged the management of the banks to expand the 
bank’s balance sheet aggressively, with the belief that a larger institution would produce larger 
profits and hence share price expansion. First, the liability side of the bank’s balance sheet was 
largely provided by international wholesale funding activities, later to be boosted by 
international retail deposits.  The banks also raised funding from bond issues listed on the 
Icelandic Stock exchange (Kaupthing, 2007).  Significant buyers of the bonds were both pension 
funds and mutual funds managed by the investment management companies of the bank (Glitnir, 
2008).  The extent of the wholesale funding led to obvious re-financing risk (Barclays Capital 
Research, 2006), not only in terms of being able to obtain new funding upon the maturity of their 
debt, but also in terms of pricing risk owing to changes in the international interest rate 
environment. On the asset side of the balance sheet the banks needed to invest their finance once 
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achieved. This led to large investments in Icelandic domiciled companies wishing to expand 
overseas, such as Baugur and Bakkavör (BusinessTimes online, 2009).  In many instances the 
Icelandic banks secured the riskier junior and mezzanine positions in the financing of their 
Icelandic customers’ international loans (Glitnir, 2007) meaning that in the event of a loan 
default, the Icelandic banks would be ranked behind many of the other suppliers of financing. 
Also, in the apparent rush to satisfy their clients, the banks prided themselves on being quick and 
flexible in their decision-making (BusinessTimes Online, 2009).  This may, in hindsight, point to 
internal procedural and risk management issues, where the granting of loans was not thoroughly 
analysed and approved as should have been the case. The Icelandic banks borrowed too much, 
and invested heavily in risky asset purchases, with their balance sheets showing excessive 
growth. 
 
Pension Funds  
The Icelandic pension system is composed of a tax-financed public pension scheme (pillar 1), 
mandatory funded occupational pension schemes (pillar 2) and increasing voluntary private 
pension savings (pillar 3).  Iceland has the largest per capita pension fund in the world. The 
growth in pension funds’ assets took off during the period between 1979 and 1986 when 
indexation and free interest rates were introduced. With the liberalisation of the financial system 
the distribution of assets became less restricted and pension funds had more choices of 
investment. Strong demand by the pension funds for financial instruments along with new 
opportunities for supplying securities triggered a vibrant market for securities in Iceland 
(Tómasdóttir, Ólafsson, Óladóttir, Thorláksson and Thorsteinsson, 2007).  Much to the envy of 
many other countries Iceland’s pension fund system was well-structured and well-managed. 
Over the last decade the total assets of the pension funds grew to over 120% of the GDP by 
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2006. This figure stood at 50% of the GDP in 1994. The pension fund system was an important 
force behind increased FDI by Icelandic companies in the last few years. The funds served as 
major investors in most of Iceland’s largest companies and created massive liquidity and savings 
(Tómasdóttir, Ólafsson, Óladóttir, Thorláksson and Thorsteinsson, 2007). Compared with other 
countries, these pension funds are not highly regulated and can therefore provide capital for 
investments.    
 
Access to Finance 
Apart from Iceland, the interest rates in the developed world had become considerably lower 
than the interest rates found in Iceland. Investors used this to their advantage by borrowing 
money from the US, EU, UK, Switzerland, and Japan, and then lending it to others at a higher 
rate against increasingly poor collateral. 
 
Interests of Politicians in the Business Sector 
Until this century the banking system consisted of relatively large state-run banks along with a 
couple of privately-owned banks. The financial system was characterised by political interference 
and severe restrictions, with politicians representing the banks’ boards and decisions on loans often 
made on the basis of a person’s political affiliation. The three largest banks each ‘belonged’ to a 
separate political party. This political structure can also be seen in the Central Bank, with each of 
the three governors representing one of the main political parties. Therefore, the Central Bank has 
always been closely linked to the government, which has often raised doubts about its 
independence and has reduced its credibility (Danielsson and Zoega, 2008). 
Even though politics and business are not as intertwined now and decisions on loans are no longer 
ruled by party affiliation there are considerable connections. There are many examples of 
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politicians or politically appointed people with interests in some of the banks or publicly listed 
companies prospering. One can imagine that when politicians are directly connected to the 
financial sector and have interests in some specific banks or companies it is very difficult for them 
to be neutral in decision-making owing to clashes of interest.  
 
Regulation Framework and Supervision 
It is the legal responsibility of both the Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) and the Central 
Bank of Iceland to ensure that a certain financial stability is present in the economic system of 
Iceland. In order to make that possible these organisations need to have legal competence and good 
access to information on the institutions that are under their supervision to prevent instability in the 
banking and financial sector. The obligatory tasks of the FSA should, for example, be regular 
gathering of information concerning the operations and finances of parties subject to supervision 
which should give an overview of the situation in specific areas of the financial market as well as 
an indication about the performance of individual firms. The FSA should also act as a supervisory 
party with a range of specific on-site investigations conducted in the case of individual firms; it 
should also deal with various communications from parties subject to supervision regarding their 
operating licences and interpretation of laws and regulations relating to their operations.  The FSA 
has the responsibility for investigating and supervising 109 pension funds, commercial banks, 
insurance companies, securities companies and so forth, many of which have vast operations 
spread around the world.  The institutional and supervisory environment lagged behind the 
development in the banking sector as it seems that neither the FSA nor the Central Bank had the 
ability, the autonomy or the manpower to pursue their duties with necessary actions. The bottom 
line is that the supervision was not kept in line with the growth of the banking sector (Danielsson 
and Zoega, 2008). Furthermore, there is even evidence that the companies that were supposed to be 
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supervised by the FSA were able, in a sense, to manipulate the institution, as the supervisory 
institution itself participated in marketing efforts of internet savings accounts in Holland only a few 
months before the economic collapse in Iceland. Within the banks the regulatory framework 
appears to have failed as there was nobody from outside the bank to make sure that it was upheld. 
This happened in the US as well, where the lack of supervision of mortgage loans created the 
infamous sub-prime loan crisis (Zuckerman, 2008). 
 
Monetary Policy 
In 2001, Iceland adopted a monetary policy similar to that of Europe and the United States by 
focusing on inflation targets. Inflation, however, remained higher than the target rate, prompting 
the Central Bank to increase interest rates repeatedly from 5.3% in 2003 to 18% at the beginning of 
2009. There are many explanations as to why the inflation target was not successful but the inflow 
of foreign currencies is the most prominent. The comparatively high interest rates in Iceland 
compared with international currencies tempted private homes and companies to take out loans in 
foreign currencies. Because of the Central Bank’s poor track record of keeping inflation under 
control the higher interest rates had limited effects on long-term rates which reflect inflation 
expectations (Danielsson and Zoega, 2008).  The high interest rates attracted foreign investors to 
take loans in low-yielding currencies such as the Japanese yen and Swiss franc and buy Icelandic 
kronas. If the currency exchange rate remained stable the holder of Icelandic kronas expected to 
make significant profits. This was known as the carry trade. The success of the carry trade strategy 
became a self-fulfilling prophecy, and led to an increased demand for kronas, which in turn fuelled 
the appreciation of the currency (Danielsson and Zoega, 2008). If compared internationally the 
Central Bank of Iceland would be considered as a weak institution. Around the time of the 
economic collapse the currency reserves of the Central Bank were 3.5 billion dollars which was 
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around 30% of the GDP. That in itself is a very high ratio if compared internationally. For example, 
the currency reserves in Sweden were merely 7% of the GDP at the end of 2007. When all short-
term liabilities of the Icelandic banks are considered as a percentage of the GDP, however, it is 
clear that the currency reserves were far too small. The debt of the financial sector at the beginning 
of 2008 was 211% of the GDP, which left the Central Bank with little or no means to maintain 
financial stability and back the financial sector up (Financial Times, 2008).  
 
Simple and Efficient Tax System 
One of the things that made Iceland an attractive place for investors was the fact that the corporate 
income tax was reduced from 51% in 1991 to 18% in 2002, and today it is 15% (Haarde, 2004).  
The tax on capital gains is flat in Iceland or 10% (Bill to Congress no. 90/2003). This is one of the 
things that have made the tax system in Iceland simple and attractive.  It has not only attracted 
foreign investments but also made it more attractive for Icelandic investors to stay in Iceland. That 
is, to have a home base in Iceland and expand from there instead of moving their headquarters 
abroad. 
Definition of Yesterday’s Business Model 
The roots of what is now called Yesterday’s Business Model, or the business model of the boom 
period, can be traced back to the fact that valuations of companies emerging from the downturn 
which ended in late 2002 were very low.   There was a considerable amount of money in 
circulation, interest rates fell from just under 7% to just below 4% in 2002 and there was 
straightforward access to foreign funding.  There was generational shift in many companies 
(owners – family owned companies, retired or did not have the financial clout to buy out other 
people).  The business model was based on acquiring companies which were performing quite 
well at a low EBITDA multiple.  Many companies were consequently divided into real estate 
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companies or management companies.  The Icelandic banks were quick to take advantage of this 
and it was initially highly profitable.  What the banks did was to:  
(a) Identify investment opportunities,  
(b) Provide funding for acquisitions  
(c) List the companies on the stock exchange and offer the sellers private banking services.   
If the owners of the bank sold the companies, then the bank received deposits, managed these 
funds and the company's EBITDA began to increase.  People got involved in mergers, 
acquisitions and various streamlining measures.  Companies were set up (holding companies) 
which were leveraged, subsidiaries were then refinanced and the excess capital was then used to 
buy other companies and the ‘gearing’ used as equity in transactions.  Gradually these multiples 
began to increase and equity accumulated in the holding companies, forming opportunities to 
provide further loans for investments in other companies. 
Some acquired companies were listed but others were private and they were acquired in Iceland 
and abroad, almost exclusively in leveraged buy-outs, i.e. no new equity was usually injected 
into the company, and if this was done then it was often injected into the original holding 
company or the first management company.  When the Icelandic banks grew, they transferred 
this business model to their foreign operations and kept on going. This is a highly risk-seeking, 
fee-driven model in which fees were charged all the way along the line.  
Theoretical Differences in Firm Growth Measures 
Although empirical reviews on organisational growth are numerous, researchers have recently 
noted some important inconsistencies in findings. In a study of 193 companies, Weinzimmer, 
Nystrom, and Freeman (1998) found that the explanation could be found in the different 
approaches used to measure growth.  Whereas some researchers chose to look only at changes in 
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sales, others would look at the number of employees, the value of assets, dividends paid, or 
return on investment.  As if that is not confusing enough, they also found that the researchers 
chose different methods of analysing the data. Some focused on quarterly reports, others on the 
mean change between years. Some used relative numbers, others absolute, and yet others would 
look at the overall change between the start and end of a chosen period.  
Comparing results from research with completely different research methods can range from 
being demanding to simply impossible when, for example, one is faced with comparing growth 
in relative sales of one company with growth in number of employees in another. Scholars have 
therefore struggled to find a ‘one-best-way’ solution to measure growth and have suggested that 
research should strive towards finding one way or a few ways, of measuring organisational 
growth. As a result, many have resorted to using Gibrat’s model of growth from 1933. His model 
is the simplest way of measuring organisational growth and assumes that (1) growth is 
independent of company size and (2) it is uncorrelated in time. His model has since been rejected 
empirically but is still used by many for lack of an alternative (Stanley et al., 1996).  
It has been suggested by Delmar, Davidsson,and Gartner (2003) that different types of 
companies should in fact be measured differently. According to their study of over 11,000 listed 
companies in Sweden it is apparent that high-growth companies grow in different ways. They 
defined seven growth strategies which can be roughly divided by industry, age, size, and 
governance (affiliation with a company group vs. independent). They concluded that, by 
ignoring the differences in an organisation’s internal and external environment, scholars ignore 
the fact that organisational growth is not a simple number, but rather a multidimensional 
approach. 
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Difference in Types of Organisational Growth 
Although theoretical implications suggest that dissimilar companies should be measured 
differently, that is not to say that companies end up with a particular growth pattern at random. 
Instead, how companies grow is related to the characteristics of these companies and their 
environment (Delmar, Davidsson and Gartner 2003). Andrew J. Sherman has written seventeen 
books on the legal and strategic aspects of business growth and capital formation and 
consequently has extensive knowledge of the subject. Through his experience he believes that 
the key question which all companies face at one point or another is how and when to grow 
(Sherman, n.d.). One way of answering HOW to grow is to start by defining the different types 
of organisational growth into internal and external growth. Internal growth could happen through 
specialisation and increased sales, by the introduction of new products or services, or through 
diversification – while still maintaining the old. An example of internal growth could therefore 
be when a company optimises its manufacturing production which increases sales while still 
keeping the same number of employees. External growth, on the other hand, can be 
accomplished through acquisitions, joint ventures, or vertical integration (Dalton and Kesner, 
1985).  
Empirical Research on how Growth Relates to Performance 
Dalton and Kesner (1985) suggest that absolute size, whether obtained through internal or 
external growth, is not correlated to the financial performance of companies.  They also note that 
if a merger is undertaken in order to increase profits, it is usually unsuccessful in doing so, and 
economies of scale cannot explain the sheer size of some companies. Therefore, whereas in some 
cases growth results in higher levels of performance, at some point the formula is reversed and 
the growth of a business begins to exceed the benefits of its size and performance decreases. The 
‘optimal’ size of a business may therefore be well below the ‘actual’ size. As size increases, so 
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does complexity, until the point when the company becomes unmanageable (Dalton and Kesner, 
1985.).  
This raises the question why, if a merger will not increase profits and economies of scale 
will eventually cease to be a good reason for growth, some companies continue to grow at the 
phenomenal rate witnessed in Iceland.  Dalton and Kesner (1985) suggest that pure size in itself 
was in fact a desirable state for some and that with size come other benefits such as more pay, 
challenge, and prestige for top management. When the top management consists of the owners, 
Eichner (1987) found that it becomes a natural instinct to try to maximise the short-term benefits, 
regardless of the long-term effects this might have on the organisation (as cited in Shapiro, 
1990). ‘Fast growth - Quick profits’ may therefore become the epitome of Yesterday’s Business 
Model in the future. 
It would be extremely interesting to see the relationship between growth and companies’ 
performance.  We have not been able to find any empirical research on the relationship between 
growth and company performance.  As stated earlier, there is little direct evidence of a 
relationship between actual size and performance. The growth strategy chosen by a company 
may, however, be directly linked to its performance. At least we have not found any evidence in 
the literature which states otherwise. In order to analyse whether the growth strategies of 
companies affect their performance it is necessary to compare the form of growth with 
measurements of performance. 
 
Measurements of Growth 
There are different measurements of growth.  To use a single growth measure would probably 
provide only one aspect of a company’s growth. Multiple measures and methods for exploring 
organisational growth are also important for an understanding of a company’s growth process. 
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According to the research done by Delmar, Davidsson and Gartner (2003), it is necessary to 
measure different forms of growth with different growth measures. Classifying how companies 
grow helps to us to understand their growth strategies. Ultimately, however, it will be the 
owners’ and managers’ strategies and objectives that determine a company’s growth.  As 
Yesterday’s Business Model, in the context of this study, has been defined as aggressive growth 
through FDI, it follows that the Icelandic companies grow mainly through foreign acquisitions.  
As such, they should all show signs of a strong positive development in absolute sales and in 
number of employees, but negative development in organic employment, indicating that growth 
is achieved mainly through acquisitions.  
Financial Crisis 
The whole world is now facing a financial crisis.  Some economies are experiencing a worse 
situation than others and Iceland is one of them.  Financial crises can be damaging and 
contagious, prompting calls for swift policy responses which has been very loud in Iceland.  The 
financial crises of the past have led affected economies into deep recessions and sharp current 
account reversals. Some crises turned out to be contagious, rapidly spreading to countries with 
no apparent vulnerabilities. Among the many causes of financial crises has been a combination 
of unsustainable macroeconomic policies; including large current account deficits and 
unsustainable public debt, excessive credit booms, large capital inflows, and balance sheet 
fragilities, combined with policy paralysis owing to a variety of political and economic 
constraints. In many financial crises currency and maturity mismatches were a salient feature, 
whereas in others off-balance sheet operations of the banking sector were prominent (Laeven and 
Valencia, 2008).   
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To choose the best way of resolving a financial crisis and accelerating economic recovery is far 
from unproblematic. There has been little agreement on what constitutes best practice or even 
good practice. Many approaches have been proposed which have tried to resolve systemic crises 
more efficiently. Some of these differences may arise because objectives of the policy advice 
have varied. Some have focused on reducing the fiscal costs of financial crises, others on 
limiting the economic costs in terms of lost output and on accelerating restructuring, still others 
on achieving long-term, structural reforms. Trade-offs are likely to arise between these 
objectives (Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven, 2003; Hoelscher and Quintyn, 2003; Honohan and 
Laeven, 2005).  Governments may through certain policies consciously incur large fiscal outlays 
in resolving a banking crisis, with the objective of accelerating recovery, or structural reforms 
may be politically feasible in the context of a severe crisis with large output losses and high 
fiscal costs (Laeven and Valencia, 2008).   
Discussion and Conclusion 
In the contextual framework of this thesis, we distinguished certain key characteristics of 
Icelandic MNCs. These characteristics are labelled as the three Ss, which stand for scope, speed 
and specificity (Óladóttir, 2009). Scope reflects OFDIs that are intended to capitalise on a strong 
customer base and reputation. Building on Dunning (1988), scope reflects primarily asset-related 
ownership advantages (Oa). In this sense, the MNC (in this case the Icelandic MNC) either 
exploits its existing ownership advantages or acquires, instead of generating, foreign proprietary 
assets in order to meet the pressures of international competition. Scope reflects the 
interdependence between ownership advantages and location/market advantages (Dunning, 
1988: 4) and, contrary to Dunning, actually explains not only common ownership but also the 
mapping of the location of the subsidiary network of the MNC. Recent work by Rugman and 
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Verbeke (2004), and also empirical work related to the OFDI of small countries, does suggest 
that MNCs show a particular regional pattern in the spread of their subsidiary network. It is 
consequently logical to assume that scope bridges common ownership with the location choice 
and identity of foreign subsidiaries (Óladóttir, 2009). 
Speed assesses the efficiency of investment execution, from target screening to deal-making and 
purchase. Speed falls primarily into a transaction ownership advantage (Ot) as it reflects 
efficiency in the internal decision-making process and coordination implementation. If we extend 
the argument, speed also captures internalisation advantages (I) as it reflects the effectiveness of 
management control (Dunning, 1988: 12, Figure 1). Internalisation theory suggests that the 
growth of an MNE may be the result of cross-border transactions providing a more macro view 
of OFDI. If a micro view of OFDI is taken, then the ultimate focus will be on the quality of a 
specific managerial decision (Dunning, 2000). In such a case, the experience of the manager, and 
the strategic goals of the firm alongside its O advantages, as well as the L advantages, result in 
very complex and specific investment decisions. Speed in a contemporary context elicits the 
contribution of corporate governance scholars who explicitly address the role of boards in the 
decision and implementation of strategic investment, and it also stresses the role of institutions as 
a distinctive location factor in monitoring the impact of management processes. At the same 
time, speed is related to the internationalisation model of MNCs. Efficient management 
processes should be evaluated in terms of the pool and quality of information surrounding the 
prospective OFDI. This could eventually explain either a gradual or more aggressive foreign 
market entry. It also explains the ‘born global’ nature of many Icelandic MNCS (Óladóttir, 
2009). Speed is a clear characteristic of Icelandic FDI. Investment execution, from the target 
screening to the deal-making and purchase, of Icelandic companies seems to have been very fast 
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(Óladóttir, 2009).  Finally, specificity assesses the OFDI in terms of its relative position among 
its competitors. Thus, it provides a supply-side element of the OFDI project that Icelandic firms 
look into when they invest abroad, as they need to augment their competitive advantages. 
Specificity, like scope, reflects mainly Oa advantages. Unlike scope, however, specificity reflects 
the potential for asset-generating ownership advantages and thus embodies the characteristic of 
dynamic ownership advantages. Specificity incorporates the elements of uniqueness and 
stickiness and thus non-replicability (Hymer, 1960). MNCs from small countries would mostly 
tend to acquire unique assets abroad, as their foreign operations would play a more extensive role 
in the internationalisation process compared with headquarters. Foreign operations are also more 
exposed to global competition compared with domestic operations and thus are more sensitive in 
assessing the dynamic context of the Oa necessary for sustainable competition. Thus, the third 
characteristic of the Icelandic investments is specificity, where investment focus seems to be 
very narrow, i.e. Icelandic companies seem to follow an investment pattern (or strategy) of 
obtaining a leading position and size in a given market niche. It is important to note that, for 
scope and specificity, the unit of analysis is the firm, whereas for speed the unit of analysis is the 
manager and/or the Board of Directors (Óladóttir, 2009). 
It is safe to say that the Icelandic business environment has changed a lot in the last ten to 
fifteen years.  Very dramatic changes have taken place from 1998 to 2008.  The Icelandic banks, 
as mentioned earlier, were privatised between 1998 and 2002, which was one of the most 
influential factors in the aggressive growth of Icelandic firms in the same time period.  In 2008 
the Icelandic bank, however, became state-owned again, which led to discussion of Yesterday’s 
Business Model, something that exists no longer.  In those ten years the Icelandic firms grew at a 
very fast pace in terms of assets, revenues and employees.  Regardless of which measurement is 
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used, it was an aggressive growth from a small domestic base.   A likely explanation of the 
companies’ success is the managerial aspect of the growth. Investment management and risk 
evaluation in relation to the high level of leverage as well as other factors have played a 
significant role in managing the rapid growth of these companies.  Let us call them bad morals. 
Related to the changes in managers’ mindset is the view that the Icelandic companies 
were riddled with bad morals. Fast profits and short-term growth were put before the long-term 
well-being of companies. Some companies even created subsidiaries whose primary goal was 
withdrawing money from the parent company (although official explanations were different). 
The parent company suffered heavy losses, but the owners of the subsidiary gained millions in a 
short space of time. According to the law, these practices are legal, but they definitely test our 
understanding of moral behaviour.  Another question is whether we were living in a culture 
bubble.  We could say that Icelanders are used to living in an unpredictable world. Many 
believed the fluctuations in the market were a natural occurrence, when others began to become 
more risk-averse. A common expression in Iceland has always been ‘Everything will work itself 
out’. In this regard the mindset of Icelanders is different from that of many others. When warning 
signs from various analysts were pouring in, Icelanders simply shrugged them off as the paranoid 
imaginings of people who simply did not understand the ‘Icelandic way of doing business’, or 
even as jealousy.   There is no doubt that the Icelandic business landscape was characterised by 
over-aggressive growth through FDI:  aggressive risk-taking actions, cross-ownerships, lack of 
supervision from authorities, leveraged capital structures, heavy borrowing, easy access to 
capital and competitive aggressiveness with the will to become large in the global market.  The 
so-called model is most definitely something that was but is no longer.  The fact is that we saw 
aggressive external growth.  It was impressive growth on the balance sheet but usually the 
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growth was not solid and in some instances, not all, it was purely fake.  As the bottom line, 
Iceland grew faster than any other small economy in the world.  The country led the world 
investment report list in a few years, something that should have been impossible for such a 
small country, but the managers, the government, the public in Iceland have, we hope, learned 
that aggressive growth through FDI is perhaps not the best way for the economy to grow.  The 
country has a lot to offer.  It should slow down, restrict the scope of its investments and focus on 
their specificity. 
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Implications for Further Research 
 
There are many interesting research topics that has arrised after October 2008 when the Icelandic 
economy collapsed.  Here few are mentioned. 
The Core Competences of the Economy 
Nothing seems to be irrelevant for Icelandic investors.  If we look at the strengths of the 
economy, the fishing industry and renewable energy are the main resources.  In about three 
decades Iceland has gone from relying on imported coal for 75 per cent of its energy needs to 
meeting 82 per cent of its needs today with renewable sources. Iceland  now imports oil only to 
power the nation’s vehicles and its fishing fleet and the country intends to run entirely on 
renewable energy sources by 2050. ‘We see Iceland as the world’s laboratory for a decarbonised 
future’, said Iceland’s foreign minister, Össur Skarphéðinsson in an television interview. A 
volcanic island, Iceland has a relatively easy path to that future because it benefits from 
geothermal heat to power steam generators for electricity. The country is also now exporting its 
geothermal know-how to China and other nations as the world gears up to exploit deeper sources 
of geothermal energy.  There is much potential for the economy to recover fast from the financial 
crisis that has hit the whole world but Iceland the worst.  Iceland could become a leading country 
by focusing on its specificity, by focusing on the core competence of the nation, and by focusing 
on niche markets. 
What Really Happened in Iceland 
Future research should focus on what really happened in Iceland. Can we blame it all on the 
Icelandic banks and on the útrásarvíkingar, meaning the Icelandic managers who organised and 
managed the aggressive growth of the Icelandic firms in a relatively few years?  Iceland as has 
been highlighted many times before as one of the smallest economies in the world whose 
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investments were way above the capacity of the economy itself.  We can see that the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, Denmark and many other countries are facing difficulties at the 
moment but they have the critical mass and the connections they need.  Icelandic investors and 
Icelandic firms, however, have invested enormously in the foreign financial sector, food 
industry, pharmaceuticals, airlines, insurance and real estates, orthopaedics, media, retail of all 
kinds, and telecommunications,  
Measuring Performance 
Measuring how the Icelandic companies performed would be very valuable for the future.  
Indicators of company performance can be obtained through various formulas and financial 
ratios which have stood the test of time in the financial industry. In order to analyse a possible 
relationship between the growth of a company and its performance it is necessary to look at how 
a company is performing at the same time as it is growing. If a company’s stock price, ROE, and 
revenues are growing at the same pace as the company size it indicates that the growth strategy 
has a positive effect on company performance and vice versa. If there is no apparent relationship 
between growth and performance then it may also indicate that the excessive growth of some of 
the Icelandic companies was not the only factor in their downfall and that in fact there may be 
other, more confounding, factors which led to their demise. 
Corporate Governance and Cross-Ownership 
Future research should also focus on ownership and corporate governance in general in Iceland 
and of course in other countries.  There is a question mark over the actual independence of 
Icelandic companies’ boards.  Cross-ownership is another subject for further research.  If we 
look at companies like Marel and Actavis, which have been discussed before, we can relate them 
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both to Landsbanki today.  Who actually owns these companies?  How leveraged are they after 
this aggressive growth? 
Regulations and Supervision 
The rules and regulations are properly the subject of other research, as is the question of what the 
Central Bank of Iceland, the Financial Supervisory Authority and the Icelandic government, have 
done in past years to support the economy and to make sure that the foreign direct investments of 
these Icelandic firms were not as aggressive as they have been.  Did they do their job or were 
they sleeping during the years when the Icelandic economy grew beyond its strength?   
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Appendix 1.  
 
Table 1. Information about the Icelandic MNCs used as a background in various papers 
 
 
Table 2. Employees and number of countries in 2006 
Used as a background in various papers 
 
 
 
  
Company Industry Established First greenfield investment The first acquisition
Actavis Generic pharmaceutical 1956 2003 1999
Alfesca Convinience food 1932 1980 1990
Avion Group Transportation and logistics 2005 n/a 2005
Bakkavör Convinience food 1986 1994 1999
Baugur Group Retail and real estate 1989 1999 2001
Eimskip Transportation and logistic 1914 1915 1991
FL Group Investment company 2005 n/a 2005
Flaga Group Sleep diagnostic and services 1988 2003 2002
Fons Investment company 2002 n/a 2005
Glitnir Commercial and investment bank 2000 2003 2000
Hampiðjan Manufacturing 1934 1990 1997
Icelandic Group Seafood company 1942 1945 1955
Kaupþing Investment and commercial bank 1982 1998 2001
Kögun Information technology 1988 2001 2001
Landsbankinn Commercial and investment bank 1886 2005 2002
Marel Manufacturing in high tech industry 1983 1985 1997
Norvik Retail 1962 1993 2002
Plastprent hf Plastic manufacturing 1957 n/a 2003
Promens Plastic manufacturing 1984 1996 1999
Samskip Transportation and logistics 1990 1993 1998
Össur Manufacturer of prosthetic and orthotic devices 1971 1995 2000
Company Employees 1999/2000 Employees 09/2005 Employees 06/2006 Employees in Iceland 2006 Employees outside of Iceland 2006 Operation in nr of countries 2006
Actavis 146 7000 10000 500 9500 30
Alfesca 1700 2400 3500 6 3494 5
Avion Group 0 4400 6500 1500 5000 14
Bakkavör 300 13000 16008 8 16000 7
Baugur Group 1225 52000 62000 10600 51400 4
Eimskip 1200 1370 1500 1050 450 16
FL Group 0 8 16 12 4 3
Flaga Group 54 235 210 7 203 5
Fons 0 50000 0 0 0 n/a
Glitnir 860 1082 1232 937 305 8
Hampiðjan 400 537 527 108 419 10
Icelandic Group 1255 2700 3293 57 3236 13
Kaupþing 205 2317 2500 1050 1450 10
Kögun 55 917 1500 800 700 6
Landsbankinn 977 1121 1725 1139 586 12
Marel 543 836 1400 380 1020 15
Norvik 700 2560 3000 1700 1300 4
Plastprent hf 150 560 420 120 300 3
Promens 0 1300 1600 70 1530 14
Samskip 681 1550 1440 650 790 22
Össur 112 912 1300 235 1065 7
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Table 3. Turnover from abroad in 2006 
Used in paper 2 The Internationalization from a small domestic base 
 
 
 
  
Company Turnover abroad in 2006
Actavis 95%
Alfesca 99,80%
Avion Group 76,90%
Bakkavör 99,90%
Baugur Group 82,90%
Eimskip 30%
FL Group 25%
Flaga Group 96,60%
Glitnir 24,50%
Hampiðjan 79,50%
Icelandic Group 98,20%
Kaupþing 58,00%
Kögun 46,60%
Landsbankinn 33,90%
Marel 72,80%
Norvik 43,30%
Plastprent hf 71,40%
Promens 95,60%
Samskip 54,80%
Össur 81,90%
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Table 4. Changes in number of employees from 2000-2006 
Information used in paper 2, The Internationalization from a small domestic base. 
 
 
  
Company Year 2000 Year 2006
Actavis 146 10000
Alfesca 1700 3500
Avion Group 0 6500
Bakkavör 300 16008
Baugur Group 1225 62000
Eimskip 1200 1500
FL Group 0 16
Flaga Group 54 210
Glitnir 860 1232
Hampiðjan 400 527
Icelandic Group 1255 3293
Kaupþing 205 2500
Kögun 55 1500
Landsbankinn 977 1725
Marel 543 1400
Norvik 700 3000
Plastprent hf 150 420
Promens 0 1600
Samskip 681 1440
Össur 112 1300
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Table 5. Age of the CEOs and the chairman of the boards of the Icelandic MNC (since 2006) 
Used as a background information in various papers regarding young age of Icelandic managers. 
 
 
 
  
Company CEOs Age Chairman of the board Age
Actavis Róbert Wessman 39 Björgólfur Thor Björgólfsson 39
Alfesca Xavier Govare 49 Ólafur Ólafsson 49
Avion Group Magnús Þorsteins 45 Magnús Þorsteins 45
Bakkavör Ágúst Guðmundsson 42 Lýður Guðmundsson 39
Baugur Group Jón Ásgeir Jóhannesson 39 Hreinn Loftsson 51
Eimskip Baldur Guðnason 41 Magnús Þorsteins 45
FL Group Hannes Smárason 39 Skarphéðinn Berg 43
Flaga Group David Baker 52 Bogi Pálsson 44
Fons Pálmi Haraldsson 47 Pálmi Haraldsson 47
Glitnir Bjarni Ármannsson 38 Einar Sveinsson 58
Hampiðjan Jón Guðmann Pétursson 48 Bragi Hannesson 75
Icelandic Group Björgólfur Jóhannesson 51 Magnús Þorsteins 45
Kaupþing Hreiðar Már Sigurðsson 36 Sigurður Einarsson 46
Kögun Bjarni Birgisson 43 Örn Karlsson 48
Landsbankinn Sigurjón Árnason 41 Björgólfur Guðmundsson 66
Marel Hörður Árnason 44 Árni Oddur Þórðarson 37
Norvik Jón Helgi Guðmundsson 60 Jón Helgi Guðmundsson 60
Plastprent hf Sigurður Bragi Guðmundsson 49 Ásgeir Thoroddssen 65
Promens Ragnhildur Geirsdóttir 36 Geir A. Gunnlaugsson 64
Samskip Ásbjörn Gíslason 37 Ólafur Ólafsson 49
Össur Jón Sigurðsson 50 Niels Jacobsen 50
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Table 6. Examples of investment of the Icelandic MNC 
 
Part of the data that author collected during his Ph.D study. 
 
Note: due to a certain circumstances, not all the investments are included in the list. 
 
Acquirer Target Type of 
investment 
Year Country Industry
Actavis Balkanpharma Acquisition 1999 Bulgaria Manufacturing
Actavis Pharmamed Acquisition 2001 Malta Manufacturing
Actavis Zdravlje Acquisition 2002 Serbia Manufacturing
Actavis UNP Acquisition 2002 Denmark Manufacturing
Actavis Velefarm Acquisition 2003 Serbia Manufacturing
Actavis Colotech Acquisition 2003 Denmark Manufacturing
Actavis Fako Acquisition 2003 Turkey Manufacturing
Actavis Pharmaco Inc Greenfield 2003 USA Manufacturing
Actavis N/A Greenfield 2003 Sweden Manufacturing
Actavis Pliva Pharma 
Nordic Acquisition 
2004 Finland Manufacturing
Actavis Pliva Pharma 
Nordic Acquisition 
2004 Norway Manufacturing
Actavis Biovena Acquisition 2004 Poland Manufacturing
Actavis Higia Acquisition 2005 Bulgaria Manufacturing
Actavis Pharma 
Avalanche Acquisition 
2005 Czech 
Republic 
Manufacturing
Actavis Ophtha Acquisition 2005 Denmark Manufacturing
Actavis Kéri Pharma Acquisition 2005 Hungary Manufacturing
Actavis Lotus Acquisition 2005 India Manufacturing
Actavis Alpharma Acquisition 2005 Norway Manufacturing
Actavis Lorabid Acquisition 2005 Sweden Manufacturing
Actavis Amide Acquisition 2005 USA Manufacturing
Actavis Sindan Acquisition 2006 Romania Manufacturing
Alfesca N/A Greenfield 1980 UK Manufacturing
Alfesca N/A Greenfield 1986 Germany Manufacturing
Alfesca N/A Greenfield 1989 Italy Manufacturing
Alfesca NordMorue Acquisition 1990 France Manufacturing
Alfesca N/A Greenfield 1990 Spain Manufacturing
Alfesca N/A Greenfield 1996 Japan Manufacturing
Alfesca Sans Souci 
Seafood Ltd. Acquisition 
1997 Canada Manufacturing
Alfesca Gelmer S.A Acquisition 1997 France Manufacturing
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Alfesca N/A Greenfield 1997 Spain Manufacturing
Alfesca J.B. Delpierre Acquisition 1998 France Manufacturing
Alfesca N/A Greenfield 1998 Brasil Manufacturing
Alfesca Christiansen 
Partner a.s  Acquisition 
1999 Norway Manufacturing
Alfesca E & J Armengol 
s.a Acquisition 
1999
Spain 
Manufacturing
Alfesca E & J Armengol 
s.a Acquisition 
2002
Spain 
Manufacturing
Alfesca Lyons seafood Acquisition 2003 UK Manufacturing
Alfesca Labeyrie Group 
Acquisition 
2004 France Manufacturing
Alfesca N/A Agency N/A UK Manufacturing
Alfesca N/A Greenfield N/A France Manufacturing
Avion Group Excel airways 
Acquisition 
2004 UK Services
Avion Group Excel airways  
Acquisition 
2004 UK Services
Avion Group Shannon MRO 
Acquisition 
2004 Ireland Services
Avion Group The Really Great 
Holiday Company 
Acquisition 
2005 UK Services
Avion Group Casino Express 
Acquisition 
2005 USA Services
Avion Group Tech-Log 
Acquisition 
2005 UK Services
Avion Group Star Airlines 
Acquisition 
2006 France Services
Avion Group Aero Flight 
GmbH & Co Acquisition 
2006 Germany Services
Bakkavör Bakkavör UK Ltd 
Greenfield 
1994 UK Seafood
Bakkavör N/A 
Greenfield 
1997 France Convenience 
food 
Bakkavör Lysekil 
Havsdelikatesser 
Acquisition 
1999
Sweden 
Convenience 
food 
Bakkavör Comptoir Du 
Caviar Acquisition 
1999 France Seafood
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Bakkavör Pesquera Isla Del 
Rey Acquisition 
2000 Chile Seafood
Bakkavör Vine & Dine 
Acquisition 
2000 UK Convenience 
food 
Bakkavör Norpol Sp. Z.o.o   
Acquisition 
2000 Poland Seafood
Bakkavör Bakkavör Finland 
OY Greenfield 
2001 Finland Convenience 
food 
Bakkavör Katsouris Fresh 
food Acquisition 
2001 UK Convenience 
food 
Bakkavör N/A 
Greenfield 
2002 UK Convenience 
food 
Bakkavör Geest Plc 
Acquisition 
2004 UK Convenience 
food 
Bakkavör Hitchen Foods 
Acquisition 
2005 UK Convenience 
food 
Bakkavör Geest Plc 
Acquisition 
2005 UK Convenience 
food 
Bakkavör Creative Foods 
Acquisition 
2006 China Convenience 
food 
Bakkavör New Primebake 
Acquisition 
2006 UK Convenience 
food 
Bakkavör Laurens 
Patisseries Acquisition 
2006 UK Convenience 
food 
Baugur SMS Greenfield 1999 Faroe Islands Services
Baugur Bonus dollar 
stores Greenfield 
1999 USA Services
Baugur Arcadia Acquisition 2001 UK Services
Baugur Bill’s Dollar 
Stores Inc 
(sameinað) Acquisition 
2001 USA Services
Baugur House of Fraser 
Acquisition 
2002 UK Services
Baugur Sommerfield Acquisition 2002 UK Services
Baugur LXB Group 
Limited Acquisition 
2003 UK Services
Baugur Julian Graves Acquisition 2003 UK Services
Baugur Oasis Acquisition 2003 UK Services
Baugur Hamleys Acquisition 2003 UK Services
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Baugur Big Food Group 
Acquisition 
2003 UK Services
Baugur Magazin du Nord 
Acquisition 
2004 Denmark Services
Baugur MK One Acquisition 2004 UK Services
Baugur Goldsmiths Acquisition 2004 UK Services
Baugur Karen Millen Acquisition 2004 UK Services
Baugur Shoe studio Group 
Acquisition 
2004 UK Services
Baugur Merlin Acquisition 2005 Denmark Services
Baugur Keops Acquisition 2005 Denmark Services
Baugur Illum Acquisition 2005 Denmark Services
Baugur Mappin &Webb 
Acquisition 
2005 UK Services
Baugur Whittard of 
Chelsea Acquisition 
2005 UK Services
Baugur MW Group 
Limited Acquisition 
2005 UK Services
Baugur Woodward 
Foodservice Acquisition 
2005 UK Services
Baugur Jane Norman Acquisition 2005 UK Services
Baugur Big Food Group 
Acquisition 
2005 UK Services
Baugur Atlas Ejendomme 
Acquisition 
2006 Denmark Services
Baugur Nordicom 
Ejendomme AS 
Acquisition 
2006 Denmark Services
Eimskip N/A Greenfield 1915 Denmark Services
Eimskip N/A Greenfield 1946 USA Services
Eimskip N/A Greenfield 1983 Netherlands Services
Eimskip N/A Greenfield 1985 USA Services
Eimskip N/A Greenfield 1986 Germany Services
Eimskip N/A Greenfield 1986 Sweden Services
Eimskip N/A Greenfield 1990 Canada Services
Eimskip N/A Greenfield 1990 Faroe Islands Services
Eimskip MGH Ltd Acquisition 1991 UK Services
Eimskip N/A Greenfield 1991 Latvia Services
Eimskip N/A Greenfield 1994 Estonia Services
Eimskip N/A Greenfield 1995 Russia Services
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Eimskip N/A Greenfield 1995 Russia Services
Eimskip N/A Greenfield 1996 Norway Services
Eimskip Anderson 
shipping AB Acquisition 
1997
Sweden 
Services
Eimskip Giske Shipping Acquisition 1999 Norway Services
Eimskip Malenstein Air 
BV Acquisition 
1999 Netherlands Services
Eimskip N/A Greenfield 1999 Belgium Services
Eimskip N/A Greenfield 2000 Canada Services
Eimskip Pelican Cargo Ltd. 
Acquisition 
2000 UK Services
Eimskip Eimskip Denmark 
A/S Greenfield 
2001 Denmark Services
Eimskip Faroe ship Acquisition 2004 Faroe Islands Services
Eimskip 
Cold Store & 
Transport Group Acquisition 2004
Norway Services
Eimskip N/A Greenfield 2004 China Services
Eimskip 
Eimskip Reefer 
Logistics BV Greenfield 2004
Netherlands Services
Eimskip P/F Heri Thomsen 
Acquisition 
2005
Faroe Islands 
Services
Eimskip Daalimpex Acquisition 2005 Netherlands Services
Eimskip N/A Greenfield 2005 Spain Services
Eimskip N/A Greenfield 2005 USA Services
Eimskip Farmaleiðir Acquisition 2006 Faroe Islands Services
Eimskip Kursiu Linija Acquisition 2006 Lithuania Services
Eimskip Innovate Ltd Acquisition 2006 UK Services
FL GROUP Sterling 
Acquisition 
2005 Denmark Services
FL GROUP Easyjet Portfolio 
Investment 
2005 UK Services
FL GROUP Finnair Portfolio 
Investment 
2005 Finland Services
FL GROUP Bang og Olufsen 
Acquisition 
2006 Denmark Services
FL GROUP Royal Unibrew 
Acquisition 
2006 Denmark Services
FL GROUP Refresco Holding 
B.V Acquisition 
2006 Netherlands Services
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FL GROUP Aktiv Kapital 
Acquisition 
2006 Norway Services
FL GROUP  EasyJet Portfolio 
Investment 
2004 UK Services
FL GROUP  EasyJet Portfolio 
Investment 
2004 UK Services
FL GROUP  Easyjet Portfolio 
Investment 
2005 UK Services
FL GROUP  Easyjet Portfolio 
Investment 
2005 UK Services
FL GROUP - 
Loftleiðir 
International Air 
Bahama 
Acquisition 
1969 Bahamas Services
Flaga Group Medcare 
Diagnostics Acquisition 
2002 USA Manufacturing
Flaga Group 
Midwest Sleep& 
Neurodignostic  Acquisition 
2003 USA Manufacturing
Flaga Group N/A 
Greenfield 
2003 Germany Manufacturing
Flaga Group SleepTech LLC 
Acquisition 
2004 USA Manufacturing
FLGROUP FL Group 
Denmark asp Greenfield 
2006 Denmark Services
Fons Iceland Acquisition 2004 UK Manufacturing
Fons Maersk Acquisition 2005 Denmark Manufacturing
Fons Sterling Acquisition 2005 Denmark Manufacturing
Fons Fly me Acquisition 2005 Sweden Manufacturing
Fons Booker Acquisition 2005 UK Manufacturing
Fons Zeta display 
Portfolio 
Investment 2005 Sweden 
Manufacturing
Fons 
Woodward 
Foodservice Acquisition 2005
UK Manufacturing
Glitnir Raphael & Sons 
Acquisition 
2000 UK Services
Glitnir N/A Greenfield 2003 Luxembourg Services
Glitnir Kredittbanken Acquisition 2004 Norway Services
Glitnir N/A Greenfield 2005 Denmark Services
Glitnir Bank2 Acquisition 2005 Norway Services
Glitnir FactoNor Acquisition 2005 Norway Services
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Glitnir  Bnbank Acquisition 2005 Norway Services
Glitnir N/A Greenfield 2006 Canada Services
Glitnir N/A Greenfield 2006 China Services
Glitnir 
Fischer Partners 
Fondkommision Acquisition 2006 Sweden 
Services
Hampiðjan N/A Greenfield 1990 Portugal Manufacturing
Hampiðjan N/A Greenfield 1995 Namimbia Manufacturing
Hampiðjan Hampidjan NZ 
Ltd  Acquisition 
1997 New Zealand Manufacturing
Hampiðjan Hampidjan USA 
Ltd  Acquisition 
1997 USA Manufacturing
Hampiðjan Hafi Acquisition 1999 Norway Manufacturing
Hampiðjan Cosmos Trawl Acquisition 2001 Denmark Manufacturing
Hampiðjan Gundrys Ltd Acquisition 2002 Ireland Manufacturing
Hampiðjan Swan Net Acquisition 2002 Ireland Manufacturing
Hampiðjan N.P. Utzon A/S 
Acquisition 
2003 Denmark Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
N/A 
Greenfield 
1945 USA Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
N/A 
Greenfield 
1946 Netherlands Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
N/A 
Greenfield 
1947 USA Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
N/A 
Greenfield 
1948 Czech 
Republic 
Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
N/A 
Greenfield 
1954 USA Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
Snax(Ross) Ltd. 
Acquisition 
1955 UK Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
N/A 
Greenfield 
1956 USA Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
Kaupir frystihús 
Acquisition 
1957 UK Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
N/A 
Greenfield 
1958 UK Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
N/A 
Greenfield 
1967 USA Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
N/A 
Greenfield 
1968 UK Manufacturing
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Icelandic 
Group 
N/A 
Greenfield 
1978 USA Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
N/A 
Greenfield 
1981 Germany Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
Brekkes Ltd 
Acquisition 
1986 UK Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
N/A 
Greenfield 
1989 France Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
Icelandic Freezing 
plants 
corporations Greenfield 
1990 Japan Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
N/A 
Acquisition 
1995 UK Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
N/A 
Greenfield 
1996
Spain 
Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
Árnes Europe 
Greenfield 
1999 Netherlands Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
Scandsea 
Acquisition 
1999
Sweden 
Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
Fishery Products 
International Ltd. 
Acquisition 
2000 Newfoundland Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
Fisher Foods, 
Redditch Acquisition 
2002 UK Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
Barogel S.A. 
Acquisition 
2003 France Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
Neptune Fisheries 
í Norwalk 
Acquisition 
2003 USA Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
Ocean to Ocean 
Acquisition 
2003 USA Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
Comigo Geneco 
Acquisition 
2004 France Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
Coldwater 
Seafood UK Ltd. 
Acquisition 
2004 UK Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
Cavaghan & Gray 
Seafood Acquisition 
2004 UK Manufacturing
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Icelandic 
Group 
Seachill Ltd 
Acquisition 
2004 UK Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
Icelandic China 
Greenfield 
2004 China Manufacturing
Icelandic 
Group 
Ecomsa S.A 
Acquisition 
2005
Spain 
Manufacturing
Kaupthing N/A Greenfield 1998 Luxembourg Services
Kaupthing N/A Greenfield 2000 Denmark Services
Kaupthing N/A Greenfield 2000 Faroe Islands Services
Kaupthing N/A Greenfield 2000 Sweden Services
Kaupthing N/A Greenfield 2000 Switzerland Services
Kaupthing N/A Greenfield 2000 USA Services
Kaupthing Sofi Financial 
Services Oyj Acquisition 
2001 Finland 
Services
Kaupthing Handsal Asset 
Management 
S.A.R.L Acquisition 
2001 Switzerland 
Services
Kaupthing Aragon Holding 
AB. Acquisition 
2002
Sweden Services
Kaupthing Tyren Holding AS 
Acquisition 
2003 Norway 
Services
Kaupthing JP Nordiska Acquisition 2003 Sweden Services
Kaupthing BMY Corporate 
Finance Limited 
Acquisition 
2003 UK 
Services
Kaupthing N/A Greenfield 2004 UK Services
Kaupthing FIH Acquisition 2004 Denmark Services
Kaupthing PFA Pension 
Luxembourg Acquisition 
2004 Luxembourg 
Services
Kaupthing Singer & 
Friedlander Acquisition 
2005 UK 
Services
Kaupthing Capital markets Greenfield 2006 UK Services
Kaupthing  Norvestia Oyj Acquisition 2003 Finland Services
Kaupthing  A. Sundvall AS Acquisition 2004 Norway Services
Kögun N/A Greenfield 2004 Latvia Services
Kögun Commitment Data 
Acquisition 
2005 Denmark 
Services
Kögun NN Acquisition 2005 USA Services
Kögun SCS Inc Acquisition 2006 USA Services
Kögun  Hands ASA Acquisition 2005 Norway Services
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Kögun (OK) Datapoint Svenska 
AB Acquisition 
2001
Sweden Services
Kögun (OK) N/A 
Greenfield 
2001 Denmark 
Services
Kögun (OK) Delta Consulting 
Acquisition 
2003 Denmark 
Services
Kögun (OK) Delta Teamco 
Acquisition 
2003 Denmark 
Services
Kögun (OK) Virtus AB 
Acquisition 
2003
Sweden Services
Kögun (OK) DataRex A/S 
Acquisition 
2004 Denmark 
Services
Kögun WorkIT Acquisition 2005 Denmark Services
Landsbankin
n 
Heritable Bank 
Acquisition 
2000 UK Services
Landsbankin
n 
Heritable Bank 
Acquisition 
2002 UK Services
Landsbankin
n 
Bunadarbankinn 
International SA Acquisition 
2003 Luxembourg Services
Landsbankin
n 
Kepler Equities 
Acquisition 
2005 France Services
Landsbankin
n 
Merrion Capital 
Group Acquisition 
2005 Ireland Services
Landsbankin
n 
Key Business 
Finance 
Corporation plc Acquisition 
2005 UK Services
Landsbankin
n 
Teather & 
Greenwood Acquisition 
2005 UK Services
Landsbankin
n 
N/A 
Greenfield 
2005 UK Services
Marel Marel Enquipment Greenfield 1985 Canada Manufacturing
Marel N/A Greenfield 1991 USA Manufacturing
Marel N/A Greenfield 1996 Denmark Manufacturing
Marel Marel USA Greenfield 1996 USA Manufacturing
Marel Carnitech Acquisition 1997 Denmark Manufacturing
Marel Marel UK Greenfield 1998 UK Manufacturing
Marel Arbor  Acquisition 2000 France Manufacturing
Marel TVM 
Maschinenbau Acquisition 
2000 Germany Manufacturing
Marel OL-Tool 
Production Aps Acquisition 
2001 Denmark Manufacturing
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Marel  CP Food 
Machinery a/s Acquisition 
2001 Denmark Manufacturing
Marel N/A Greenfield 2002 Australia Manufacturing
Marel N/A Greenfield 2003 Chile Manufacturing
Marel Marel Russia Greenfield 2003 Russia Manufacturing
Marel Marel Spain Greenfield 2003 Spain Manufacturing
Marel Röscherwerke 
GmbH Acquisition 
2004 Germany Manufacturing
Marel Dantech Food 
PTE Acquisition 
2005 Singapore Manufacturing
Marel n/a Acquisition 2005 Slovakia Manufacturing
Marel Marel Carnitech 
Tailand Greenfield 
2005 Thailand Manufacturing
Marel AEW Delford Acquisition 2006 UK Manufacturing
Norvik N/A Greenfield 1993 Latvia Services
Norvik CED Sia Acquisition 2002 Latvia Services
Norvik N/A Greenfield 2002 UK Services
Norvik Continental Wood 
Products Acquisition 
2005 UK 
Services
Norvik Wayland Timber 
Products Ltd Acquisition 
2005 UK 
Services
Norvik N/A Greenfield 2005 Latvia Services
Norvik Norwood Greenfield 2005 Russia Services
Plastprent Unifleks Acquisition 2003 Latvia Manufacturing
Plastprent Plastpaks Acquisition 2004 Latvia Manufacturing
Plastprent Gerove Acquisition 2004 Lithuania Manufacturing
Promens Sæplast India Greenfield 1996 India Manufacturing
Promens Dyno Acquisition 1999 Canada Manufacturing
Promens Dyno Acquisition 1999 Norway Manufacturing
Promens Atlantic Island Acquisition 2000 Norway Manufacturing
Promens Nordic supplies 
Containers AS Acquisition 
2000 Norway Manufacturing
Promens Sæplast Holland 
Greenfield 
2000 Netherlands Manufacturing
Promens Sæplast Asia Greenfield 2001 Hong Kong Manufacturing
Promens Icebox Plastico Acquisition 2002 Spain Manufacturing
Promens Sæplast UK Greenfield 2003 UK Manufacturing
Promens Sæplast Vietnam 
Greenfield 
2003 Vietnam Manufacturing
Promens Plasti - Ned Acquisition 2003 Netherlands Manufacturing
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Promens Sæplast China Greenfield 2005 China Manufacturing
Promens Elkhart Plastics 
Inc Acquisition 
2006 USA Manufacturing
Promens Sæplast 
Philippines Greenfield 
2006 Philippines Manufacturing
Promens hf  Bonar plastics  Acquisition 2005 UK Manufacturing
Samskip n/a Greenfield 1993 Denmark Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 1993 Denmark Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 1995 Netherlands Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 1995 UK Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 1996 USA Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 1997 Norway Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 1997 Norway Services
Samskip Bischoff Group Acquisition 1998 Germany Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 1999 Norway Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 1999 Sweden Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 2000 Germany Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 2000 Sweden Services
Samskip Sotra Europa 
Transport Acquisition 
2002 Germany 
Services
Samskip Silver Sea AS Acquisition 2002 Norway Services
Samskip TECO Lines Acquisition 2003 Estonia Services
Samskip Van Dieren 
Maritime Acquisition 
2003 Netherlands 
Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 2003 Belgium Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 2003 Netherlands Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 2003 Norway Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 2003 Korea Services
Samskip Nedshipping Liner 
Agencies BV 
Acquisition 
2004 Netherlands 
Services
Samskip Seawheel Acquisition 2004 UK Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 2004 China Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 2004 China Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 2004 Faroe Islands Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 2004 Germany Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 2004 Germany Services
Samskip Seawheel Acquisition 2004 UK Services
Samskip Geest North Sea 
Line Acquisition 
2005 Netherlands 
Services
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Samskip n/a Greenfield 2005 Estonia Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 2005 Latvia Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 2005 Lithuania Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 2005 Ukrania Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 2005 Vietnam Services
Samskip Kloosterboer Acquisition 2005 Netherlands Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 2006 Spain Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 2006 Sweden Services
Samskip Safari Transport Acquisition 2006 Faroe Islands Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 2006 Brasil Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 2006 Brasil Services
Samskip n/a Greenfield 2006 Korea Services
Össur N/A Greenfield 1994 USA Manufacturing
Össur N/A Greenfield 1995 UK Manufacturing
Össur Pi Medical  and 
Karlsson & 
Bergstom Acquisition 
2000
Sweden 
Manufacturing
Össur Flex Foot Acquisition 2000 USA Manufacturing
Össur Century XXII Acquisition 2000 USA Manufacturing
Össur N/A Greenfield 2000 Netherlands Manufacturing
Össur N/A Greenfield 2000 Sweden Manufacturing
Össur N/A Greenfield 2000 USA Manufacturing
Össur N/A Greenfield 2000 USA Manufacturing
Össur Capod systems Acquisition 2002 Sweden Manufacturing
Össur Linea Orthopedics Acquisition 2003 Sweden Manufacturing
Össur Generation II Acquisition 2003 USA Manufacturing
Össur GBM Medical AB Acquisition 2005 Sweden Manufacturing
Össur Innovative 
Medical Product 
Holdings Acquisition 
2005 UK Manufacturing
Össur Royce Medical 
Holding, Inc Acquisition 
2005 USA Manufacturing
Össur N/A Greenfield 2005 Australia Manufacturing
Össur Innovation Sports 
Inc Acquisition 
2006 USA Manufacturing
Össur  N/A Greenfield 1995 Luxembourg Manufacturing
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Appendix 2.  
Questions  asked in cooperation with Gallup in Iceland in 2006, used in paper 2, The 
Internationalization from a small domestic base. 
 
q1)   All/single answer 
Does your company operate only in Iceland, in Iceland and one other country or in Iceland 
and several other countries? 
1ٱ Only in Iceland 
2ٱ In Iceland and one other country 
3ٱ In Iceland and several other countries 
4ٱ Refuses to answer 
5ٱ Does not know 
 
q2)   All/single answer 
Has your company bought a ruling shareholder position in a company abroad during the 
last 12 months? 
1ٱ Yes 
2ٱ No 
3ٱ Refuses to answer 
4ٱ Does not know 
 
q3)   Those that have not bought a ruling shareholder position in a company during the last 12 months 
But has your company considered buying a ruling shareholder position  in a company 
abroad during the next 12 months? 
1ٱ Yes 
2ٱ No 
3ٱ Refuses to answer 
4ٱ Does not know 
 
 
q4)   All/single answer 
Which do you believe to be better for your company, to buy a relatively large company and 
high growth potential or to buy a smaller company and grow slower? 
1ٱ Large company 
2ٱ Smaller company 
3ٱ Both 
4ٱ Refuses to answer 
5ٱ Does not know 
 
 
q5)   Those that have bought a ruling shareholder position in a company abroad / Multiple answer allowed 
What is the motivation behind buying a company abroad? Is it access to a market, access to 
distribution channels, access to knowledge, access to a workforce, increased revenue or 
increased profit? 
1ٱ Access to a market 
2ٱ Access to distribution channels 
3ٱ Access to knowledge 
4ٱ Access to a workforce 
5ٱ Increased revenues 
6ٱ Increased profit 
7ٱ Other – What? 
8ٱ Refuses to answer 
9ٱ Does not know 
 
q6)   Those that have bought a ruling shareholder position in a company abroad / Single answer 
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How does your company finance the growth abroad?  Through loans or equity. 
1ٱ Loans 
2ٱ Equity 
3ٱ Combination of loans and equity 
4ٱ Other methods – what? 
5ٱ Refuses to answer 
6ٱ Does not know 
 
q7)   If answered ”1” or ”3” in q. 6 / Single answer 
Are the loans borrowed from domestic or foreign loan institutions? 
1ٱ Domestic loan institutions 
2ٱ Foreign loan institutions 
3ٱ Combination of domestic and foreign loan institutions 
4ٱ Refuses to answer 
5ٱ Does not know 
 
q8)   All / Open question 
What do you believe to be the key for success in growing the company abroad? 
1ٱ Open question – list everything 
2ٱ Refuses to answer 
3ٱ Does not know 
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